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EXECUTIVE SUMMARY 
Introduction 
Context and aims  
This report was commissioned by the Equality and Human Rights Commission to 
inform its Human Rights Inquiry. The Commission is carrying out the inquiry under its 
statutory duties under the Equality Act 2006 to: 
• Promote understanding of the importance of human rights 
• Encourage good practice in relation to human rights 
• Promote awareness, understanding and protection of human rights, and 
• Encourage public authorities to comply with the Human Rights Act (HRA) 
(section 9 of the Equality Act).1 
 
The report covers England and Wales. It aims to:  
• Explore the impact of the outcome of a number of strategic human rights 
legal cases on a range of public authorities in England and Wales 
• Explore with service providers from different sectors whether and how the 
principles established in these cases have been incorporated into policy and 
practice 
• Explore the positive impact within these sectors of implementing human 
rights principles, and 
• Identify the barriers that prevent or obstruct the use of human rights 
principles in these sectors.2  
 
 
1 http://www.equalityhumanrights.com/en/projects/humanrightsinquiry/Pages/ 
HumanrightsInquiry.aspx. The inquiry includes several strands of evidence gathering including a 
call for written evidence, inquiry panels and research projects on 'the impact of human rights 
culture on public sector organisations: lessons from practice' and 'the role and experience of 
inspectorates in promoting human rights in public services'. 
2  Case law is just one among a number of mechanisms that facilitate implementation of the HRA 
among public authorities. Others include the training of public authorities, advocacy by and on 
behalf of service users, guidance to public authorities, and the use of levers like 
inspectorates and inquiries.  
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The selected cases   
Cases brought under the Human Rights Act and at the European Court of Human 
Rights (ECHR) were selected because, among other criteria, they relate to an 
underlying human rights principle which is applicable to a range of different sectors 
and because they are strategic decisions, in that the judgments have implications for 
many people and could require changes to commonplace policy and/or practice. The 
cases are:  
• Osman v UK, No. 23452/94, Judgment of 28 October 1998 / Osman v UK 
(2000) 29 EHRR 245 
• A cluster of five cases involving vulnerable detainees and Article 2, the right to 
life3 
• Price v UK (2001) 34 EHRR 128 
• R (Limbuela and Others) v Secretary of State for the Home Department [2005] 
UKHL 66, 3 November 2005 
• R v East Sussex County Council Ex parte A, B, X and Y [2003] EWHC 167 
• Bernard v Enfield LBC [2003] HRLR 4 
 
Methodology   
Interviews: Our research used qualitative methods; we conducted 65 individual in-
depth interviews and engaged 12 people in two focus group discussions. The choice 
of interviewees was driven by the particularities of each case. For East Sussex and 
Bernard, we concentrated on service directors, operational managers and frontline 
practitioners in local authorities. The cases of Osman, Price, Limbuela and the 
detainees cluster have implications both for national policy and guidance and for 
operational practice; we spread our interviews between the national, regional and 
local levels accordingly.  
We have engaged (via interviews and a questionnaire) with frontline police officers, 
and those who train them, to explore how the Osman judgment has impacted upon 
routine practice. In the prison sector, we interviewed national level policy officers and 
practitioners responsible for delivering healthcare in prisons; however, research 
constraints prevented us from interviewing prison governors or officers.   
                                            
3  Keenan v UK (2001) 33 EHRR 38; R (on the application of Middleton) v Coroner for the Western 
District of Somerset [2004] 2 AC 182; R (on the application of Amin) v S/S for the Home 
Department [2004] 1 AC 653; R (on the application of Wright) v S/S for the Home Department 
[2001] 1 Lloyd’s Rep Med 478; [2001] EWHC Admin 520; 2001 WL 606447; Edwards v UK 
(2002) 35 EHRR 19. 
 
We also obtained the views of organisations that have specialised knowledge or 
experience relating to the cases and the sectors they affect, both from the 
practitioner and service user perspective.  
Surveys: We did three surveys of senior operational figures within local authorities - 
directors of adults’ and children’s social services (17 responses), directors of housing 
(24 responses) and directors of legal services (36 responses). These are not 
statistically robust but provide a useful corrective to the anecdotal experience in our 
interviews.  
Literature: We refer to both published and unpublished material, including guidance, 
policies, “on the ground” research and material produced by civil society groups, 
professional associations and other interested bodies. 
Protecting life: Osman v UK 
 
SUMMARY: Case law is a significant part of the policy development process within 
policing. Many policing policies, as well as practical options for protecting life, are 
informed by the case of Osman. Awareness of the case is high among police, 
although concern is sometimes expressed as to whether awareness translates into 
understanding.  
In Osman, the ECHR established criteria for when authorities had failed in their 
obligations to protect life. The court held that in order to show a violation of the 
positive obligations of Article 2 it is necessary to establish that “the authorities knew 
or ought to have known at the time of the existence of a real and immediate risk to 
the life of an identified individual or individuals from the criminal acts of a third party 
and that they failed to take measures within the scope of their powers, which, judged 
reasonably, might have been expected to avoid that risk”.  
Nearly 10 years on, Osman principles have become part of policing policy and 
practice across a range of areas – indicating acceptance of the underlying principles 
of the case and their applicability to a range of situations wider than those examined 
by the court. Further, Osman is referred to in documents on standards by which 
police forces are assessed. 
The process by which cases are integrated into policy involves both national and 
local level “scanning” – by the National Policing Improvement Agency (NPIA) and by 
individual forces. The sources that both NPIA and forces draw upon are wide. As well 
as case law they include the Association of Chief Police Officers (ACPO), Her 
Majesty’s Inspectorate of Constabulary, government ministries, the Independent 
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Police Complaints Commission (IPCC), professional journals and the experiences of 
individual forces.  
Some interviewees noted that reference to case law features in their dissemination of 
policy changes. Interviewees emphasised the importance of using a variety of 
methods to disseminate policy changes, including those derived from case law. Our 
interviewees spoke of using training, email, intranets and face-to-face meetings.  
The majority of the 43 police forces of England and Wales have in place policies on 
handling threats or risks to life. Senior police officers state that such policies derive 
directly from the obligations of Article 2 of the ECHR and from Osman. An 
examination of a selection of these policies confirms this.4 Policies are put into 
practice using a wide variety of preventive measures. These include “Osman 
warnings”, which are sent by police to individuals whose lives the police have reason 
to believe are at risk.  
This project interviewed a number of individuals working in the area of prison 
healthcare, where the Osman principles could be expected to be particularly relevant. 
In contrast to those working in policing most of those interviewed had not heard of 
Osman. However, on being told the broader principles of the case – all said that it 
accorded with their understanding of their obligations under Article 2.  
There is a high level of awareness among the police we interviewed of the Osman 
case and its principles, as well as clear examples of its imprint on policy and practice. 
However some interviewees sounded caution about using case names as short-hand 
for particular principles which could encourage a “tick box” approach to 
implementation.  
The rights of detainees: Keenan, Middleton, Amin, Wright and Edwards  
 
SUMMARY: We have discerned few clear chains of impact: the issues that arose in 
these cases are complex and are affected by fundamental structural change as well 
as lower level policy change. However, in some policies cases are explicitly identified 
as driving forces. Where the cases concern the investigative obligation it is easier to 
identify an impact within the broader legal system.  
The cases of Keenan, Middleton, Amin, Wright and Edwards all involve deaths in 
prison custody. They build on the principles of the Osman case – applying them in a  
 
 
5
                                            
4  This project examined the publicly available policies of the Metropolitan Police, Devon and 
Cornwall Constabulary, West Mercia Constabulary, and Leicestershire Constabulary. In some 
cases these are to be read in conjunction with other, confidential, documents that this project was 
not able to examine. This project was also provided with the confidential text of one other policy. 
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different context. Further, they establish principles of their own. The cases we have 
selected each have a different focus. Keenan involved a suicide in custody of an 
individual with mental illness. Middleton concerned the investigative obligations 
triggered by a suicide in prison. Wright involved an individual who died from an 
asthma attack. The Amin judgment was concerned with the investigative obligations 
of Article 2 following the killing of Zahid Mubarek by his cell-mate. The case of 
Edwards also involved a killing by a cell-mate; in this case both individuals had 
mental health problems, and the judgment discussed both the investigative 
obligations and the preventive measures that might have been taken to avert the risk 
to life. 
The impact of these cases is variable and difficult to discern given the multiple 
initiatives to reduce deaths in custody. Asked about the role of case law and human 
rights law generally in policy formation, interviewees frequently said other drivers 
were more significant. Asked about their role in motivating good practice, 
interviewees associated with prisons said that values such as decency were more 
important. Interviewees associated with healthcare provision were keen to embrace 
human rights but often expressed uncertainty about how to do so.  
Prison policy and practice are governed by rules, regulations and guidelines in the 
form of the Prison Rules, Prison Service Orders (PSOs) and Prison Service 
Instructions (PSIs).5  
The case of Keenan resulted in changes to the PSO on segregation.6 The changes 
were explicitly linked to the case and cited by the government as steps taken to 
address the violation of Article 3 found in Mark Keenan’s case.  
The case of Middleton was identified by coroners and experts as having had a 
concrete impact on coroners’ verdicts, with a notable increase in the use of narrative 
verdicts, although all our interviewees spoke of the impact being geographically 
variable.  
 
5  Individual prisons are obliged to comply with PSOs and PSIs, however, they use them as the 
basis for local policies, guidelines and practices. The review process to which PSOs and PSIs are 
subject takes into account a variety of sources – including case law – but also including 
legislation, best practice, learning from previous incidents and recommendations from inquiries.  
 
6  Another instance where a direct link is identifiable between a case and policy changes, as 
reflected in PSOs, is the “prison babies” case (R [on the application of P and Q] v S/S for the 
Home Department [2001] EWCA Civ 1151). PSO 4801 on the Management of Mother and Baby 
Units notes: “in a few (legal) cases we have accepted the need to modify our approach and MBU 
staff have been informed of developments as they arose”. The PSO goes on to cite the case and 
reflects its findings in the section on age limits.  
 
In some cases it is possible to identify an indirect impact on policy and practice. The 
Amin case, for example, resulted in the Mubarek inquiry. The inquiry gave rise to 88 
recommendations about relevant areas of policy and practice. In parallel the death of 
Zahid Mubarek is cited as giving rise to policy changes before the inquiry took place. 
Police interviewees told this project that the inquiry led them to review custody 
policies – though often the outcome was that little needed changing. The aspects of 
the Wright case that dealt with the investigative obligations also resulted in an 
inquiry.  
The cases – especially Edwards and Wright – had implications for healthcare 
provision. Here there have been substantial changes in policy and practice. 
Responsibility for healthcare in prisons has moved to the NHS. Healthcare related 
prison policies – especially those on mental healthcare - have also evolved. Our 
interviewees all noted that both these factors had resulted in improvements in 
healthcare provision. However the link to our selected cases is uncertain. 
Interviewees cited more fundamental concerns as having driven the changes. 
The positive obligation to address difference: Price v UK 
 
SUMMARY: Policy documents on disability and detention draw on a variety of 
sources to facilitate better practice. These include the Disability Discrimination Act 
2005 (DDA) which has brought some of the issues raised in Price into sharper focus. 
However, we have not seen evidence of a distinct human rights focus - or the case 
of Price - as a driver for change in this area.    
Price, who is four-limb deficient, spent a night in a Lincolnshire police cell which was 
wholly unsuited to her needs and dangerous to her health, before being transferred 
to prison. The court found a violation of Article 3. Separate opinions held that the 
“primary responsibility” for the violation lay with the judicial authorities for not 
ensuring that adequate facilities existed, and that to avoid unnecessary hardship, 
Price should have been treated differently from others because her situation is 
significantly different.   
We have found no indication that Price has had a discernable impact on policy or 
practice in the police or prison services. 
A policy manager in Lincolnshire Police said the force could not locate files on the 
case nor trace ways in which lessons were learned, however, the case “would not 
happen now”. A Custody Policy was put in place in 2006 – five years after Price. The 
policy reflects the national Guidance on the Safer Detention and Handling of Persons 
in Police Custody and the force’s own Disability Equality Scheme. Measures are now 
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in place to integrate learning from case law, complaints and the work of other forces. 
The force also undertakes a human rights appraisal for all policies. There is no 
indication that Price was a driver behind these changes. 
Police personnel from other forces we interviewed were largely unaware of Price. 
Many viewed the circumstances of the case as unusual and said current policy and 
legislation would prevent the situation recurring. The DDA, the national Safer 
Detention guidance and the Home Office Police Custody Buildings Design Guide – 
all subsequent to Price – were noted by interviewees as likely to forestall a 
recurrence. However, we cannot explicitly link this legislation and guidance to Price: 
driving forces and source material for them are multiple. 
The Safer Detention guidance notes that officers must determine if an individual is fit 
to be detained and consider alternatives to police detention. However, interviewees 
noted that seeking alternatives is an option with limited applicability in prisons. A 
senior policy maker said that where time allows, forward planning can allow relevant 
authorities – including prisons – to make appropriate plans for a disabled person. 
However in the Price case this was not an option open to the police or prison 
authorities – nor, she comments, would it be if they were placed in exactly this 
situation again. 
While most interviewees cited the DDA as a tool in preventing situations like Price’s 
from recurring, some also expressed doubt. One police officer commented that, 
notwithstanding the DDA, he very much doubted every force would be in a position to 
accommodate an individual as severely disabled as Price.  A senior prison policy 
maker saw the DDA as an instrument that only partially addresses the issues raised 
by Price, as its requirements deal primarily with the built environment and not the 
careful planning required to meet individual needs. Further, she saw the case as 
raising questions as to whether there is a level of disability that prisons “simply 
cannot cope with”. She did not feel this possibility was something that had been 
integrated into either policy or practice. 
Destitution in the asylum system: the case of Limbuela 
 
SUMMARY: Limbuela had a direct impact on reducing destitution within the asylum 
system by changing the use of a statute which denied late asylum applicants 
support. The UK Government has interpreted the case narrowly and Limbuela has 
had no impact on the rising incidence of destitution among failed asylum seekers.   
Limbuela focused on the application of section 55 of the Nationality, Immigration and 
Asylum (NIA) Act 2002 which allowed support to be refused to individuals who failed 
to apply for asylum “as soon as reasonably practicable”, causing many to become 
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destitute. The case established the principle that where the fate of individuals is in 
the hands of the state – because it denies them support and bars them from working 
or claiming mainstream benefits – severe destitution that results constitutes inhuman 
or degrading treatment under Article 3.  
Judgments by the Court of Appeal (2004) and House of Lords (2005) had a direct 
and immediate impact on the way section 55 was used, as these figures show: 
Year Number of asylum seekers 
referred for section 55 decision 
Number of applicants deemed 
ineligible for support under section 55 
2003 14,760 9,410 
2004 10,570 1,360 
2005 3,780 355 
2006 n/a  910 
2007 n/a 990 
 
Revised guidance to asylum case workers and policy teams (now part of the UK 
Border Agency, UKBA) adopts the destitution threshold set out in Limbuela. It states 
that where an asylum applicant lacks overnight shelter and basic provisions such as 
food and access to sanitary facilities, support should be provided to prevent a breach 
of Article 3, even if the claimant is judged to have applied late. Unlike pre-Limbuela 
guidance, it indicates how to apply the Article 3 test in practice.   
A senior legal officer within UKBA said Limbuela changed “quite markedly” the way 
that section 55 was used by taking “a different view on how the acts and omissions of 
the agency actually amount to treatment of an individual in a way that engages 
Article 3”. 
Limbuela has been interpreted narrowly by the UK Government to apply only to the 
specific matrix of factors arising in the case. The parliamentary Joint Committee on 
Human Rights has expressed concern that section 55 is still being used to deny 
cash-only support to late applicants, and wants it to be repealed.7 Limbuela has had 
no impact on government policy in addressing the rising incidence of destitution 
among failed asylum seekers.  
                                            
7  Our interviewee in the UKBA says repeal “will be considered” as part of a process of legal 
simplification, but gave no timeframe. 
Attempts have been made at the Asylum Support Tribunal to invoke Limbuela in 
support of failed asylum seekers denied support under section 4 of the NIA Act 
2002.8 These failed because it was deemed that the solution to the applicants’ 
destitution lay in their own hands by voluntarily leaving the UK. Advocacy 
organisations say section 4 places an unrealistic demand on failed asylum seekers to 
prove they are taking all reasonable steps to return.9 
For their part, local authorities are prohibited from assisting failed asylum seekers, 
except when doing so would lead to a violation of Convention rights. There is 
considerable variation and uncertainty in the way local authorities conduct human 
rights assessments (if they do so at all). We interviewed one authority that uses 
Limbuela explicitly when conducting human rights assessments. However, 
interviewees generally said Limbuela was not “high on the radar” of local authorities 
and had not influenced decision-making.  
Some service directors and managers in local authorities said the principles of 
Limbuela are relevant in that they set a baseline of acceptable treatment and remind 
decision makers that omissions as well as actions can breach Convention rights. One 
director said the case could be pertinent to local authorities who face unfamiliar 
challenges such as an influx of migrant workers living in destitute conditions. Others 
said the case could regain prominence in relation to destitution among newer 
European migrants who lack support networks.  
In summary, Limbuela has had a direct and quantifiable impact in reducing 
“beginning of process” destitution but not in reducing “end of process” destitution. A 
case has not been made in the literature as to whether the factors causing destitution 
among failed asylum seekers who fall foul of the current criteria might amount to 
“acts or omissions for which the state is directly responsible” as established in 
Limbuela.  
Balancing rights: the case of East Sussex 
 
SUMMARY: The imprint of East Sussex is visible in some policy, guidance and 
debate within public authorities and professional associations and networks. Manual 
handling practitioners describe its beneficial impact on their work. However, the 
impact across all public authorities and care providers is highly variable and 
uncertain.      
 
 
10
                                            
8  Section 4 support is available to failed asylum seekers who have either signed up to return 
voluntarily or are, according to various criteria, unable to leave the UK through no fault of their 
own. 
9  Concern is especially focused on applicants who are stateless, whose nationality is in dispute, 
who do not possess identity documents or whose safe route home is in dispute. 
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The family of two profoundly disabled young women challenged a local authority ban 
on care workers lifting them manually. The High Court found a violation of Article 8 
and provided a framework for public authorities to balance the interests of the dignity 
of the individual with the health and safety of employees by means of individualised 
risk assessments.  
The Disability Rights Commission (DRC) intervened in the case, saying it was “the tip 
of a no-lifting iceberg”. The Ministry of Justice told us the case was “very much a ‘one 
off’ with extreme circumstances”10. This apparent discrepancy shows how difficult it is 
to generalise about manual handling practice which is diffused across the social care 
field.  
The principles established in East Sussex were not, in the main, new; there was 
some earlier (non HRA) case law and guidance, and professional debate, which 
promoted them. However, the case exerted a “bottom up” impact by validating the 
efforts of practitioners who were already challenging restrictive policies. One 
interviewee described the case as “a ray of sunlight that allowed us to do [manual 
handling] properly and legitimately”. Another said it “speeded up the process of 
evolution without being a revolution”.   
The imprint of the case is clearly visible at the level of policy and guidance – notably 
in the “gold standard” guidance on manual handling.11 The editor said the guidance 
differs essentially from pre-East Sussex editions in that it is “not prescriptive; it’s 
about equipping people to make balanced judgments”.  
The case is expressly referenced in several public authority manual handling policies 
we have seen. An interviewee on the Welsh Local Government Association Manual 
Handling Forum said “there’s plenty of evidence that all [Welsh authorities] provide a 
balanced assessment process”.12  
Identifying the case’s impact on everyday practice is uncertain: policy and practice 
don’t run on straight lines. Interviewees identified some positive impacts on their 
practice which they attributed in part to their knowledge and understanding of the 
case.   
• Individualised risk assessment can bring about improved transparency and 
accountability (“at least [service users] are not completely disempowered”)  
 
10  Ministry of Justice submission to this project, August 2008 (unpublished) 
11  Smith, J (ed) (2005), The Guide to the Handling of People, 5th Edition (London: Back Care). This 
guidance was produced in collaboration with the Royal College of Nursing, the National Back 
Exchange, the Chartered Society of Physiotherapy and the College of Occupational Therapists. 
12  The forum plans to replicate Scottish guidelines (developed with explicit reference to East 
Sussex) for the moving and handling of children and young people with disabilities. 
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• Balanced decision-making was beneficial to staff; previously they had done 
manual handling “on the quiet”, without protection or supervision.   
• The case had enriched the understanding of dignity, for example in 
relation to the lifting of morbidly obese patients.   
 
However, our findings caution against overstating the overall impact “on the ground” 
of East Sussex. Our interviews suggest consistency is not always achieved within a 
single authority, less still between authorities. There is anecdotal evidence of 
restrictive policies persisting both within public authorities and private providers. One 
interviewee reported “shocking” practices among both public authorities and private 
providers, including some which say: “we don’t do stairs” or “we don’t do legs”. 
Occupational therapists in a London borough said “no lifting” policies persist among 
private care agencies sub-contracted by their authority.  
Interviewees said the contracting out of services can dilute the impact of manual 
handling policies that enshrine the primacy of individual risk assessment. Local 
authority staff we interviewed also raised the issue of direct payments13 as 
presenting new challenges: they were all unsure how far they can or should prom
good manual handling practice to care workers employed by direct payment 
recipients, and some feared the possibility of legal cha
Some interviewees said “sensationalised” media coverage had created erroneous 
perceptions of the case and prompted defensive responses among care staff (“before 
we couldn’t lift and now we have to”, “what about our rights?”). Among occupational 
therapists employed by a London borough a unanimously positive view of the East 
Sussex case co-existed with a generally negative view of human rights law and 
language (“there’s a lot of fear around it”). However, these attitudes were not shared 
by all interviewees: one said the principle of balanced decision-making was seen as 
empowering by care assistants because it helped them understand how decisions 
are made and allowed them to raise concerns about their own safety.   
Professional associations and networks have played a significant role – often 
informally – in disseminating information about the East Sussex case and debating 
its implications for practice.14 Our interviews highlight the strong potential these 
informal channels have for translating and disseminating the lessons of case law.   
 
13  Cash payments made to individuals assessed as needing services. 
14  For example the National Back Exchange, which has a network of local groups and an online 
forum; http://www.nationalbackexchange.org/. 
 
The positive obligation to secure dignity and integrity: the case of Bernard 
 
SUMMARY: The Bernard case is widely cited as illustrating the potential of human 
rights to improve public services. Our findings suggest this potential has not been 
fulfilled: we have found no impact on local authorities or at a national policy level. 
Factors include constraints on capacity and a tendency to view Bernard as an 
aberration. The sheer breadth of areas the case holds lessons for means any 
potential impact is lost amid a raft of other drivers.
TheBernard case concerned a severely disabled woman who had knowingly been 
left in unsuitable accommodation for 20 months, confined to one room and unable to 
use the toilet. The council had a positive obligation to secure her dignity and integrity; 
its failure to act without undue delay was a breach of Article 8 and the court awarded 
£10,000 in damages. 
According to our interviews, this case has had no discernable impact on policy or 
practice among local authority housing or social care departments, or at a national 
policy level. In our survey of housing directors, fewer than half of respondents had 
heard of the case; just over a third said their authority had examined policies in the 
light of it, and only one individual said their authority had changed policy. Legal 
directors were more familiar with the case, but only one out of 36 said their authority 
had changed policy because of it.    
Housing directors and managers and national policy officers said the case was 
viewed as aberrant: “it couldn’t happen here”. The majority suggested that existing 
legislation and statutory duties should have prevented it; the HRA and case law were 
peripheral to stronger drivers of policy and practice, notably housing legislation, the 
DDA and disability equality duties, and other performance indicators and codes of 
practice which already enshrine the principle of no undue delay. A policy officer in the 
Local Government Association said Bernard was “extreme”; she could not recall it 
being raised in any discussions with senior officers in local authorities. National 
officers in the Chartered Institute of Housing and the Housing Corporation (which 
regulates housing associations) agreed. Bernard was not a “landmark case” in the 
housing sector. Cases which had gained a higher profile were those which appeared 
to expose a “systemic failure” which placed authorities at risk of breaching the law, or 
those which “go to the very core of the mechanics of how tenancies work”.   
One director of housing said the recourse to case law is very council specific – and 
frequently determined by limits on capacity. In central London boroughs, the scarcity 
of housing means that councils habitually operate “on the edge of the law”. In 
authorities with more plentiful stock, “we rarely encroach on any case law, human 
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rights or otherwise”. A disability housing advisor in Hull said he handles some 400 
cases a year, many comparable to Bernard – “and that’s the tip of the iceberg”.  
A senior housing manager in LB Enfield said changes had been made since the 
case, especially in the interface between housing and social care and the handling of 
cases of complex housing need. She emphasised that none was a direct result of 
the case. Instead, it was a subsidiary element in a continuum of other developments, 
notably the government’s drive for greater personalisation of care. The case did not 
feature prominently in staff training. 
Most of our interviewees, including the manager in LB Enfield, said the £10,000 
penalty was not sizeable enough to be a significant factor for most authorities. 
Our findings suggest that the potential of the HRA to drive improvements in public 
services has been particularly under-explored in relation to housing. There was a 
marked tendency to view the HRA as peripheral to other drivers, including equalities 
legislation. It might be argued that this perspective neglects the role played by the 
HRA as overarching legislation that renders visible groups that fall outside the 
patchwork of anti•discrimination legislation and gives them a voice and a channel for 
legal redress. This suggests further potential to develop integrated human rights and 
equality approaches within public authorities. 
Conclusions 
In this section, we analyse the themes that emerge from our qualitative research on 
the impact of selected cases. These illustrate the inherent limitations of any exercise 
to determine the impact of case law (section 8.1) and the barriers which might 
prevent case law principles from changing policy or practice in non-compliant 
authorities (section 8.2). We examine how, in practice, the lessons of human rights 
case law have been put into practice and ways of communicating human rights to 
gain consent (section 8.3). 
Limits to assessing impact 
Multiple drivers for change 
At an institutional level, the HRA and human rights cases are rarely the sole or 
principal driver for change. Others include: statutory requirements, performance 
targets, codes of practice, inspectorate standards, media coverage and broader 
policy directions set by government. The limits to assessing impact are not uniform, 
however. Where a case has direct and immediate implications for policy and 
guidance set nationally, the impact is visible and even quantifiable. Impact is harder 
to ascertain where cases have implications for diverse practice across a range of 
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public authorities, or where they involve complex circumstances from which it 
appears hard to generalise.    
As individual practitioners, interviewees frequently struggled to disentangle their 
knowledge of case law from other factors (such as their professional ethos and 
training) as an influence on specific decisions or habitual behaviour. 
Passage of time 
The time lag between an incident, a legal judgment, and resulting policy changes 
reaching operational managers can make it difficult to determine what is attributable 
to case law and what relates to the evolution of good practice. Policy changes may 
be made in response to an incident review ahead of any legal case; they may also be 
made in response to inquiries that stem from the legal case. In each case, 
determining the impact of the case itself is uncertain. 
Media coverage and advocacy 
In some cases, there has been high profile media reporting of a judgment and/or 
subsequent inquiries, or vocal campaigns by relatives and advocacy organisations to 
challenge poor practice. Arguably, the HRA underpins any resulting changes to 
policy and practice, however, a note of caution is needed when assessing the impact 
of the case on its own.  
Potential barriers to impact 
Divergent perceptions of human rights 
We found both positive and negative views about human rights and the HRA at 
different levels of seniority in public authorities. 
Some service directors and managers had experienced human rights as a “stick to 
beat us with” or as the basis for unrealistic or unfounded claims. This had led to what 
one London housing manager described as a case-hardened attitude to the HRA. 
Some said human rights were debated in an oppositional manner, making it harder to 
win consent to change (“what about my rights?”). Others spoke of the HRA as being 
“almost taboo”, an object of derision or something threatening, in contrast to the DDA 
which was viewed positively by all those who referred to it.  
However, other interviewees emphasised that such views are neither universal nor 
insurmountable. Service directors spoke positively about human rights as a set of 
underpinning principles for their work and a constructive challenge function. 
Practitioners spoke about learning from human rights cases to approach seemingly 
intractable problems (such as the moving and handling of morbidly obese patients) 
and as a framework within which to resolve competing interests. 
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Opinions in a single authority can differ hugely. One frontline police officer told this 
project the Osman case had contributed to a “bureaucratic nightmare with frontline 
officers bearing the brunt” while another from the same force said Osman was 
"another example of how the Police are becoming more professional/accountable”.15  
Resources and capacity – an issue of supply and demand 
Interviewees said a significant barrier to applying the lessons of case law 
systematically is the need for additional resources (for example, the cost of a social 
care budget) or additional capacity (for example, accessible prison space or housing 
stock). 
In some cases, public authorities appear to develop ways of interpreting the 
obligations they might be expected to take on as a result of case law to fit within 
available resources. For example, a regional asylum policy officer said hard-pressed 
local authorities with large numbers of destitute failed asylum seekers effectively 
apply a higher threshold for community care than neighbouring authorities with fewer 
claimants.   
In other instances, case law which, like Bernard, is concerned with a minimum level 
of decency and respect for a claimant’s human rights can struggle to gain purchase 
in a system driven by the equitable and transparent rationing of resources. The case 
may be a salient reminder of the “bottom line” but does not, interviewees said, assist 
an authority to make hard decisions about allocating adapted housing stock in 
conditions of overall scarcity.   
On the demand side, variations in the availability of legal representation or advocacy 
can create something akin to a “post code lottery”. Interviewees spoke of “advice 
deserts” and of applicants struggling to make headway through the system without 
representation. Disability organisations say demands by service users to 
operationalise case law are patchy and certainly have not achieved a sufficient 
critical mass to drive change.     
Variable mechanisms to monitor case law and review policy 
From the evidence we have seen, monitoring arrangements are variable and often 
highly specific to each authority.  
Some local authority service directors and managers said mechanisms to review 
policy and guidance in the light of case law are sometimes haphazard, reactive and 
overly dependent upon personal initiative.  
 
15  These views were obtained via an anonymous questionnaire of detective constables and police 
inspectors in the same force.   
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Other interviewees (both in local and national government, including NOMS and the 
UKBA) were confident that mechanisms exist to ensure that fresh case law is 
scanned for its implications for policy and guidance. Police officers in four out of five 
forces we interviewed were able to outline internal mechanisms for monitoring case 
law and disseminating relevant points.    
Variable mechanisms to disseminate the lessons of case law 
We encountered variable experience within the public authorities we interviewed and 
surveyed, both as to the perceived effectiveness of dissemination and the extent to 
which policy responses to human rights case law are signposted as such, especially 
to “frontline” practitioners.  
In our surveys, fewer than half of all director-level respondents consider that frontline 
staff in their authorities receive sufficient, timely or accessible guidance about the 
lessons of case law. Anecdotally, the service managers and practitioners we 
interviewed generally could not recall getting guidance about East Sussex or Bernard 
(or any resulting policy changes) through their authority. 
There is debate about how far down an organisation it is helpful to label a policy 
change or guidance as being based on human rights. Some said this can be off-
putting or unnecessarily legalistic; others said it helped frontline staff to know that 
changes were not arbitrary and that a human rights framework could protect them 
and those using their service.  
Interviewees in different sectors said that, in some instances, practitioners do find it 
helpful to understand the human rights origin of guidance or policy changes. 
Interviewees working in prison healthcare articulated a need for more explicit advice 
on human rights case law, framed as positive guidance based on sound, reasoned 
judgment. An interviewee in NOMS noted that explicit references to human rights 
cases in policy documents can prevent staff from becoming “cellular” and forgetting 
that experiences from other prisons are relevant to them. Service managers and 
practitioners noted that understanding the origin of the East Sussex principles had 
helped staff see that resulting changes to policy or protocol were not arbitrary and 
involved a balancing of rights, including their own. 
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Human rights as a driver for change 
A principles based approach  
Legal judgments are generally specific interpretations of the law applied to a 
particular set of circumstances. This can discourage any culture within public 
authorities of identifying generalisable principles arising from case law. Moreover, 
there appears to be a generic tendency to view some human rights cases as arising 
from extreme or aberrant circumstances.  
Professor Francesca Klug has promoted the idea of “smart compliance”: that is, 
providing guidance to public authorities on the implications of human rights case law 
which extend beyond the specific facts of a particular case in ways that may not be 
immediately apparent. We found some examples of smart compliance, such as a 
Welsh county borough council which said human rights principles had been one 
driver behind a decision to stop applying a blanket policy on intentional 
homelessness because it was disadvantaging vulnerable children. 
Interviewees across the public service areas we have explored suggest that there is 
a need to equip service directors and operational managers to be able more 
confidently to apply human rights principles across a range of circumstances. One 
director of housing and social care, who is active in the disability network of the 
Association of Directors of Adult Social Services (ADASS), said: 
What we’d like to know is: what is generalisable, what does this [case law] 
suggest should be done in a broad way across all areas? That’s the area that 
needs to be developed. 
The absence until 2007 of an organisation charged with this role of promoting human 
rights and “translating” the lessons of law into effective practice may well, our 
interviews suggest, have led to the potential of the HRA being under-sold and under-
exploited. 
Promoting “smart compliance” 
Our findings suggest different dynamics by which case law can exert impact. 
Sometimes the lever is top down: for example, instructing case workers to process 
asylum support applications differently. Impact can also be achieved by less 
mechanistic routes from the bottom up: such as influencing professional debate and 
reinforcing the efforts of practitioners to evolve good practice. 
 
 
Our interviews suggest several levers for promoting the implications of human rights 
case law to public authorities, which we show here as a cycle.  
 
Our interviews suggest the potential for national leadership to promote the 
principles of human rights case law – in particular from central government policy 
departments in partnership with national associations such as ADASS, together with 
the Equality and Human Rights Commission.16  
Promotion via the media, both specialist and mainstream, is an effective way to 
reach practitioners, particularly given the patchy institutional application of case law. 
One service manager said legal officers were more likely to examine policies where a 
case was seen as a “live issue” posing greater reputational risk. Our findings also 
suggest the potential to promote human rights principles through professional 
associations and networks, using new technology such as online forums. The 
engagement of those who can act as “multipliers” is critical (such as manual handling 
co-ordinators in the case of East Sussex).  
Advocacy - both legal representation and campaigning advocacy – can boost the 
“demand side” in relation to human rights cases. In the case of Bernard, our 
interviews suggest that the £10,000 penalty was not a sufficient incentive for change. 
A greater awareness among service users and advocacy organisations might 
increase the potential leverage of future cases. 
Effective institutional application involves monitoring, review and “lessons learned” 
mechanisms, dissemination, training and the translation of principles into messages 
that make sense to practitioners’ everyday roles. Our findings suggest these systems 
                                            
16  Our interviewee in the College of Occupational Therapists (COT) offered the “spectacular” roll out 
of the Mental Capacity Act as a model for how to get a co-ordinated message across to those 
delivering public services.   
 
 
19
  
20
vary considerably between authorities and in particular that the lessons of case law 
may not always filter down to those on the frontline.   
Application across sectors: The principles arising from legal cases, and the 
implications for practice, are not always immediately transparent to practitioners and 
are sometimes disputed. This brings us back to the role of national leadership to 
identify and champion key principles and lessons to a wider range of sectors and 
circumstances than might be suggested by the facts of the individual case.   
Communicating human rights 
Our interviews suggest that, in order to become more embedded in public services, 
human rights principles need to be communicated to professionals within those 
services (the “supply” side) and to those using services and the wider public (the 
“demand” side). 
Our interviews with those delivering public services suggest several strategies for 
communicating rights in a way which taps into existing organisational cultures. 
In some cases, practitioners are already delivering services in a way which meets 
human rights standards, sometimes whilst under pressure to cut costs. Guidance that 
suggests they can have confidence in their judgments is seen by our interviewees as 
a useful validation. Our interviews on East Sussex suggest that, where there are 
rights to be balanced, setting out guidance in a way which makes the resolution of 
competing interests clear can help gain consent. Where an absolute right is engaged, 
and where obligations are strong because someone is in the state’s care, 
interviewees (especially those new to detention settings) articulated a need to have 
these obligations explained explicitly and in a way that makes sense to their job.    
 Where we encountered negative perceptions of human rights, this was in part based 
on a sense of their being burdensome. However, some interviewees working in 
housing and social care emphasised that the time invested in considering every 
aspect of a person’s needs – and involving service users and carers in devising 
solutions – can effect a qualitative change in the relationship between those who use 
and deliver public services.   
Human rights and the HRA are viewed as one among many drivers of policy and 
practice in public authorities. In local government, as a senior interviewee in the 
Improvement and Development Agency put it: 
... equalities is seen as a home issue – I don’t think human rights is an 
‘owned’ issue in the same way … It’s not in the DNA. 
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This suggests potential to develop integrated equality and human rights approaches 
which build consensus around the HRA as a means to extend existing approaches to 
inequality and set a threshold of treatment to secure dignity and respect for those in 
vulnerable situations. 
Our findings suggest that the effective promotion of “smart compliance” requires a 
pragmatic understanding of the complex legal and policy environment in which new 
principles need to be applied and a readiness to work with the grain of organisational 
cultures. Equally, we have detected an appetite among some of our interviewees to 
operationalise the lessons of case law based upon a more confident understanding 
of how human rights principles can be applied across public services, thus promoting 
both the transformative and remedial roles the HRA was anticipated as playing a 
decade ago. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  
22
                                           
CHAPTER 1 
INTRODUCTION 
 
1. Context of the report 
This report was commissioned by the Equality and Human Rights Commission 
(EHRC) to inform its Human Rights Inquiry. The Commission is carrying out the 
inquiry under its statutory duties under the Equality Act 2006 to: 
• promote understanding of the importance of human rights 
• encourage good practice in relation to human rights 
• promote awareness, understanding and protection of human rights, and 
• encourage public authorities to comply with the Human Rights Act (section 9 
of the Equality Act)17 
 
The terms of reference of the inquiry are:  
• to assess progress towards the effectiveness and enjoyment of a culture of 
respect for human rights in Great Britain  
• to consider how the current human rights framework might best be developed 
and used to realise the vision of a society built on fairness and respect, 
confident in all aspects of its diversity18 
•  
The inquiry involves several strands of evidence gathering including research 
projects, a call for written evidence and Inquiry Panels.19 
 
 
 
17 http://www.equalityhumanrights.com/en/projects/humanrightsinquiry/ 
Pages/HumanrightsInquiry.aspx 
18 http://www.equalityhumanrights.com/en/projects/humanrightsinquiry/ 
Pages/HRIConsultation.aspx 
19  The EHRC has commissioned reports on 'the impact of human rights culture on public sector 
organisations - lessons from practice' and 'the role and experience of inspectorates in promoting 
human rights in public services'.  
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2. Aims of this report 
Public authorities have an obligation to comply with the Human Rights Act (HRA). 
They must refrain from harm, and in some instances, also take pro-active steps to 
protect and promote human rights. One way to ensure this compliance is through 
legal challenge. But victory in the courtroom is no guarantee that the desired 
institutional response will be forthcoming.20 The scoping project for the inquiry found 
strong evidence pointing to the urgent need for more systematic and timely guidance 
for public authorities on the implications of relevant case law.21  
The aims of this report are: 
• to identify key human rights cases from the UK and European Court of 
Human Rights (ECtHR) case law 
• to explore the impact of the outcome of those cases on a range of public 
authorities 
• to explore with service providers from different sectors whether and how the 
principles established in these cases have been incorporated into policy and 
practice 
• to explore the positive impact within these sectors of implementing human 
rights principles 
• to identify the barriers that prevent or obstruct the use of human rights 
principles in these sectors 
 
This report which covers England and Wales focuses on case law - just one among a 
number of mechanisms that facilitate implementation of the HRA in public services. 
Others include the training of public authorities,22 advocacy by and on behalf of 
service users,23 guidance to public bodies,24 and the use of levers like 
inspectorates and inquiries.25  
 
20  Equality and Human Rights Commission, Research Specification, Evaluating the impact of 
selected cases under the Human Rights Act on public service provision. 
21  Equality and Human Rights Commission (2008) Human Rights in Britain since the Human Rights 
Act 1998: A Critical Review. 
22  The British Institute of Human Rights (BIHR), for example, provides comprehensive training 
programs to public authorities. See http://www.bihr.org.uk/. 
23  The Human Rights Act – Changing Lives, by the BIHR, outlines 15 case studies of the HRA being 
used in practical ways to challenge aspects of service provision by public authorities. See 
http://www.bihr.co.uk/sites/default/files/The%20Human%20Rights%20Act%20-
%20Changing%20Lives.pdf.  
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3. Selection of cases 
In discussion with the EHRC we developed criteria and selected key cases across a 
range of sectors in order to be able to explore different public authorities including 
social care, policing, prisons, immigration and housing. Cases chosen were of 
relevance to different sections of society – including those with particular 
vulnerabilities or that face particular hurdles in accessing rights – for example those 
in contact with the criminal justice system, asylum seekers, and disabled people.  
Each case is ‘strategic’: their judgments have implications for many of us and may 
require changes to commonplace policy or practice. They also have underlying 
principles that have the potential to be applied in different sectors. We included 
decisions of the domestic courts applying the HRA and UK cases at the ECtHR. 
The cases are:  
• Osman v UK, No. 23452/94, Judgment of 28 October 1998 / Osman v UK 
(2000) 29 EHRR 245 
• A cluster of five cases involving vulnerable detainees26 
• Price v UK (2001) 34 EHRR 128 
• R (Limbuela and Others) v Secretary of State for the Home Department 
[2005] UKHL 66 
• R v East Sussex County Council Ex parte A, B, X and Y [2003] EWHC 167 
• R (Bernard) v Enfield LBC [2003] HRLR 4 
4. Methodology   
This study used qualitative research methods, conducting 65 individual in-depth 
interviews and engaging 12 more in two focus group discussions (see Annex 6). The 
choice of interviewees was driven by directions provided by the EHRC. At their 
request we identified relevant staff at senior, management and service delivery levels 
                                                                                                                                        
24  Examples include guidance on the HRA issued by the Ministry of Justice 
(http://www.justice.gov.uk/guidance/humanrights.htm); Human Rights Act Toolkit by Jenny 
Watson and Mitchell Woolf issued by the Legal Action Group 
(http://www.lag.org.uk/Templates/System/Publications.asp?NodeID=89151&Mode=display); and 
the Human Rights in Healthcare Project undertaken by BIHR and the Department of Health 
(http://www.bihr.co.uk/projects/human-rights-in-healthcare-project). 
25  The Joint Committee on Human Rights, for example, has conducted inquiries into the treatment 
of asylum seekers; people with learning disabilities and older people in healthcare. 
26  Keenan v UK (2001) 33 EHRR 38; R (on the application of Wright) v S/S for the Home 
Department [2001] 1 Lloyd’s Rep Med 478; R (on the application of Amin) v S/S for the Home 
Department [2004] 1 AC 653; [2001] EWHC Admin 520; 2001 WL 606447                    
Edwards v UK (2002) 35 EHRR 19; R (on the application of Middleton) v Coroner for the Western 
District of Somerset [2004] 2 AC 182. 
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in a number of public authorities, including local authorities, police forces and health 
authorities.27 We did not focus on inspectorates or national government, although 
interviews in these areas contributed significant policy understanding and contextual 
information.28 The particularities of each case also drove the choice of interviewees.  
For East Sussex and Bernard, we concentrated on service directors, operational 
managers and frontline practitioners in local authorities. The cases of Osman, Price, 
Limbuela and the detainees strand have implications both for national policy and 
guidance and for operational practice; we spread our interviews between the 
national, regional and local levels accordingly.  
Where possible we have “drilled down” within individual public authorities and where 
appropriate on more than one case. We have also engaged (via interviews and a 
questionnaire) with operational and rank and file police officers and those who 
manage them to explore how the Osman judgment has impacted upon routine 
practice. For each of the cases, we obtained the views of organisations that have 
specialised knowledge or experience relating to the cases and the sectors they affect 
from the practitioner and service user perspective.  
We conducted three surveys of senior operational figures within local authorities - 
directors of adults’ and children’s social services (73 sent, 17 responses), directors of 
housing (405 sent, 24 responses) and directors of legal services (417 sent, 36 
responses). We also surveyed local authority housing practitioners.29 These surveys 
are not statistically robust but provide a useful corrective to the anecdotal experience 
in our interviews; they aimed to identify whether policies have been reviewed or 
changed in the light of case law, as well as the availability of guidance on HRA case 
law for the staff for whom the respondents are responsible. 
We refer to both published and unpublished material, including guidance, policies, 
“on the ground” research and material produced by civil society groups, professional 
associations and other interested bodies. 
 
 
 
27  Owing to time constraints and the requirement that research in the prison sector go through a 
formal approval procedure, these authorities did not include prisons. Healthcare staff in prisons 
were interviewed. 
28  As part of its inquiry the EHRC has commissioned a research project, “The role and experience of 
inspectorates in promoting human rights in public services”. 
29  Via the Chartered Institute of Housing (13 responses).  
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5. Guide to the report  
Chapter 2 looks at Osman v UK and the obligations on public authorities to take 
steps to protect life, under Article 2 of the European Convention on Human Rights 
and Fundamental Freedoms (ECHR).  The chapter provides an overview of the ways 
in which case law is translated into policy and practice in the area of policing. It 
identifies a range of policing policies that have taken into account the Osman case. 
The chapter examines briefly the impact of Osman on prison policies.  
Chapter 3 looks at a group of cases involving deaths in custody. The chapter looks at 
the role of case law in the process of policy development in prisons and in the 
provision of prison healthcare. It examines the case of Keenan v UK and its impact 
on segregation, the case of Middleton and the way in which it has shaped the 
practice of inquests, and the cases of Wright, Edwards and Amin and their impact on 
meeting the investigative obligations under Article 2. Chapter 3 looks at the evolution 
of prison policies on information sharing, risk assessments, healthcare, suicide 
prevention, although it notes difficulties in relating such changes to the cases under 
examination. The chapter makes brief observations about the impact of these cases 
on police custody. We conclude that the process of policy change is complex and 
multi-faceted, and that it is difficult to identify clearly the impact of specific cases and 
chains of cause and effect. In some cases however, it is possible to see the imprint of 
cases and in some they are explicitly identified as driving forces. Where these cases 
concern themselves with the investigative obligation it is easier to identify an impact 
within the broader legal system. Broader changes initiated by government are 
precipitated, if not caused, by the cases collectively.  
Chapter 4 examines Price v UK and issues around disability and detention. The 
chapter looks at the impact the case had on the police force that had originally 
detained Adele Price and at the broader impact on other police forces. It concludes 
that relevant detention policies have evolved since the case but that the case itself 
was not a key driver in these changes; instead the Disability and Discrimination Act 
2005 (DDA) was a major influence. 
Chapter 5 focuses on the case of Limbuela. It looks at the impact of the case on 
refusals to provide support to asylum seekers under section 55 of the National 
Immigration and Asylum (NIA) Act (2002). The chapter looks at the impact beyond 
section 55, including on local authorities. It concludes that Limbuela has had a direct 
and quantifiable impact on reducing “beginning of process” destitution by changing 
the way section 55 is applied in policy and practice, but that it is not possible to 
identify a direct impact of Limbuela in reducing “end of process” destitution. Contrary 
to the narrower interpretation of the case by the UK Border Agency (UKBA), local 
authority interviewees do see the case as having some relevance for their work in 
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setting a baseline of acceptable treatment and reinforcing the principle that omissions 
as well as actions can breach Convention rights. However, subsequent case law 
more directly applicable to local authority responsibilities was said to be significantly 
more influential. 
Chapter 6 is about the East Sussex case. It looks at the impact of the case on 
manual handling policies, on the provision of training and on service delivery. It 
identifies impacts on transparency and accountability, on the integration of the 
concept of dignity and on the health and safety of staff. We conclude that the impact 
of the case across the range of care sectors is variable and uncertain.    
Chapter 7 is about Bernard v Enfield. It examines whether there was any impact on 
the defendant authority or on other local authorities. It concludes that the case 
achieved little traction in the housing and social services sectors. The reasons for this 
include a proliferation of legislation and case law, constraints on resources and 
capacity, and a tendency to view the case as an aberration.  
Chapter 8 draws together and analyses themes that arose across the selected 
cases. It notes the limits of assessing the impact of legal cases as well as some of 
the potential barriers to impact. It examines the ways in which human rights more 
broadly can operate as a driver for change.  
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CHAPTER 2 
PROTECTING LIFE: OSMAN V UK 
 
In this chapter we look at Osman v UK and the obligations on authorities to take 
steps to protect life, under Article 2 of the ECHR.  The chapter looks at the ways in 
which case law is translated into policy and practice in the area of policing and 
identifies a range of policing policies that have taken into account the principles 
established in the Osman case. The chapter examines briefly the impact of Osman 
on prison policies.  
1. The case and its context 
The Osman case established key principles about the positive duty on authorities to 
take steps to protect life and found these steps to be part of the authorities’ 
obligations under Article 2 of the ECHR, on the right to life. The key principles are: 
• That a violation of the positive obligations of Article 2 exists where “the 
authorities knew or ought to have known at the time of the existence of a real 
and immediate risk to the life of an identified individual or individuals from the 
criminal acts of a third party and that they failed to take measures within the 
scope of their powers, which, judged reasonably, might have been expected 
to avoid that risk”.30  
• There is no need to show gross negligence for there to be a violation of 
Article 2: “it is sufficient for an applicant to show that the authorities did not do 
all that could be reasonably expected of them to avoid a real and immediate 
risk to life of which they have or ought to have knowledge”.31 
 
The case concerned a teacher, Paul Paget-Lewis, who had developed an obsession 
with one of his pupils, Ahmet Osman.  The family of Ahmet Osman experienced 
harassment and criminal damage. The school was concerned for Ahmet Osman’s 
safety and police were aware of the situation. These events culminated in an attack 
by Paget-Lewis in which Ahmet Osman was injured and his father, Ali Osman, killed. 
Paget-Lewis pleaded guilty to and was convicted of manslaughter on the grounds of 
diminished responsibility.  
 
30  Osman v UK (2000) 29 EHRR 245 at para 116. 
31  Osman v UK (2000) 29 EHRR 245 at para 116. 
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ECHR heard the family’s claim that the police had failed to take appropriate and 
adequate measures to secure effective protection for their lives in 1998. While the 
family identified measures the police could have taken and did not, the court found 
no violation of Article 2. The judgment gave consideration to the circumstances in 
which authorities may fail to meet their positive obligation “to take preventive 
operational measures to protect an individual whose life is at risk from the criminal 
acts of another individual”.32  
The application of the Osman standard is wide. In its original formulation it was 
intended as a generalisable principle for the court to use to assess whether 
authorities had met their obligations in the particular case. Since 1998 the standard 
has been used in a number of other judgments including cases that are explored in 
Chapter 3.  
2. The impact of Osman  
2.1 The impact on policing 
Nearly 10 years on, Osman principles have become part of policing policy and 
practice across a range of areas – indicating acceptance of the underlying principles 
of the case and their relevance to a range of situations beyond those examined by 
the court. Osman is also referred to in documents on standards used to assess 
police forces. As a member of the Association of Chief Police Officers (ACPO) 
explained:    
It’s found in Public Protection Guidance about vulnerable people, children, 
the mentally ill…it’s found in the Murder Investigation Manual. It’s relevant to 
protecting witnesses, to investigating child abuse and investigating domestic 
violence. There’s guidance currently being drafted on managing violent 
offenders…which will allude to Osman.  
To understand the impact of Osman on policing policy and practice at national and 
local levels, we interviewed nine police officers at senior and middle levels from five 
different forces. We could not assess the immediate impact of the case and the 
specific policy changes that occurred in its immediate wake. However senior police 
officers who remember the case told us that the policy and cultural impact of the case 
was huge. They showed the lasting significance of the case by providing examples of 
how the principles of the case imbue their practice to this day. 
 
 
 
32  Osman v UK (2000) 29 EHRR 245 at para 115. 
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2.1.1 The process of policy change 
To understand how the Osman principles shape policing and are communicated to 
the force, we looked at the monitoring and interpretation of case law at a national 
level and how this informs policy. 
The National Policing Improvement Agency (NPIA)33 monitors case law relevant to 
police operations to help inform the development of “doctrine” by the agency.34 
Doctrine aims to develop and promote best practice in the Police Service – it includes 
legally binding Regulations, Code, for which Chief Officers are required to "have 
regard", Guidance and Advice. Regulations and Code are commissioned by the 
Home Secretary. Guidance and Advice are requested by ACPO and Home Office 
Policy Units. One senior police officer commented that this system works well – 
reacting swiftly to legal judgments and issuing communications in days or even 
hours. Another officer commented that the content is usually good: “Ninety per cent 
of doctrines are excellent”. 
The speed with which individual police forces are able to operationalise these 
communications from NPIA varies. Senior police officers comment that a large police 
force will “localise” NPIA notes, that is, make them relevant to and fit with force-level 
policies, which can take time. Smaller forces may have less detailed procedures for 
NPIA communications to go through.  When there is an urgent need to change 
practice, senior officers said that police forces use email to make all relevant police 
officers aware immediately. More detailed policies, or sometimes changes to relevant 
legislation, follow later. Forces disseminate amended policies, including through the 
use of intranets. 
NPIA-issued doctrine documents also inform the inspection methodologies of Her 
Majesty’s Inspectorate of Constabulary (HMIC). HMIC examines compliance with a 
range of doctrine documents during inspections.   
Individual police forces also monitor case law and develop their own policies and 
processes on a range of different issues. Precise mechanisms for this vary. Police 
officers talked about “environmental research”, or “environmental scans”, undertaken 
by a learning and development department, a professional standards and 
performance department, or a policy unit. None of these mechanisms focus 
exclusively on case law – drawing also on outputs from NPIA, ACPO, HMIC, the 
Home Office, the Independent Police Complaints Commission (IPCC), professional 
 
33  NPIA was preceded by the National Centre for Policing Excellence, also known as Centrex.  
34  In addition to case law, sources for doctrine documents include legislation, recognised good 
practice, evidence-based research, the work of relevant experts and extensive consultation 
(http://www.npia.police.uk/en/index.htm). 
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journals, and the experiences of their own police force and others. This research 
informs the collaborative review and development of local policies.  
A senior police officer with a role in custody described this process in his force:  
We have an environmental researcher in our Professional Standards and 
Performance Department. She periodically sends out a detailed document 
with all the relevant legislative changes and cases. My policy officers will go 
through that document and will inform me and others of any significant 
changes that might inform our business. If it’s important for the way we run 
custody suites then we’ll send out a Criminal Justice Department Brief…that 
goes out to all custody staff and to anyone else whose role we think is 
affected. 
As well as forming part of the environment case law impacts policy in other ways. For 
example, two forces told this project that they had policy writing templates, designed 
to ensure that human rights considerations form part of the policy design process.  
The policy outcomes of case law monitoring are disseminated in a variety of ways. 
The Metropolitan Police, for example, publishes new policy on the policy and news 
pages of the force’s intranet, and sends email communications to Custody Managers 
in each of the 33 boroughs, and to all custody users.  
Reference to case law features in the dissemination of policy changes. One officer 
commented that information disseminated about a change in policy triggered by case 
law would usually include reference to the case, but rarely any details: “Briefs must 
be brief – they can’t be four pages or they wouldn’t get read”. Another commented 
that his force had recently started to include a summary of new policies, incorporating 
the reasons for the changes, whether case law, IPCC investigations, coroners’ 
verdicts or something else. This provides both a history of the evolving policy and a 
history of how the force has responded to cases.  
Forces recognised the role of training in disseminating policy changes. The 
Metropolitan Police told us that they hold training seminars for Custody Managers 
three to four times a year. Another force provided a rolling programme of weekly 
sessions, usually over a five week period, covering every aspect of the work, 
structured and repeated in order to maximise participation. An officer noted that 
cases – especially new ones – are incorporated into relevant training, but that the 
ongoing nature of training and the evolution of the law means it is not possible to say 
that all relevant individuals had accessed relevant information through training, and it 
would always need to be complemented with other methods of disseminating 
information. The outcome of training, one officer comments, is knowing what she 
needs to know, not talking about a case itself with any authority. 
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Another senior officer noted the importance of regular discussion, for example at 
daily management meetings:  
It’s all very well publishing something, but it needs to be translated into a 
reality… (used in) everyday language.   
She believed that police officers need to discuss the principles of case law and real-
life policing experiences in order to understand the implications for decisions on 
practice. Regional meetings also facilitate the sharing of good practice and lesson 
learning but, again, the focus is wider than case law. Talking about regional meetings 
one officer commented that cases – in the sense of incidents – are important and are 
part of learning from a breadth of sources including other forces:   
We’re all striving for best practice. We learn from the IPCC; we learn from 
legislation. We learn from every possible area that we can… 
The same officer notes the importance of learning lessons as quickly as possible. He 
notes that he sees IPCC reports before they are finalised. If he sees aspects of 
relevance that he can change and that he feels should be changed in his own force 
he will do so, rather than wait for a final report. 
2.1.2 Osman in policing policies and practice 
This section looks at selected national and local police policies influenced by the 
Osman case.35 It looks first at policies on handling threats or risks to life. It then 
looks at relevant practices including issuing “Osman warnings”. Finally it looks at a 
selection of other policies. 
2.1.2.1 Threat to life policies 
Osman was primarily concerned with police protecting individuals in the community 
from other individuals who present a risk to life. At local level the majority of the 43 
police forces of England and Wales have in place specific policies on handling 
threats or risks to life. One police force interviewed for this project is formulating a 
regional guide for managing threat to life with four other forces. Senior police officers 
state that such policies derive directly from the obligations of Article 2 of the ECHR 
and from the Osman case. Examination of a selection of these policies confirms 
this.36 
 
 
35  Policing policies are too many and too detailed for a comprehensive review of all policies to form 
part of this project. 
36  This project examined the publicly available policies of the Metropolitan Police, Devon and 
Cornwall Constabulary, West Mercia Constabulary and Leicestershire Constabulary. In some 
cases these are to be read in conjunction with other, confidential, documents that this project was 
not able to examine. This project was also provided with the confidential text of one other policy. 
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The Metropolitan Police’ Dealing with Threats to Life Policy, for example, notes in its 
introduction:  
The right to life is enshrined in Article 2 of the European Convention on 
Human Rights, and in the Human Rights Act 1998. Obligations on the police 
service to take reasonable steps to protect the life of people where there is 
a real and immediate risk to them from the acts of another have been 
determined in European and domestic case law, notably in Osman v UK 
1998.37 
Devon and Cornwall Constabulary’s Management of Threats to Human Life policy 
refers to the Human Rights Act and to the Osman case. It describes the right to life 
as having been “a fundamental right for many years and a cornerstone to policing.”38 
Leicestershire Constabulary’s Dealing with Threats to Life policy references the 
European Convention, the Human Rights Act and the Osman case,39 as does West 
Mercia Constabulary’s Management of Threat and Risk to Life.40 
These policies reflect the core components of the Osman case – the principle that 
they apply to cases where they “knew or should have known”, of a “real and 
immediate risk to life”. The Metropolitan Police’ Dealing with Threats to Life Policy 
notes that it applies: 
… to all cases in which the Metropolitan Police Service knows, or ought to 
know, of the existence of a real and immediate risk to the life of an 
individual.  
Other policies include near identical wording. 
One policy made confidentially available to this project defines “real and immediate 
danger” as: 
… a risk that has been reasonably assessed to be real and that the 
potential assailant has the intention and current ability to carry it out.  
 
37  Metropolitan Police, Dealing with Threats to Life Policy, available at: 
http://www.met.police.uk/foi/pdfs/policies/threats_to_life_policy.pdf.  
38  Devon and Cornwall Constabulary, Management of Threats to Human Life, available at: 
http://www.devon-cornwall.police.uk/v3/pdfstore/Crime_D339.pdf. 
39  Leicestershire Constabulary, Dealing with Threats to Life, available at: 
http://www.leics.police.uk/files/library/documents/threats_to_life_200601.pdf. 
40  West Mercia Constabulary, Managing Threat and Risk to Life Policy 2008, available at: 
http://www.westmercia.police.uk/foi/JUNE%20POLICY%20S-
V/Threat%20and%20Risk%20to%20Life%20Force%20Policy%20LATEST.pdf. 
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These policies reflect further some of the detail of the Osman case, committing forces 
to “take all reasonable steps” in the circumstances in which the policy applies, that is 
where there is a “real and immediate” risk to life. One policy lays down a sequence of 
events: receipt of information, assessment of risk, “devising and initiating a strategy for 
preventative or disruptive measures”, resolution and monitoring. 
These threat or risk to life policies also provide guidance on the interpretation of 
“known or should have known” – a crucial element of the principles of the case. By 
including an understanding of the circumstances in which the force should have 
known, these policies are laying down the basis for ensuring that where they should 
have known, the police force does know. Three of the publicly available policies 
looked at by this project, plus one other policy provided privately, state that if an 
individual police officer has information that would lead others to “deduce reasonably 
that a real and immediate threat to the life of an individual exists”, then the force as 
an entity ought to know of it. One of the policies provides officers with precise details 
of the processes to be followed to record and share information.  
2.1.2.2  Practical measures  
Police use a wide range of tactical options to meet the principles of the Osman case 
in protecting life. Officers noted that acting on Osman means assessing the level of 
risks and then deciding on an appropriate course of action – the proportionate and 
reasonable level of response will vary depending on the level of risk and the details 
of the case.  Options include but are not limited to increasing police patrols in a 
particular area, closing licensed premises, surveillance, overt filming, placing marked 
cars in relevant areas, installing alarms or radio links to police control rooms, 
ensuring people at risk have both land-lines and mobile telephones, and relocation of 
people at risk.  
One particular circumstance in which police use a range of tactics in order to 
operationalise their obligations, as defined in Osman, is in witness protection work. 
Officers saw the Osman case as key to informing such work.41   
One officer notes that the principles of Osman only go so far in assisting decision-
making – they provide a framework but actually deciding on a reasonable course of 
action is complex: 
Who decides what’s reasonable and what you know or ought to know?...it’s 
down to individual assessment and experience. 
 
41  The House of Lords recently ruled that the Osman threshold for showing a violation of Article 2 is 
not lowered in cases involving witnesses. A violation of Article 2 exists where there is failure to 
take steps to safeguard life when authorities know or ought to know of a “real and immediate risk” 
(Chief Constable of the Hertfordshire Police v Van Colle [2008] UKHL 50). 
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He notes too that threat to life policies have to be flexible, not prescriptive: “You can’t 
write a policy for every situation”. 
In addition to the tactics mentioned above police forces operationalise their 
commitment to protect life by means of “Osman warnings”, sent by police to 
individuals whose lives the police have reason to believe are at risk. In 2007 police 
forces in England and Wales issued warnings to at least 1,028 individuals.42 An 
example is attached in Annex 7. 
Our interviews and a brief questionnaire completed by six frontline officers indicate at 
least the perception that there is a high level of awareness of this particular practice. 
One ACPO officer noted: 
All inspectors and above know that in all cases (where there is a real and 
immediate threat to life) we issue formal notes telling people they’re at risk. 
Osman warnings serve the purpose of both alerting an individual to a possible risk 
and to measures that could reduce that risk. The Northamptonshire document, for 
example, notes: 
I therefore suggest that you take such remedial action as you see fit to 
increase your own safety measures e.g. house burglar alarms, change of 
daily routines, always walk with an associate, carry a mobile phone, install a 
domestic CCTV door guard system, increase house security measures e.g. 
locks and bolts. It may even be that you decide that it is more appropriate 
for you to leave the area for the foreseeable future. That is a matter for you 
to decide. 
Osman warnings may not always be appropriate. Our police interviewees cited 
intelligence considerations – such as revealing information about sources that could 
expose someone to heightened risk – as something that can weigh against their use. 
One of the right to life policies mentions that such warnings could in fact exacerbate 
levels of violence.  
2.1.2.3  Other policies  
National level policies focused on a diverse range of issues reflect the Osman 
principle that authorities have an obligation to take reasonable measures to protect 
the right to life.43 One such example is the ACPO policy Police Officers Who Commit 
 
42  Police tell more than 1,000 people that someone wants to kill them, Adam Fresco, The Times, 
June 9, 2008. 
43  It is expected that the national level policy documents identified below are reflected in force-
specific policies, however identifying such policies is beyond the scope of this project.  
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Domestic Violence-Related Criminal Offences.44  This sets out ways of ensuring that 
police officers who perpetrate domestic violence are held accountable.  It notes its 
purpose as being that: 
… all offenders of domestic violence-related criminal offences (are) 
accountable through the Criminal Justice System. 
The policy outlines the principles that inform this – noting that the HRA: 
… includes positive obligations on the part of public bodies to safeguard an 
individual’s right to life… 
It uses Osman to show that this obligation means that: 
Police and other agencies with special powers to protect individuals from 
violence can be held liable for failure to use those powers…These 
obligations are clearly applicable in cases where police officers are alleged 
to have committed domestic violence-related criminal offences. 
The Practice Advice on Core Investigative Doctrine 2005, issued by the National 
Centre for Policing Excellence incorporates an understanding of the duty of care held 
by the police and defined in the Osman case:  
A crucial case relating to this duty of care was that of Osman v UK 29 
EHRR 245 where the court held that Article 2 ECHR (the right to life) 
imposes a positive duty on states to safeguard the lives of those within their 
jurisdiction. The court went on to hold that in certain circumstances the 
police have a duty to take all reasonable steps to protect potential victims 
from a real and immediate threat to their lives arising from…Actual or 
threatened criminal acts of another (and) Suicide...45 
This advice explains that for the police to be held accountable the police must have 
been aware of the likelihood of the danger or risk to the individual concerned. It notes 
explicitly that this duty extends to witnesses, victims, members of the public and 
defendants.46 
Osman is referred to in a range of other documents. The NPIA practice advice on 
policing roads contains references that are nearly identical to those found in the 
 
44  ACPO Policy, Police Officers Who Commit Domestic Violence-Related Criminal Offences, 
available at: http://www.acpo.police.uk/asp/policies/Data/Police%20perpetrators%20policy.doc.   
45  Practice Advice on Core Investigative Doctrine, 2005, produced on behalf of the Association of 
Chief Police Officers by the National Centre for Policing Excellence, p.39. 
46  Practice Advice on Core Investigative Doctrine, 2005, produced on behalf of the Association of 
Chief Police Officers by the National Centre for Policing Excellence, p.39. 
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Practice Advice on Core Investigative Doctrine, cited above.47 The Guidance on the 
National Intelligence Model includes guidance on handling information: 
… relating to any risk or threat to the life or personal safety of any known 
individual or identifiable group against which action may be taken/is possible 
(R v Osman)48.  
ACPO has produced a set of minimum standards relevant to protective services.49 
Protective services are defined as including: 
… counter-terrorism and extremism, serious organised and cross-border 
crime, civil contingencies and emergency planning, critical incident 
management, major crime (requiring the appointment of a senior 
investigating officer), public order, strategic roads policing and protecting 
vulnerable people.50 
ACPO’s minimum standards are to be used as a “threshold by which each force will 
be assessed” and include ones where the Osman principles are either implicit or 
explicit.51 The standards for counter-terrorism, for example, include the need to have 
processes which allow intelligence to inform preventive action; under the section on 
major crime intelligence must be disseminated to partner agencies and other forces 
“where appropriate”. Counter-terrorism and serious organised crime work is to be 
assessed on whether there is “a good understanding of OSMAN warnings”;52 
homicide/violence reduction strategies “should include OSMAN”.53  
A number of police told this project that Osman in particular, and human rights in 
general, loom large in their current work to improve protection of individuals when 
they are released from custody. Clearly understanding that the Osman principles can 
be applied to cases of suicide, two forces we spoke to mentioned that they are 
grappling with the problem of how to handle an individual currently in detention, who, 
according to the Police and Criminal Evidence Act should be released, but who 
 
47  Practice Advice on the Policing of Roads, 2007, Produced on behalf of the 
Association of Chief Police Officers by the National Centre for Policing Excellence. 
48  Guidance on the National Intelligence Model, 2005.  
49  Gaps in protective services were identified in Closing the Gap, HMIC Thematic Report, 
(September 2005), triggering debate about the structures of the police forces.  
50  http://police.homeoffice.gov.uk/police-reform/protective-services1/ 
51  Protective Services Minimum Standards, ACPO. 
52  Protective Services Minimum Standards, ACPO, section 3.1.2. The ways in which intelligence 
should inform preventive action are laid out in the ACPO/Centre for Policing Excellence Guidance 
on the National Intelligence Model (2005). 
53  Protective Services Minimum Standards, ACPO, section 3.4.2.2. 
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threatens suicide should this occur.54 The case of Osman is cited by one officer as a 
reason why “simply” releasing the individual is not a preferred approach, as well as a 
fundamental consideration of “doing the right thing”. The difficulty of balancing “doing 
the right thing”, the principles of Osman and the right to life, the legal framework 
protecting the right to liberty, and rights to privacy and family life are apparent – and 
discussion is still ongoing about how best to do this.55  
2.2 The impact of Osman beyond the police 
The Osman principles have been found to be relevant to agencies other than the 
police. Most notably the obligation to take protective measures has been recognised 
as applying to situations of prison custody.  
This project interviewed a number of individuals working in the area of prison 
healthcare, where the Osman principles are particularly relevant. They included 
healthcare professionals working in prison settings and a small number of people 
involved in policy development and management. In contrast to those working in 
policing most of those interviewed had not heard of Osman. Those that had known 
the case through independent study or research. However, on being told the 
principles of the case – that a violation of Article 2 exists where authorities knew or 
ought to have known of a real and immediate risk to life and failed to take measures 
within their scope that could have averted the risk – all said that it accorded with their 
understanding of their obligations. One commented, “I would assume the standard is 
applicable – and would always have expected this to be the case”.  
This project also examined published prison policies dealing with relevant aspects of 
the prison regime. These, and their relationship to other cases being considered by 
this project, are examined in more detail in Chapter 3. With regard to Osman, and in 
contrast with policing, the policies examined do not explicitly mention the case or its 
principles. 
2.3 Recognition of the Osman Principles  
Among the police officers this project spoke to there was a high level of awareness of 
the case and some senior level officers were well-versed in its principles and ways in 
which these are reflected in policy and practice. A small number of police in less 
senior positions completed a short questionnaire on Osman for this project. The 
group was so small – just six individuals – that it is not possible to draw any 
generalised conclusions from it, however, all of those completing the questionnaire 
 
54  Other forces are also grappling with this issue. However of the five the project engaged with only 
two mentioned it to us.  
55  For example the officer had concerns that referring the individual to relevant agencies or 
contacting family might raise issues around the right to privacy and family life. 
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recognised the principles of the case as something that guided their work. As a group 
they were less sure about implementing the principles in practice – only two were 
confident that they knew what “known or ought to have known” means in practice.  
This accords with comments from some of our interviewees who sounded a note of 
caution about the apparently high level of awareness of the Osman case. As 
reflected in this project’s limited contact with frontline officers a certain level of 
awareness of a case does not, in itself, guarantee understanding of the case’s 
principles nor that they are put into practice. According to our more senior 
interviewees that lies more with robust policies, robust policy development 
mechanisms and thorough dissemination. 
One senior officer expressed concern about the dangers of referring to ideas and 
principles using labels such as the case from which they derive. In some cases this 
can cause people to believe they are complying with relevant principles without 
actually thinking critically – it can, she warns, become a box-ticking exercise – “Have 
we done Osman? Yes”.56 
Among those interviewed by this project working in the area of prisons, awareness of 
the case was markedly lower. However anecdotal evidence suggests that this may 
not mean a lack of understanding of the principles of the case.   Cases involving 
prison custody in which the Osman principles have been used, and relevant prison 
policies are considered below – they could be argued to indicate a different approach 
to case law but not necessarily a different outcome. 
3. Conclusion 
Our research revealed that case law is a significant part of the policy-development 
process within policing. It identified a wide range of policing policies, as well as 
practical options for protecting life, that are informed by the case of Osman. The case 
also features in ongoing policy and practice development. Awareness of the case is 
high, although concern is sometimes expressed as to whether awareness translates 
into understanding. 
 
56  Officers referred to the case of R v Johnson [1998] 1 WLR 1377 as having a similar status as a 
label for certain processes.  
  
40
                                           
CHAPTER 3 
THE RIGHTS OF DETAINEES: KEENAN, MIDDLETON, AMIN, 
WRIGHT AND EDWARDS 
 
This chapter looks at the cases of Keenan, Middleton, Wright, Edwards and Amin. All 
involve deaths in prison custody.57 We examine the role of case law in the process of 
policy development in prisons and in prison healthcare. The chapter looks at the case 
of Keenan and its impact on segregation, the case of Middleton and the way in which 
it has shaped the practice of inquests, and the cases of Wright, Edwards and Amin 
and their impact on meeting the investigative obligations under Article 2. The chapter 
goes on to look at the evolution of prison policies on information sharing, risk 
assessments, healthcare and suicide prevention. The chapter makes brief 
observations about the impact of these cases on police custody. 
1. The cases and their context 
Keenan concerned a suicide in custody of an individual with mental illness, following 
a period of segregation. Middleton concerned the investigative obligations triggered 
by a suicide in prison. Wright concerned an individual who died from an asthma 
attack. The case looked at the investigative mechanisms and at Article 3. Edwards 
involved a killing by a cell-mate. Both individuals had mental health problems, and 
the judgment discussed both the investigative obligations and the preventive 
measures that might have been taken to avert the risk to life. The Amin judgment 
was about the investigative obligations of Article 2 following the killing of Zahid 
Mubarek by his cell-mate. 
The impact these cases have had on policy and practice is difficult to discern given 
widespread consensus that reducing deaths in custody is an aspiration that should 
be embraced. As one senior manager within the National Offender Management 
Service (NOMS) put it: “I don’t need persuading that trying to stop people dying is a 
good idea”. 
A wide range of initiatives feed into efforts to reduce deaths in custody. In 2004 the 
Joint Committee on Human Rights (JCHR) published a report on deaths in custody 
 
57  Keenan v UK (2001) 33 EHRR 38; R (on the application of Middleton) v Coroner for the Western 
District of Somerset [2004] 2 AC 182; R (on the application of Amin) v S/S for the Home 
Department [2004] 1 AC 653; R (on the application of Wright) v S/S for the Home Department 
[2001] 1 Lloyd’s Rep Med 478; [2001] EWHC Admin 520; 2001 WL 606447; Edwards v UK 
(2002) 35 EHRR 19. 
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which examined prison overcrowding, risk assessment, healthcare and more.58 The 
report’s “principal conclusion” was the need for a central forum to address the 
problem of deaths in custody. The Forum for Preventing Deaths in Custody, bringing 
together government, police, healthcare, prisons, coroners and the independent 
sector, met for the first time in November 2005. The government response to the 
JCHR report noted a range of initiatives relevant to reducing deaths in custody.59  
2. The impact of these cases 
This project looked at national level prison policies and spoke to a number of those 
involved in their development in order to discern the imprint of these cases and to 
understand the policy-making process. The cases all have implications for the 
delivery of healthcare in prisons and we spoke to individuals involved in delivery.60 
We also spoke to some police forces about their custody work. 
2.1 The process of change: prisons 
In 2008 new structures have been put in place, as part of the restructuring of the 
Ministry of Justice (MOJ), bringing together the Probation Service and HM Prison 
Service, under NOMS. NOMS is now responsible for prison policy and for delivery of 
prison services through HM Prison Service and through private suppliers.  
Prison policy and practice are governed by legislation in the form of the Prison Rules, 
Prison Service Orders (PSOs) and Prison Service Instructions (PSIs). PSOs and 
PSIs are developed nationally, reflect relevant legislation and include rules, 
regulations and guidelines by which prisons are governed.   PSOs and PSIs are 
mandatory – PSOs are used for rules intended to be in place for an indefinite period. 
PSIs have an expiry date and are also used to amend PSOs.61 Individual prisons 
must comply with PSOs and PSIs and will use them as the basis for local policies, 
guidelines and practices. One NOMS policy maker comments: 
(t)here’s enough flexibility in a PSO to allow governors to mould it to their 
own needs. They should take hold of it and develop their local instructions. 
NOMS policy staff told this project that PSOs and PSIs are subject to a three-yearly 
review process. This takes into account a variety of sources including case law, 
investigations, legislation, best practice, learning from previous incidents, and 
recommendations from inquiries.  
 
58  http://www.publications.parliament.uk/pa/jt200405/jtselect/jtrights/15/1502.htm.  
59  http://www.publications.parliament.uk/pa/jt200506/jtselect/jtrights/60/6002.htm and 
http://www.publications.parliament.uk/pa/jt200405/jtselect/jtrights/69/6902.htm 
60  Interviews with other prison staff would give a more complete picture but the approval process 
was too lengthy for this project.   
61  http://www.hmprisonservice.gov.uk/resourcecentre/psispsos/ 
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Asked about the role of case law and human rights law more generally in policy 
formation one NOMS senior manager noted that cases from the ECtHR had always 
formed part of their policy debates – including before the HRA. Legal advice was an 
important element of the process with a legal adviser on the NOMS management 
board. The aim is to be “human rights compliant” and this is a constant process: 
Like all bits of law, as the courts interpret the Act and case law builds round 
it, actually the law moves slightly so you’re not always sure which way it will 
move…you sometimes have to respond to movements on what you 
previously thought was ok. 
In some cases of policy revision case law is referred to expressly. One NOMS policy-
maker noted that this “helps staff understand”. He wouldn’t expect staff to read the 
case but a quick reference helps people implementing policy appreciate the drivers 
for change. One NOMS senior manager expected that Prison Governors would know 
leading cases and know the reasons behind policy changes, but did not think 
awareness of cases beyond governors was helpful. He expressed concern that staff 
would “worry” about applying learning from cases and the result would be confusion: 
It’s important we give them guidance that’s based on the law but in an 
understandable coherent form that they can manage.62  
When asked about training provision for prison workers the Prison Service College 
told us that their training curriculum does not include specific training on human rights 
– although certain aspects of human rights would be integrated into various courses. 
“The right to life wouldn’t be covered, but the sentiments would”. Similarly Article 3 
would not be covered as such but issues of treating prisoners with “respect and 
dignity” would. 
2.2 The process of change: healthcare in prisons 
Health services in the prisons of England and Wales have undergone radical 
changes in the last five years, with responsibility passing from the Prison Service to 
the National Health Service, mainly through Primary Care Trusts (PCTs), in 2003.  
 
62  In addition to the case of Keenan, considered below, another instance where a direct link is 
identifiable between a case and policy changes, as reflected in PSOs, is with regard to the “prison 
babies” case (R [on the application of P and Q] v S/S for the Home Department [2001] EWCA Civ 
1151). PSO 4801 on the Management of Mother and Baby Units notes: “in a few (legal) cases we 
have accepted the need to modify our approach and MBU staff have been informed of 
developments as they arose”. The PSO goes on to cite the case and reflects its findings in the 
section on age limits.  
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These changes were kick-started by the November 1996 report, Patient or Prisoner? 
by then HM Inspector of Prisons David Ramsbotham. The underlying principle of 
these changes is that of equivalence – that prisoners should be able to access the 
same healthcare in prison as non-prisoners do in the community.  
Our interviews with healthcare professionals working with or in the prison system 
revealed a low level of awareness of the cases selected. Nearly all said they did not 
receive training or guidance on case law. They had not received and were not aware 
of training or guidance on human rights more generally. Healthcare professionals 
expressed a high level of interest in human rights and commitment to the underlying 
principles. One prison psychiatrist said: 
I don’t work with case law at the front of my mind but I do work with the driving 
principle that this is a very marginalised under-represented group so I would say  
that human rights principles are very much at the forefront of my mind. 
Several expressed concern that they lacked the requisite knowledge to understand 
fully the implications of human rights for their work and to ensure they were putting 
human rights principles into practice. Some noted that working in prisons was – 
relative to the overall work of a PCT - such a small and specialised area of 
healthcare that they felt their work was not given appropriate priority.  
Most healthcare interviewees were unsure whether case law was monitored by PCTs 
and the extent to which it played a role in policy development. One said that case law 
plays an indirect role in health policy, and another that his PCT had a legal 
department that would monitor case law and alert staff to relevant cases. He also 
mentioned best practice guidance from the Department of Health as something he 
felt would include learning from case law. This interviewee – who had studied human 
rights independently – felt that it was important that case law did play a role in the 
formulation of healthcare policies and that policies and procedures are seen as 
positive guidance, not just about risk aversion. A number of interviewees felt that 
Clinical Governance mechanisms help ensure compliance with human rights 
standards and law. 
One interviewee noted that a recent driver of change around engagement with 
human rights has been the Healthcare Commission’s introduction of human rights 
into its consideration of the work of PCTs: 
… it has made us start to think about human rights in the way previously we have 
thought about equality and diversity. 
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Interviews revealed interesting and relevant changes in policy and practice but the 
cases could not be identified as particular drivers for these changes. Changes to 
healthcare provision have been driven by much wider considerations and institutional 
restructuring.  
As NHS employees, rather than prison employees, healthcare professionals are not 
bound by PSOs, however all commented that they operate within them, one saying 
that this co-operation was “to enable the running of the prison as one”. Interviewees 
were unable to provide examples of NHS-originated prison-related policies.  
2.3 Keenan: changing the use of segregation 
Mark Keenan committed suicide in prison in 1993. He had a long history of mental 
illness. While in prison he assaulted prison officers. He was placed in segregation 
and had extra days of detention added to his sentence.  
• The court applied the Osman criteria – that Article 2 is violated if authorities 
knew or should have known of the risk and failed to take reasonable steps 
that would have prevented it. No violation of Article 2 was found. 
• The court held that the punishments imposed on Mark Keenan were: “not 
compatible with the standard of treatment required in respect of a mentally ill 
person. It must be regarded as constituting inhuman and degrading treatment 
and punishment within the meaning of Article 3 of the Convention”.63 
 
Segregation in prisons is governed by PSO 1700.64 This was revised in the light of 
Keenan.65 One NOMS policy maker said: “(w)e looked at the judgment with our legal 
advisers and identified key areas of failure”. This causation is backed up by explicit 
reference to the case in the PSO:  
The importance of treating prisoner’s (sic) as individuals and taking into 
account their personal circumstances when making decisions was 
emphasised in the judgment of the European Court of Human Rights in 
Keenan v. the United Kingdom (April 2001).  
The government cited the revision of the PSO as part of its response to the Keenan 
case, as reflected in the Council of Europe’s assessment of implementation:  
 
63 Keenan v UK (2001) 33 EHRR 38 at para 116. 
64 PSO 1700 – Segregation, available at: http://pso.hmprisonservice.gov.uk/pso1700/default.htm. 
65 The PSO is currently under further review. This process, interviewees told this project, was initiated 
by the requirement that all PSOs are reviewed every three years. The current review is a 
“tripartite” review being carried out by Offender Health – a partnership between the Ministry of 
Justice and the Department of Health, and the Safer Custody Group and Security Policy Unit 
which operate within NOMS. 
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In the view of the United Kingdom authorities, a revision of the Segregation 
Policy (Prison Service Order 1700) and a revision of the Prison Rules by 
Statutory Instrument 2005 No. 3437 have solved the problem in respect of 
Article 3 of the Convention.66 
The PSO cites empirical research, in addition to the case, as a reason for ensuring 
the possible impact of segregation on mental health is taken into account.  
One of the key changes to the use of segregation is the use of a new “Initial 
Segregation Safety Screen” which has to be completed by a registered nurse or a 
doctor within two hours of a prisoner being segregated. The screen includes specific 
questions that may lead to the conclusion that “there are healthcare reasons not to 
segregate at this time”. This conclusion must be fully taken into account by the 
manager authorising segregation. Our NOMS and healthcare interviewees noted the 
manager has to balance this with other considerations, including the safety of staff 
and other prisoners; healthcare workers said that whilst they can offer their opinion 
the final decision lies with prison officials. Most welcome this change from the 
previous system under which a doctor had to certify an individual “fit” for segregation. 
The PSO is explicit in noting that individuals identified as at risk of suicide or self-
harm “must only be kept in segregation in exceptional circumstances”. 
Processes for monitoring segregation have also changed. A segregation review 
board – including a healthcare representative – must meet within 72 hours of an 
individual being segregated. The Chair of the board has final authority over 
decisions.  
The PSO notes a range of measures, clearly related to the Keenan case, to protect 
the mental health of those in segregation. These are provided as ways in which 
prisons can take into account individual circumstances, as referred to in Keenan and 
include removal from segregation, increasing medical support, active management of 
a case incorporating both medical and prison staff, and provision of listening 
services.   
After PSO 1700 was introduced the Independent Monitoring Board (IMB) carried out 
a review of its implementation, concluding that all prisons were implementing the 
PSO, despite some “initial problems”.67 
 
66  Implementation of judgments of the European Court of Human Rights, Committee on Legal 
Affairs and Human Rights, Council of Europe: Introductory memorandum 26 May 2008. 
67  Independent Monitoring Boards, Review of PSO 1700, 22 March 2005, available at: 
http://www.imb.gov.uk/docs/dc-05-05.pdf?view=Binary. 
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Healthcare professionals involved in segregation interviewed by this project were 
aware of the PSO and were aware of the need for careful consideration of mental 
health issues in undertaking segregation. The interviewees were not aware of the 
Keenan case, or the finding that his treatment had been in violation of Article 3, 
however, or the ways in which the case had influenced changes in policy.  
Asked about the current use of segregation a number of interviewees expressed 
concern but none indicated that its current use might fall short of the findings of 
Keenan. The Prisons and Probation Ombudsman (PPO) told this project that a 
disproportionate number of self-inflicted deaths occur in segregation and that it 
remains a concern for him: 
Are the conditions in seg conducive to the care of someone who is a threat 
to himself? Evidently not… Are we better at caring for people in seg than we 
used to be? Yes. 
The case of Keenan was key in bringing about changes in the way that segregation 
is used, though other factors also influenced the policy review. The case prompted a 
review of policy aimed at ensuring segregation not be used in a way that falls short of 
Article 3 of the ECHR. Medical practitioners interviewed by this project were aware of 
these policies, though they were not aware of the Keenan case.  
2.4 Middleton: expanding the role of inquests  
Colin Middleton committed suicide in custody. The court examined whether or not the 
inquest regime, established by the Coroners Act 1988 and the Coroners Rules 1984, 
met the investigative requirements of the ECHR. The court held:  
• that an inquest, as a means of discharging the state’s investigative obligation, 
ought to culminate in expression of the jury’s conclusion on the central factual 
issues;  
• that narrow interpretation of the Coroners Act (1988) and Coroners Rules 
(1984) – outlining what the jury may do – meant that the regime did not meet 
the Article 2 requirements;  
• that, in order for inquests to discharge the state’s investigatory obligation, 
coroners must use a broader interpretation of “how” – in the Act and the 
Rules – as not simply meaning “by what means” but as meaning “by what 
means and in what circumstances”. 
 
The case of Middleton has had an identifiable effect on the work of coroners. Putting 
the principles of a legal case into practice is part of a coroner’s everyday role and this 
has simplified the process of change. Further, it would be expected that legislative 
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change around the coronial system would reflect case law. However several 
interviewees with expertise in inquests referred to the implementation of the 
Middleton principles as patchy – citing the absence of national support for coroners, 
resources, lack of legal aid for families, and the length of time taken.  
The key aspect of Middleton that has had an effect is the broadening of the 
interpretation of “how” into “by what means and in what circumstances”. Coroners 
have always been able to use narrative verdicts however there is agreement that the 
Middleton case has increased their use – they are being used by coroners to meet 
this requirement for a broader interpretation. One coroner summed up the impact: 
It means that juries now are able to deliver much more detail on the events 
that they find to be proved…it’s taking longer…more complex issues are 
dealt with…juries are actually being asked to make much more complex 
decisions and…the vast majority of juries are really living up to the 
task…I’ve had some wonderful narrative verdicts…very complex sometimes 
quite long…they are becoming…less inquisitorial and more accusatorial… 
Deborah Cole co-director of the group, Inquest, noted: 
Families were very frustrated prior to the Middleton case with the very 
limited, one word almost, verdicts…and the juries were very frustrated that 
they could have presided over an inquest for a couple of weeks and weren’t 
allowed to express any kind of comment…it (the narrative verdict) plays a 
symbolic role in ordinary citizens expressing views on the conduct of state 
agents and the regimes and conditions within state institutions…where 
coroners recognise the importance of an Article 2 compliant investigation it 
has shone a spotlight into the closed world of the prison system…  
Interviewees concurred that one impact of Middleton has been an increase in the 
length of time taken to reach verdicts and subsequent pressure on resources. One 
tied this to the case of Middleton specifically and to the Human Rights Act in general 
– which has brought with it increased concern about meeting the investigative 
obligations of Article 2:  
If a case was to have lasted an hour, after the Human Rights Act it would 
last a day and if it was to have lasted a week it would last several weeks 
and prison cases very, very rarely are concluded within a few days 
now…And that’s…because there is far more detailed investigation required 
to comply with the state’s responsibility to investigate where life has not 
been protected or where life has been taken by state action…  
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One prison expert that we spoke to sounded caution about the impact of Middleton. 
While acknowledging that it has had a clear impact on the work of coroners he 
expressed doubt as to the extent these broader verdicts will have wider impact, “(t)he 
prison system isn’t geared to picking these things up and learning from them”. This 
view is echoed by others. Deborah Cole said: 
I’d like to say it had made a difference in preventing deaths but that’s a 
more difficult process. In the absence of proper mechanisms to ensure 
'accountable' learning from deaths - such as a Standing Commission On 
Custodial Deaths, it is difficult to be positive as to the potential impact of 
Middleton.68  
Another note of caution is the consistency with which the judgment has been acted 
upon by coroners – one interviewee summed this up by saying, “there’s a post-code 
lottery, depending on which coroner you get”. 
Legislative reform of the coronial system was outlined by government in a draft bill 
published in 2006 but not yet been brought before parliament. In a written response 
to this project the MOJ noted that the Coroners Bill appears in the draft legislative 
programme for the next session:   
The Bill has been drafted so as to ensure that investigations into deaths 
under the Bill are compatible with the ECHR as determined by Middleton. 
Subsection (1) of clause 8 provides that the purpose of an investigation is to 
ascertain who the deceased was, and when, where and by what means he 
or she died. Subsection (2) provides that where necessary for the purpose 
of avoiding a breach of Convention rights, the purpose of an investigation is 
to be read as including the purpose of ascertaining in what circumstances 
the person died. 
2.5 Wright, Edwards and Amin: more elaboration of the investigative 
obligations 
This section provides a brief outline of key aspects of the cases of Wright, Edwards 
and Amin on the investigative obligations under Article 2. The following section looks 
at how these investigative obligations are being met.  
 
 
 
68  In July 2008 Rule 43 of the Coroners’ Rules was amended giving Coroners a wider remit to make 
reports aimed at preventing future deaths and placing an obligation on those who receive such 
reports to respond. 
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2.5.1 The case of Wright 
Wright - who had a history of serious asthma - died in prison on November 7, 1996, 
as a result of a severe asthma attack. An inquest was held at which the family 
participated without legal representation. A key witness – Wright’s cellmate – did not 
give evidence. The court held: 
• That where the victim had died and it was arguable that there has been a 
breach of Article 2, the investigation should have the general features 
identified in Jordan v United Kingdom;69  
• That the holding of an inquest may or may not satisfy the implied obligation to 
investigate arising under Article 2. This depended upon the facts of the case 
and the course of events at the inquest;70 
• That the inquest in this case did not constitute an effective official 
investigation, because the cell-mate was not called to give evidence and his 
statement was disregarded, there was no consideration at the inquest of the 
shortcomings in the medical treatment given to Wright; the role of the 
restrictions placed on the doctor primarily in charge were not considered; and 
the claimants were not represented at the inquest.71 
 
2.5.2 The case of Edwards 
Christopher Edwards was killed in custody on remand in 1994 by his cell-mate, 
Richard Linford, also on remand. Linford had a history of mental illness and pleaded 
guilty to manslaughter on the grounds of diminished responsibility. In its 
consideration of investigative obligations the ECtHR held:   
• That the purpose of an investigation “is to secure the effective 
implementation of the domestic laws which protect the right to life and…to 
ensure their accountability for deaths occurring under their responsibility”;72  
• That the authorities must act of their own motion; that investigations must be 
independent and prompt; there must be sufficient public scrutiny and next of 
kin involvement;73  
 
 
69  Jordan v UK (2001) 27 EHRR 52. 
70  R (on the application of Wright) v S/S for the Home Department [2001] 1 Lloyd’s Rep Med 478, at 
para 43. 
71  R (on the application of Wright) v S/S for the Home Department [2001] 1 Lloyd’s Rep Med 478, at 
para 60. 
72  Edwards v UK (2002) 35 EHRR 19 at para 69. 
73  Edwards v UK (2002) 35 EHRR 19 at paras 70-73. 
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• That the lack of power to compel witnesses “must be regarded as diminishing 
the effectiveness of the inquiry as an investigative mechanism”;74  
• That the involvement of Edwards’ parents had not been sufficient (they were 
not represented; most of the inquiry was conducted in private).75  
 
2.5.3 The case of Amin  
Zahid Mubarek, serving a custodial sentence in a young offenders' institution, was, 
like Edwards, killed by his cell mate who had a history of violence and racism. The 
House of Lords upheld an appeal against the Court of Appeal’s decision that an 
inquiry was not required.  The court held: 
• That the principles held in Jordan v UK applied to cases not involving 
deliberate or alleged killing by state agents.76 These principles were, inter 
alia, that the obligation to carry out an effective investigation into death in 
custody included, as a minimum, sufficient public scrutiny to secure 
accountability and an appropriate level of participation by the next-of-kin to 
safeguard their legitimate interests;77 
• That the family had not played an effective part in investigations held to date 
and that investigations to date had not been fully independent.78  
2.6 Meeting the investigative obligations 
The judgments in all these cases – Middleton, Wright, Edwards and Amin, had 
implications for the investigative obligations of Article 2.  
In the case of Amin the direct impact was the Mubarek Inquiry whose terms of 
reference were: 
To investigate and report to the Home Secretary on the death of Zahid 
Mubarek, and the events leading up to the attack on him, and make 
recommendations about the prevention of such attacks in the future, taking 
into account the investigations that have already taken place - in particular, 
those by the Prison Service and the Commission for Racial Equality.79 
 
74  Edwards v UK (2002) 35 EHRR 19 at para 79. 
75  Edwards v UK (2002) 35 EHRR 19 at para 84. 
76  Jordan v UK (2001) 27 EHRR 52. 
77  R (on the application of Amin) v S/S for the Home Department [2004] 1 AC 653 at para 20. 
78  R (on the application of Amin) v S/S for the Home Department [2004] 1 AC 653 at para 36. 
79  http://www.zahidmubarekinquiry.org.uk/. 
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Government has changed the way deaths in custody are investigated as part of its 
efforts to ensure compliance with these investigative obligations. Since 2004 deaths 
in police custody are investigated by the IPCC and deaths in prison custody, 
approved premises and detention centres, by the PPO. This is intended to 
complement coroners’ inquests to meet Article 2 requirements. The PPO told us that 
the addition of such investigations to his mandate was a huge change that reflected a 
variety of cases, none of which forced the government into making this change “but 
thoughts of Article 2 compliance were not far away”. A senior NOMS policy-maker 
held the same view – saying that all these cases contributed to the decision to hand 
the investigative role to the PPO. In its response to the JCHR report on deaths in 
custody the government confirmed that the purpose of this change was to ensure 
independence in carrying out investigations: 
The prime purpose of involving the IPCC and PPO in investigating deaths in 
custody was to ensure independence from the police and Prison Service 
respectively.80 
Another effect of this change in approach may be a counter to the length of time 
inquests take. The PPO noted that his investigations take place more quickly than 
inquests and assist in meeting the requirement that investigations are prompt.  
One coroner told this project: 
It (the HRA) has given us a great deal more to do and I think that’s a good 
thing. These cases are having an impact. They are changing practice. They 
will improve things… (but) more resources are required. 
2.7 Other impacts: information sharing, risk assessments, healthcare, suicide 
prevention 
This section looks at further changes in areas of policy and practice relevant to the 
selected cases. It is clear that it is difficult, however, to identify a direct link between 
single cases and the changes. We found some indirect links, thanks to the detail and 
high profile of the final Mubarek inquiry, with its 88 recommendations. This case 
illustrates the way in which an incident, a legal judgment and an inquiry can become 
merged. When asked about the case interviewees were aware of the incident and the 
inquiry, but often less aware of the judgment. In some cases it is possible to identify a 
cumulative impact – though arguably of incidents as much as legal judgments. The 
cases of Edwards and Amin bore such similarities that both fed into relevant 
changes. This section briefly outlines possible impact, indirect impact and joint 
 
80  Joint Committee on Human Rights, Second Report, Appendix 1, Government Response, 
available at: http://www.publications.parliament.uk/pa/jt200506/jtselect/jtrights/60/6005.htm. 
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impact, as well as feedback from interviewees about the relevance of the cases and 
the impact of these changes to policy and practice. 
Information sharing was an issue highlighted by the court in the Edwards case. One 
key policy change in this area has been with regard to the use of Prisoner Escort 
Records (PER). A substantial revision of their use was introduced in 2000 (after 
Edwards was killed but before the ECtHR case), with a PSO binding on prisons and 
escort contractors and separate guidance issued to police.81 The aim of the PER is to 
ensure information about risk – whether to the prisoner or to others – is effectively 
communicated.  
Healthcare interviewees acknowledged that overall systems – including records 
beyond the PER – had improved but expressed continued concern about incomplete 
records and late transfers of records. Others noted the high turnover of prisoners as 
a problem in ensuring good record-keeping. Interviewees commented that computer 
systems are limited and that different agencies – prisons, police, healthcare providers 
– have different systems, complicating the mechanics of sharing information. The 
cost of any form of integration would be enormous. One psychiatrist gave the 
example of an individual who had schizophrenia and was detained for six months 
before the psychiatrist was made aware of his being in the prison. In another case an 
individual whom he was in the process of assessing was sent to another prison and, 
whilst he sent relevant records to the receiving prison, he was not aware of a 
systematic approach to ensuring this happened and that records were received and 
made available to those that needed them.  
All interviewees when asked about the impact of these cases said that risk 
assessment procedures have evolved. A new risk assessment form on cell-sharing 
was introduced in 2002.82 It notes: 
A recent judgment by the European Court in the case of the tragic murder of 
Christopher Edwards, found that the Prison Service was in breach of Article 
2 of the Human Rights Act in that it failed to have in place an adequate risk 
assessment procedure.  Although improved procedures, such as the 
Prisoner Escort Record (PER) form have since been introduced, the murder 
of Zahid Mubarek at HMYOI Feltham revealed continuing weaknesses in 
our ability to risk assess and to track potentially violent or racist prisoners 
who should not share cells with other prisoners. 
 
81  PSO 1025: Communicating Information about Risks on Escort or transfer: the Prisoner Escort 
Record, available at: 
http://pso.hmprisonservice.gov.uk/PSO_1025_the_prisoner_escort_form.doc. 
82  PSI: Cell Sharing Risk Assessment, available at: 
http://psi.hmprisonservice.gov.uk/PSI_2002_026_cell_sharing_risk_assessment.doc. 
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In 2007 a broader policy document – PSO 2750 – on violence reduction was 
introduced.83 This brings together “policy on violence reduction, anti-bullying and cell 
sharing risk assessment under one PSO”. Healthcare workers told us that risk 
assessment procedures had improved considerably. One notes that she felt 
confident such procedures would prevent situations such as those in Edwards or in 
Amin from arising again. Others express concern – noting the need not just for 
policies but for them to be implemented by the right people with the right training.  
A challenge in ensuring policies on risk assessment and violence reduction are 
translated into practice, identified by interviewees, is capacity. One prison expert 
noted that the underlying principle of PSO 2750 – that conflict and risk management 
requires early identification of sources of conflict – was good, but that staff lacked the 
capacity to put this proactive approach fully into place. At HM Young Offender 
Institution & Remand Centre Feltham capacity pressures mean that there are now 72 
individuals sharing cells84 which increases the need for careful risk assessment, and 
changes staff/prisoner ratios. In July 2008 HMIP expressed concern about cell-
sharing at HMP Doncaster where a number of cells had been converted to 
accommodate three individuals.85 
In the case of Wright the court noted shortcomings in his medical treatment, including 
monitoring and treating a long-term chronic illness. Interviewees noted an 
improvement in this area, which they attributed to the structural changes outlined 
above. Most believed that there was continued scope for improvement – for example 
the lack of staff trained on a wide range of chronic conditions would hinder access to 
treatment equivalent to that received by people in the community.  
Provision of mental health services and associated work on suicide prevention were 
also cited by interviewees as areas of change relevant to these cases. Again the 
drivers for these changes are multiple – overall structural change to healthcare, a 
shared desire to reduce suicide, academic research and, according to the PSI that 
outlines the changes: 
 
 
83  PSO 2750: Violence Reduction, available at:  
http://pso.hmprisonservice.gov.uk/PSO_2750_violence_reduction.doc. 
84  Numbers of prisoners change rapidly. This number was provided by a member of the 
Independent Monitoring Board who had visited HMP Feltham days before our interview in late 
August.  
85  Report on an unannounced full follow-up inspection of HMP Doncaster, 11–15 February 2008 by 
HM Chief Inspector of Prisons. 
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… existing good practice, the results of piloting in five establishments, and 
learning from previous incidents of suicide and self-harm.86 
Interviewees were not aware of the specific cases playing a particular role. One of 
the key changes in this area has been the introduction of the Assessment, Care in 
Custody & Teamwork (ACCT) plans, in 2005, replacing the risk of self-harm forms.87 
The ACCT plans are premised on inter-agency and multi-disciplinary co-operation. It 
is not enough to identify risk, but comprehensive plans, including health plans, need 
to be put in place to address that risk. Healthcare interviewees, prison experts and 
the PPO all said that the system was an improvement. Another key change has been 
the introduction of mental health “in-reach” teams – new teams situated in prisons 
providing mental health services. 
2.8 Police Custody  
We spoke to a number of police officers about these cases to assess their impact on 
police custody. Awareness of the cases varied. Most were aware of the killing of 
Zahid Mubarek and the subsequent inquiry. A small number were aware of the 
Edwards case. One senior officer noted that both she and colleagues she had 
consulted with had not known the cases but, on reading them, “recognised the 
content” and “knew the principles”. 
All the forces that this project engaged with noted that the main source of guidance 
on their custody procedures was legislation – either the Police and Criminal Evidence 
Act 1984 or national Guidance on the Safer Detention and Handling of Persons in 
Police Custody.88  
A number of police cited the killing of Mubarek as having resulted in reviews of their 
policies. One senior officer noted that in her force the policy review prompted by 
Mubarek resulted in a more explicit explanation of the importance of not cell-sharing, 
and reminders about the importance of risk assessments.  
 
86  PSI: Introducing ACCT (Assessment, Care in Custody & Teamwork) – the replacement for the 
F2052SH (Risk of Self-Harm), available at: 
http://psi.hmprisonservice.gov.uk/PSI_2005_18_assessment_care_in_custody_and_teamwork_A
CCT.doc. 
87  PSI: Introducing ACCT (Assessment, Care in Custody & Teamwork) – the replacement for the 
F2052SH (Risk of Self-Harm), available at: 
http://psi.hmprisonservice.gov.uk/PSI_2005_18_assessment_care_in_custody_and_teamwork_A
CCT.doc. 
88  Guidance on the Safer Detention and Handling of Persons in Police Custody, produced on behalf 
of ACPO and the Home Office by the National Centre for Policing Excellence, 2006. See 
http://police.homeoffice.gov.uk/publications/operational-
policing/Safer_Detention_and_Handlin1.pdf?view=Binary. 
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3. Conclusion 
From our research it was apparent that these cases concerning various deaths in 
custody cannot be isolated from their context in order to isolate their impact on policy 
and practice. There is a basic level of widespread agreement that the aspiration to 
reduce deaths in custody is one that should be embraced. The issues that arose in 
the cases are complex – they are deeply embedded and impact on each other and 
on other areas of policy and practice. They are also affected by fundamental 
structural change as well as lower level policy change. Chronologies of associated 
change are complex since policy changes occur at different stages – including before 
legal judgments. For these reasons it is difficult to identify clearly the impact and 
chains of cause and effect. However we have seen the imprint of cases and in some 
they are explicitly identified as driving forces. Where these cases concern themselves 
with the investigative obligation it is easier to identify an impact within the broader 
legal system. Broader changes initiated by government are seen as having been 
precipitated, if not caused, by the cases collectively.  
Where human rights cases have had impact awareness of the drivers for change 
appears to be in place at the levels of policy-makers and managers. This project was 
not able to engage with frontline prison workers but comments from others indicate 
that a low level of awareness of cases could be expected. Engagement with frontline 
prison health workers showed a high level of interest in human rights with many 
desiring more information.89  
 
 
89  It should be noted that agreeing to be interviewed for this project obviously acted as a filter, and 
perhaps high level of interest in human rights issues among those who agreed to be interviewed 
could be expected.  
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CHAPTER 4 
THE POSITIVE OBLIGATION TO ADDRESS DIFFERENCE:       
PRICE V UK 
 
This chapter examines the case of Price v UK. It looks at the impact of the case on 
the police force involved and looks at the impact on other forces. It asks whether or 
not the case is still relevant in light of substantial changes relevant to detaining 
people with disabilities.   
1. The case and its context 
Adele Price, a severely-disabled person with four-limb deficiency and kidney 
problems, was committed to prison for seven days for contempt of court in January 
1995. She was taken to Lincoln Police Station where she spent one night in a cell not 
adapted for a disabled person.  The bed was not suitable, she had to sleep in her 
wheel chair, emergency buttons and light switches were out of reach and she could 
not use the toilet. She was seen by a doctor who confirmed that the cell was 
unsuitable and too cold for someone who could not move around.  Next day she was 
transferred to New Hall Women’s Prison, Wakefield and detained in their health care 
centre. The centre had wheelchair access and other adaptations. She stayed there 
for the remainder of her period of detention –three nights and four days.90  She 
alleged that she was left with no option but to allow male staff to assist her with going 
to the toilet; and that female staff had removed her bed clothes in the presence of 
male staff. The government denied that these incidents had occurred.91  
The court found a violation of Article 3:  
The Court considers that to detain a severely disabled person in conditions 
where she is dangerously cold, risks developing sores because her bed is 
too hard or unreachable, and is unable to go to the toilet or keep clean 
without the greatest of difficulty, constitutes degrading treatment contrary to 
Article 3 of the Convention.92 
 
90  Price v UK (2001) 34 EHRR 128 at paras 7-11. 
91  Price v UK (2001) 34 EHRR 128 at para 15. 
92 Price v UK (2001) 34 EHRR 128 at para 30. 
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Two separate opinions identified further issues. Judge Bratza, joined by Judge 
Costa, notes that the “primary responsibility” for the violation lay with the judicial 
authorities. The opinion notes:  
… failings in the standard of care provided by the police and prison 
authorities…stemmed in large part from the lack of preparedness on the 
part of both to receive and look after a severely handicapped person in 
conditions which were wholly unsuited to her needs. 
However the responsibility lay with judicial authorities taking the decision to commit 
the applicant to an immediate term of imprisonment without at the very least ensuring 
in advance that there existed both adequate facilities for detaining her and conditions 
of detention in which her special needs could be met.93 
Judge Greve linked the case to the ECHR’s provisions on discrimination. She makes 
the point that in order to avoid unnecessary hardship – that is, hardship not implicit in 
the imprisonment of an able-bodied person – she has to be treated differently from 
other people because her situation is significantly different. 
She also notes that the judge, the police and prison authorities contributed, and that 
each of them should have ensured that the applicant was not put into detention until 
special arrangements had been made such as were needed to compensate for her 
disabilities, arrangements that would have ensured that her treatment was equivalent 
to that of other prisoners. 
2. The impact of the case  
The case of Price relates to both police and prison detention; the judgment is not 
explicit in linking the violation to both settings but conditions it lists as cumulatively 
contrary to Article 3 include treatment experienced in both. This project focused on 
the impact of Price on police policy and practice, though some relevant indications 
concerning prison custody are mentioned.  
Police we interviewed about the case of Price were largely unaware of it. Many 
viewed the circumstances of the case as unusual and took the view that current 
policy and legislation would prevent a similar situation from recurring.  
 
 
 
93  Judges that this project spoke to were unaware of the case. 
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2.1 The impact of the case on Lincolnshire Police 
When asked about the case of Price, Lincolnshire Police said they had been unable 
to locate relevant files and were unsure what measures had been taken by them in 
response to the case. They outlined a number of policies and procedures that they 
felt would mean a situation like Price would not occur now. 
A Custody Policy was put in place in 2006 – five years after the case was heard in 
Strasbourg.94 Lincolnshire Police said that at the time of Adele Price’s detention the 
force did not have such a policy. They said that the new Custody Policy reflects the 
national Guidance on the Safer Detention and Handling of Persons in Police 
Custody95 and the force’s own Disability Equality Scheme.96 Lincolnshire Police 
provided the examples of new custody buildings at Grantham – recently completed, 
and designed and constructed in accordance with Home Office Police Custody 
Buildings Design Guide. Further they have an ongoing project to bring their practices 
in line with the Safer Detention Guidance. The force commented that resources were 
a key issue in bringing all facilities into line with the guidance, and considered 
improved training for all those involved in custody work to be a main priority.  
They have measures in place to ensure learning is integrated into the police force. 
The force is currently reviewing its Lessons Learned policy, for example, and has 
horizon-scanning and risk management processes, which together should ensure 
awareness of developments – such as court cases, IPCC reports and the work of 
other forces – that should affect its work. The force also works with others in the 
region to develop their approaches and learn from each other.  
The force undertakes a human rights appraisal for all policies which identifies which 
areas of human rights are or might be engaged by a new or revised policy. The legal 
section then examines the policy in detail in order to ensure compliance with human 
rights obligations and those completing the initial appraisal are provided with 
guidance to assist in identifying possible human rights issues.  
 
 
 
94  Lincolnshire Police Custody Policy, available at: 
http://lincs.police.uk/index.asp?locID=470&docID=-1. 
95  Guidance on the Safer Detention and Handling of Persons in Police Custody, produced on behalf 
of ACPO and the Home Office by the National Centre for Policing Excellence, 2006. See 
http://police.homeoffice.gov.uk/publications/operational-
policing/Safer_Detention_and_Handlin1.pdf?view=Binary. 
96  Lincolnshire Police Disability Equality Scheme 2006-2009, available at: 
http://lincs.police.uk/index.asp?locID=470&docID=-1. 
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2.2 The Impact of Price beyond Lincolnshire 
The case of Price was not well known among police officials interviewed by this 
project. However interviewees were aware of the issues raised and were able to 
point to policies or legislation that they felt would, or should, avoid a Price-like 
situation from arising again.  
Some were able to give examples of specific considerations in detaining an individual 
with disabilities. One senior officer gave the examples of call bells being accessible 
and of shower facilities being suitable. However, this officer said that his awareness 
of issues of adaptation for people with disabilities derives from the Disability 
Discrimination Act 2005 (DDA), not from human rights law generally or from Price. 
Other officers commented on the importance of being able to recognise and respond 
appropriately to less visible disabilities – such as learning difficulties.  
The main relevant policy documents cited by interviewees were the Guidance on the 
Safer Detention and Handling of Persons in Police Custody97 and the Home Office 
Police Custody Buildings Design Guide, which provides basic standards for the 
design and construction or refurbishment of custody facilities. Compliance with the 
DDA – itself a requirement of the Safer Detention Guidance – was also noted as 
something individuals felt would forestall a recurrence. In its response to this project 
the MOJ noted that, “the police service is now subject to the duty to make reasonable 
adjustments for disabled people in respect of its carrying out of its public functions.” 
The MOJ notes: 
It seems clear that the law has moved on since Price as the Disability 
Discrimination legislation imposes higher standards on the police than those 
required in Price, as it may be reasonable to make adjustments for a disabled 
person even though a failure to make such adjustments would not breach Article 3.   
The Safer Detention Guidance – published since the case of Price was heard – is 
also relevant. Firstly the document includes guidance on carrying out risk 
assessments – which include assessing risks to the detainee.98 The condition of the 
detainee forms an important part of the risk assessment. The guidance notes: 
(i)n assessing these risks consideration should be given to a number of 
physical, mental and medical conditions that may be present.99  
 
97  Guidance on the Safer Detention and Handling of Persons in Police Custody, produced on behalf 
of ACPO and the Home Office by the National Centre for Policing Excellence, 2006. See 
http://police.homeoffice.gov.uk/publications/operational-
policing/Safer_Detention_and_Handlin1.pdf?view=Binary. 
98  Ibid, p.16. 
99  Ibid, p.22. 
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On arrival in a custody suite “(d)etainees should be asked if they have any 
disability”.100 The guidance also includes requirements that anyone detained be 
asked about medical conditions.101 
One senior police officer’s recall of how his force operationalises these requirements 
suggests that he views the requirements broadly: “Anyone arrested is asked if they 
are suffering from any condition that might affect their detention”. The guidance notes 
that where officers are in doubt healthcare professionals should be consulted.102 
Disability also features in the treatment of buildings and facilities in the guidance. It 
notes that the needs of all custody users must be considered in order to ensure 
compliance with the DDA, and refers also to the relevant parts of the Police and 
Criminal Evidence Codes of Practice. Forces must have a policy on compliance with 
the DDA, and must use the Home Office Police Custody Buildings Design Guide and 
the Police Property Service Managers Group Custody Best Practice Document.103 
The MOJ told this project that implementation of the guidance: 
… is monitored by the NPIA Safer Detention Assisted Implementation Team 
and subject to Peer Reviews to monitor progress and to identify noteworthy 
practice and share this with guidance providers and policy developers.   
In January 2008, a national training programme was issued to accompany the 
guidance. 
Another senior officer this project spoke to, also unaware of the Price case, referred 
to the Home Office Police Custody Buildings Design Guide as the source document 
that would prevent a similar situation from arising104. He noted that there are two 
issues a police force needs to attend to – firstly a minimum that can be implemented 
within existing facilities – such as having at least one cell suited to wheelchair use, 
and then, more fundamentally, the requirement that new-builds fully meet the Design 
Guide.   
At national level there are initiatives in place to improve custody. These include a 
National Custody Forum, the Learning the Lessons Group, and the Forum for 
Preventing Deaths in Custody. The MOJ described to us the role of these initiatives 
 
100 Ibid, p.66. 
101 Ibid, p.22. 
102  Ibid, p.66. 
103  Ibid, p.118. 
104  The MOJ told us that this document refers to both human rights law and discrimination law. 
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in considering the broader issues of disability and custody, noting that the National 
Custody Forum: 
… enables practitioner-based advice and practical case scenarios to be 
promoted to a national level for policy and guidance change. 
The Learning the Lessons Group considers:  
… findings from relevant court cases and advice or guidance from other 
groups, for example healthcare professionals.  
The underlying principle of these initiatives is: 
… to recognise that all individuals are vulnerable in custody but that some 
individuals may have greater need of additional support in view of their 
physical or mental condition.    
As well as relevant national policies police officers told this project about practical 
ways they would envisage handling the detention of someone with severe disabilities.  
One senior police officer, unfamiliar with Price, commented that in his force risk 
assessment procedures would include looking at whether they had a suitable place 
to detain a person. If they did not, then other options would be pursued – including 
releasing someone on bail, or using protective custody provided by social services. 
He notes: 
In reality the options are limited – we have to make a professional judgment 
which could be not to detain them. 
In the particular circumstances of Price this would not have been an option open to 
Lincolnshire Police.   
Seeking alternatives is referred to in the Safer Detention guidance. It notes that 
officers must, in consultation with healthcare professionals, determine if an individual 
is fit to be detained.105 Alternatives to police detention are to be considered.106 
Another senior officer comments that an option open to the police if faced with a 
situation such as that which arose in the case of Price would be to make the court 
aware that adequate facilities were not available and enter into a discussion with 
them – “there may be cases where it’s very clear that we don’t have adequate 
facilities”.  
 
105  Ibid, p.66. 
106  Ibid, p.43. 
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Looking for alternatives is an option with limited applicability in the prison sector. One 
NGO analyst that this project spoke to attributes the detention of individuals in 
unsuitable conditions, at least in part, to the prison “inability to say no”; prisons are 
not in a position to turn people away. 
A senior NOMS policy-maker noted that where there is time – such as between 
conviction and sentencing – forward planning allows relevant authorities – including 
prisons – to explore the suitability of available accommodation, or to make 
appropriate plans for the detention of someone with disabilities. However in the Price 
case this was not an option open to the police or prison authorities – nor would it be if 
they were placed in the same situation again.  
3. The relevance of Price v UK and continued concerns for disabled 
detainees 
The argument that the Safer Detention Guidance and the Buildings Design Guide – 
one dealing largely with process, and another dealing with building design – and the 
obligations under the DDA would help avoid a situation like Price arising is a 
reasonable one but we cannot explicitly link this policy and legislation to the Price 
case. Neither is it possible to determine the veracity of claims that they would prevent 
a situation like Price arising again. One senior prison policy maker expressed doubt 
as to the extent the DDA addresses the issues raised by the case of Price. This 
interviewee saw the DDA as primarily setting down parameters that deal with the 
environment – requirements to put in place ramps and stair lifts, for example. 
However she argues that the needs of someone as severely disabled as Adele Price 
cannot be met simply through compliance with the DDA – there are always things 
specific to the individual that require careful planning. She believes the case raised 
more fundamental questions than through changes to process and asks whether 
there is a level of disability that prisons “simply cannot cope with”.   
Other actors express ongoing concern about treatment of prisoners with disabilities. 
The Prison Reform Trust, for example, in a recent report on older prisoners, 
expresses concerns about ill-adapted cells and lack of access to aids, such as 
walking sticks.107 The 2006/07 Annual Report HM Chief Inspector of Prisons notes 
shortcomings and, while it does not indicate the possibility of conditions of detention 
reaching the threshold of Article 3, it does note the possibility of DDA-focused 
litigation: 
…the response to the needs of prisoners with disabilities remains reactive, rather 
than proactive. … attempts to grapple with the new statutory duties are  
 
107  Prison Reform Trust (2008), Doing Time: the experiences and needs of older people in prison, 
available at: http://www.prisonreformtrust.org.uk/standard.asp?id=1470. 
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limited and patchy…reasonable adjustments, or thoughtful adaptations, are 
rarely in place. In one prison, there were insufficient wheelchairs for those 
who needed them; another had cells adapted for wheelchair users where 
the toilet grab bars could not easily be reached…There is clearly a 
considerable amount for prisons to do to comply with their new duties and 
responsibilities under the Disability Discrimination Act 2005. This is an area 
where the National Offender Management Service as a whole needs to take 
a lead in issuing guidance and robust standards, rather than waiting for a 
tragedy or costly litigation.108 
Regular, independent inspection of police custody is currently evolving. HMIC and 
HMIP have developed a joint inspection methodology and published their first joint 
inspection report in 2008.109 There is no public commentary on police capacity to 
meet the requirements of individuals with disabilities. The IPCC however, deals with 
relevant individual complaints. In June 2007 it concluded an investigation into the 
treatment of Jonathan Lea, a wheel-chair user, by West Midlands Police. The 
investigation found shortcomings in policies and procedures for dealing with people 
with disability and measured these shortcomings in relation to the DDA. A statement 
on the case noted that the complainant’s allegation that police had deprived him of 
his wheelchair, thereby compromising his human rights, was not upheld: “We found 
no evidence of…abuse of human rights”. The statement goes on to say: 
… it is equally clear that because of the force’s failure to make appropriate 
provision for disabled detainees Mr Lea was discriminated against – that is, 
he was treated differently and to his detriment because of his disability and 
the force had no adequate reason or justification for so doing.110  
In this case, curiously, issues of human rights and of discrimination were viewed 
separately where we would have expected to see clear links between them being 
drawn. 
 
 
 
108  HM Chief Inspector of Prisons for England and Wales, Report 06/07, pp.27-8. 
109  Report on an inspection visit to police custody suites in Southwark Basic Command Unit 21 – 22 
April 2008 by HM Inspectorate of Prisons and HM Inspectorate of Constabulary, available at: 
http://inspectorates.homeoffice.gov.uk/hmiprisons/inspect_reports/553231/southwark-
pcs?view=Binary. 
110  IPCC: Disability Rights Complaint: allegations of misconduct not upheld - force not meeting 
access duties, available at: http://www.ipcc.gov.uk/news/pr070607_leaconclusionswmp.htm. 
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4. Conclusion 
Policy documents draw on a variety of sources and driving factors to facilitate better 
practice. These sources include the DDA which has brought some of the issues 
referred to in Price into sharper focus - but we have not seen evidence of the distinct 
human rights focus on the issue of disability and detention as a driver for change.    
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CHAPTER 5 
DESTITUTION IN THE ASYLUM SYSTEM: THE CASE OF LIMBUELA 
 
The case of Limbuela related to the denial of asylum support to a group of destitute 
asylum-seekers on the grounds that they had applied for asylum too late. In this 
chapter, we document the direct impact of the case on reducing destitution within the 
asylum system. We show that Limbuela has been interpreted narrowly by the UK 
Government to apply only to the specific matrix of factors arising in the case; thus, it 
has not had an impact on government policy in addressing the rising incidence of 
destitution among failed asylum-seekers.  
We have also interviewed directors, managers and case workers within local 
authorities about the handling of applications for community care by destitute failed 
asylum-seekers or other people from abroad with no recourse to public funds. We 
have found evidence that – contrary to the narrow interpretation of the case by central 
government - some local authorities have interpreted the principles of Limbuela as 
being relevant to this area of their work. However, there is no evidence that the case 
has had any direct or systematic impact on decision-making by local authorities in 
relation to destitute claimants. 
1. The case and its context 
Since April 2000, asylum-seekers have been unable to claim mainstream welfare 
benefits and instead must apply for asylum support (financial support and/or 
accommodation provided by the Home Office). The UK Border Agency (UKBA) is now 
responsible for setting policy and issuing guidance on asylum, including support. 
In January 2003, the government introduced section 55 of the Nationality, Immigration 
and Asylum (NIA) Act 2002.111 Section 55 denied access to asylum support to those 
asylum-seekers who had not applied for asylum “as soon as reasonably practicable” 
after arriving in the UK.112 This had the effect of singling out late asylum claimants and  
 
 
111  See Annex 4. 
112  A government statement in December 2003 interpreted this as being within three days of arrival. 
See Inter-Agency Partnership (2006), Memorandum of Evidence: Joint Committee on Human 
Rights’ Inquiry into the Treatment of Asylum-seekers, p.4. 
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removing them from eligibility for support, at the same time as barring them from 
working or accessing mainstream benefits.  
A survey by refugee agencies of those refused support under section 55 – almost 
9,500 individuals in 2003 - found that:  
• almost 70 per cent were sleeping rough or faced imminent homelessness 
• 70 per cent had difficulty accessing food each day 
• almost 60 per cent were experiencing negative health effects.113  
 
The survey found that “too many decisions under section 55 appear to be arbitrary, 
contradictory and unsafe”.114 There was no right of appeal against negative decisions, 
and by October 2003, section 55 cases amounted to a quarter of all the judicial review 
cases lodged in the High Court.115 
In its judgment in Limbuela in 2005, the House of Lords dismissed the Home Office’s 
appeal against an earlier Court of Appeal judgment that the removal of support from 
three destitute asylum-seekers under section 55 was unlawful as it breached their right 
not to be subjected to inhuman or degrading treatment under Article 3 ECHR.116    
The Law Lords said the Secretary of State had the power under section 55(5) of the 
NIA Act 2002, and the duty under the HRA, to act to avoid a breach of Convention 
rights. The judgment set out the minimum standard of severity that treatment must 
achieve before it would constitute a breach of Article 3.117  
 
 
 
113 Inter-Agency Partnership (2004), The impact of section 55 on the Inter-Agency Partnership and the 
asylum-seekers it supports, p.3; 
http://www.refugeecouncil.org.uk/OneStopCMS/Core/CrawlerResourceServer.aspx?resource=2A5
E5C6C-F447-4A4A-8DD8-
59F5A96390B4&mode=link&guid=58737ff796474a1b87657fc5370787e4. 
114 Ibid, p.6. 
115 Joint Committee on Human Rights (2007), The Treatment of Asylum-seekers, Tenth Report of 
Session 2006-7, Volume I, p.30. 
116 R (Limbuela and Others) v S/S for the Home Department [2005] UKHL 66. Full judgment at: 
www.publications.parliament.uk/pa/ld200506/ldjudgmt/jd051103/adam-1.htm. 
117 In para 8, Lord Bingham notes that the threshold would be crossed when “an individual applicant 
faces an imminent prospect of serious suffering caused or materially aggravated by denial of 
shelter, food or the most basic necessities of life. Many factors may affect that judgment, including 
age, gender, mental and physical health and condition, any facilities or sources of support available 
to the applicant, the weather and time of year and the period for which the applicant has already 
suffered or is likely to continue to suffer privation”. 
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Key principles arising from the case are: 
• Treatment is inhuman or degrading if, to a seriously detrimental extent, it 
denies the most basic needs of any human being.118    
                                           
• Where the inhuman or degrading treatment or punishment results from acts or 
omissions for which the state is directly responsible, there is an absolute 
obligation on the state to refrain from such conduct.119 
• It is not just a question of "wait and see". The Secretary of State has the power 
to avoid the breach.120 
• The threshold test was whether “the treatment to which the asylum-seeker was 
being subjected by the entire package of restrictions and deprivations that 
surrounded him was so severe that it could properly be described as inhuman 
or degrading treatment within the meaning of [Article 3]”.121 
2. The impact of the case  
2.1 Impact on the application of section 55 
In this section, we examine the impact of Limbuela on the application of section 55 and 
the guidance issued to case workers. 
Interviewing and assessments of eligibility under section 55 were suspended on 21 
May 2004, following the Court of Appeal’s judgment,122 and an interim approach to 
section 55 decision-making was introduced in June 2004.123  
Figures show the immediate impact that the Court of Appeal judgment had on the 
application of section 55. In 2003, around two thirds of asylum-seekers referred for a 
section 55 decision were denied support;124 in 2004, the figure was less than 10 per 
cent.125   
 
118  R (Limbuela and Others) v S/S for the Home Department [2005] UKHL 66 at para 7. 
119  R (Limbuela and Others) v S/S for the Home Department [2005] UKHL 66 at para 53. 
120  R (Limbuela and Others) v S/S for the Home Department [2005] UKHL 66 at para 62. 
121  R (Limbuela and Others) v S/S for the Home Department [2005] UKHL 66 at para 58. 
122  The Secretary of State for the Home Department v (1) Wayoka Limbuela (2) Binyam Tefera 
Tesema (3) Yusif Adam Case No: C/2004/0383, 2/2004/0384 & C/2004/0277 21 May 2004; full 
judgment at http://www.asylumsupport.org.uk/docs/limbuela.pdf. 
123  Home Office (2005), Asylum Statistics United Kingdom 2004; 
http://www.homeoffice.gov.uk/rds/pdfs05/hosb1305.pdf. 
124  Home Office (2004), Home Office Statistical Bulletin: Asylum Statistics United Kingdom 2003; 
http://www.homeoffice.gov.uk/rds/pdfs04/hosb1104.pdf. 
125  Ibid. 
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Following the House of Lords judgment in November 2005, there was a further sharp 
fall both in the number of asylum-seekers being certified as section 55 cases, and in 
the proportion of those applicants deemed ineligible for support.126 The figures for 
2006127 and 2007128  show an increase on 2005, but remain significantly below the 
pre-Limbuela levels.  
This table presents available figures from 2003 to 2007.  
Year Number of asylum-seekers 
referred for section 55 
decision  
Number of applicants deemed 
ineligible for support under section 
55 
2003 14,760 9,410 
2004 10,570 1,360 
2005 3,780 355 
2006 Not available  910 
2007 Not available 990129
 
The impact of the case is clearly visible in revised guidance issued to case owners and 
policy teams in July 2007. 130 The guidance explicitly adopts the destitution threshold 
set out in Limbuela: that where an applicant has no alternative means of support, 
including overnight shelter and basic provisions such as food and access to sanitary 
facilities,  
                                            
126  Home Office (2006), Home Office Statistical Bulletin: Asylum Statistics United Kingdom 2005; 
http://www.homeoffice.gov.uk/rds/pdfs06/hosb1406.pdf. 
127  Home Office (2007), Home Office Statistical Bulletin: Asylum Statistics United Kingdom 2006; 
http://www.homeoffice.gov.uk/rds/pdfs07/hosb1407.pdf. 
128  Home Office (2008), Asylum Statistics Fourth Quarter 2007: United Kingdom, 
http://www.homeoffice.gov.uk/rds/pdfs08/asylumq407.pdf; Home Office (2007) Asylum Statistics 
Third Quarter 2007: United Kingdom, http://www.homeoffice.gov.uk/rds/pdfs07/asylumq307.pdf; 
Home Office (2007) Asylum Statistics Second Quarter 2007: United Kingdom, 
http://www.homeoffice.gov.uk/rds/pdfs07/asylumq207.pdf; Home Office (2007) Asylum Statistics 
First Quarter 2007: United Kingdom, http://www.homeoffice.gov.uk/rds/pdfs07/asylumq107.pdf. 
129  This figure does not include the small number of applicants who were initially refused support 
under Section 55 but were subsequently granted support following a reconsideration of that 
decision. 
130 Immigration and Nationality Directorate (2007), Asylum Support Policy Bulletin 75: Section 55 
guidance, p.17; 
http://www.ind.homeoffice.gov.uk/sitecontent/documents/policyandlaw/asylumsupportbulletins/acce
sstosupport/.   
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support should be provided to prevent a breach of Article 3, even if the claimant is 
judged have claimed late.131 Case owners are advised to be alert to health or other 
relevant factors. Vulnerabilities may include age and illness, in particular HIV. 
Applicants who are pregnant should normally be supported. 132 No asylum applicant 
should be refused support under section 55 without first being invited to attend an 
interview.133 Cases involving victims of torture or rape must be treated “with particular 
care and sensitivity”.134  
A senior lawyer within UKBA said the agency saw Limbuela as being about the 
detailed application of a known principle: what the judgment did was to take “a 
different view on how the acts and omissions of the agency actually amount to 
treatment of an individual in a way that engages Article 3”. The effect was to change 
“quite markedly” the way the statute was used in practice.   
The interviewee said it is challenging in a large and geographically dispersed 
organisation to ensure that frontline staff are aware of case law. The channels used 
(intranet postings, email alerts and briefing through line management chains) would 
depend on how “significant, urgent and wide-ranging” the implications of a particular 
case were. In doing so, he said, the agency would explain the context of why the 
change was necessary.135  
2.2 The narrow interpretation of Limbuela by UKBA 
2.2.1 The use of section 55 to refuse subsistence only claims 
We have seen that Limbuela has had a direct and quantifiable impact in reducing the 
numbers of destitute asylum-seekers refused support under section 55. However, the 
parliamentary Joint Committee on Human Rights (JCHR) has raised concerns that 
section 55 is still being used to refuse cash-only support claims from applicants with 
accommodation.136   
 
 
 
131 Ibid, p.3; while the pre-Limbuela section 55 guidance alerted caseworkers to the risk of breaching 
Convention rights, and specifically mentioned Articles 3 and 8, it did not give any indication as to 
how to apply the test in practice. See www.asylumsupport.info/bulletin75.htm. 
132 Ibid, p.32. 
133 Ibid, p.2. 
134 Ibid, p.9. 
135 This project has not been able to engage with regional case owners under the UKBA to sample 
levels of awareness of HRA case law.   
136 Such as people staying with friends. See: The Treatment of Asylum-seekers, p.31.   
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essary burden on them.140 
                                           
The continued use of the section 55 provision to deny support in subsistence-
only cases leaves many asylum-seekers reliant on ad hoc charitable support 
and with no regular means of providing for their basic daily necessities. We 
believe that this treatment does not comply with the House of Lords Limbuela 
judgment, and is in clear breach of Article 3 … We recommend that section 
55 be repealed. 
This view has been echoed by, among others, the Independent Asylum 
Commission137 and the Inter-Agency Partnership (IAP) of the UK’s leading refugee 
agencies.138 The IAP notes that, under section 55, the burden of proof placed on the 
asylum-seeker is high, and the decision to refuse support heavily influenced by 
subjective perceptions of the applicant’s credibility.139 The IAP argues that the 
charitable sector is not able to provide sustainable support to asylum-seekers and th
to require each claimant to prove this places an unnec
One London-based advocacy organisation said even where subsistence-only 
claimants have serious health issues, refusals of support under section 55 have not 
been overturned on appeal. This suggests that although the number of cases may be 
small, the effect for individuals who may be living in insecure accommodation and 
without the means of subsistence could be severe.141   
A senior UKBA official confirmed that repeal of section 55 “will be considered” as part 
of a wider process of legal simplification of asylum law.142  
 
 
 
137 Independent Asylum Commission (2008), Deserving Dignity: The Independent Asylum 
Commission’s Third Report of Conclusions and Recommendation, p.33; 
www.independentasylumcommission.org.uk. 
138 Memorandum of Evidence: Joint Committee on Human Rights’ Inquiry into the Treatment of 
Asylum-seekers, p.5-6. 
139 For example, the guidance on section 55 states that the “well-presented and clean shaven” 
appearance of an applicant might call into question the veracity of his account. The IAP says this 
ignores the fact that many cultures place a high value on appearance when presenting to 
authorities. 
140  Ibid, p.6. 
141  We also heard evidence that Limbuela has been used by advocacy organisations to press for 
better housing conditions for asylum-seekers who do qualify for both accommodation and 
subsistence from UKBA. An interviewee in the Welsh Refugee Council said he had used the case 
to argue that in some instances requiring asylum-seekers to share accommodation was inhuman or 
degrading.  
142  The draft Immigration and Citizenship Bill was published in July 2008; our interviewee confirmed 
that asylum support was “in the frame” as part of the reform of the legal framework for immigration, 
but gave no timeframe. 
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2.2.2 Destitution among failed asylum-seekers: the use of section 4    
There is a significant body of research about the rising incidence of destitution, 
particularly among failed asylum-seekers.143  In this section, we show that Limbuela 
has not been interpreted as applying to failed asylum-seekers either by UKBA or by 
the Asylum Support Tribunal.144      
                                           
Individuals whose asylum claims have been refused can apply to the UKBA for 
support under section 4 of the NIA Act 2002. To qualify for this support, they must 
have either signed up to return voluntarily or be unable to leave the UK through no 
fault of their own.145 UKBA case owners have been given guidelines to help them 
assess whether individuals will face destitution if they are denied support under 
section 4.146 The guidelines do not expressly refer to Limbuela, the ECHR or Article 
3.147  
Attempts have been made at the Asylum Support Tribunal to invoke Limbuela in 
support of claimants denied support under section 4. Two “landmark” decisions 
indicate that the fact of destitution, per se, is not a violation of the Convention and the 
Limbuela judgment is not to be interpreted as such.148 In these two decisions, appeals 
for section 4 support by a Palestinian and an Iranian Kurd are rejected because the 
individuals, though destitute, fail to meet at least one of the other necessary criteria.  
 
143  See for example: Inter-Agency Partnership (2008), Destitution tally: an indication of the extent of 
destitution among asylum-seekers and refugees, 
http://www.refugeecouncil.org.uk/NR/rdonlyres/D446ACE9-9F10-442D-A1A8-
B7D53DD1C3A6/0/IAP_Destitution_Tally_Jan08.pdf; Refugee Action (2006),The Destitution Trap: 
Research into destitution amongst refused asylum-seekers in the UK, http://www.refugee-
action.org.uk/campaigns/documents/RA_DestReport_Final_LR.pdf; Amnesty International (2006), 
Down and Out in London: The road to destitution for failed asylum-seekers, 
http://www.amnesty.org.uk/uploads/documents/doc_17382.pdf; The Joseph Rowntree Charitable 
Trust (2008), Not Moving On: Still Destitute in Leeds, 
http://www.jrct.org.uk/text.asp?section=0001000200030006; West Midlands No Recourse to Public 
Funds Conference: focus on asylum-seekers (2008), 
http://www.wmlga.gov.uk/documents/NRPF%20conference%20report%20with%20appendices.pdf. 
144  The body which hears appeals against decisions made by the UKBA. 
145  This may be because they are too ill to travel or have outstanding representations with the Home 
Office such as a fresh claim for asylum or a Judicial Review. In addition, women in the late stages 
of pregnancy or who have babies less than six weeks old qualify for section 4 support. See 
http://www.bia.homeoffice.gov.uk/asylum/support/. 
146  Immigration and Nationality Directorate (undated), Asylum Support Policy Bulletin 4: Determining 
whether persons who apply for asylum support are destitute.  
147  Note, however, that the threshold for destitution under section 4 is less severe than that in the 
Limbuela judgment and applied under section 55. A claimant is deemed destitute if he either does 
not have adequate accommodation or any means of obtaining it or he cannot meet his other 
essential living needs, allowing the possibility of subsistence only claims. 
148  See ASA/06/09/14132 and ASA/06/04/13140; http://www.asylum-support-
tribunal.gov.uk/public/landmarkDecisions.aspx. 
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The applicants’ destitution was not the consequence of a deliberate administrative act; 
rather, the solution to their destitution lay in their own hands by voluntarily leaving the 
UK.149  
By the latest count, there are an estimated 283,000 failed asylum-seekers in the 
UK.150 As of December 2007, approximately 9,140 individuals were receiving section 4 
support.151  Advocacy organisations and social care directors and managers within 
local authorities expressed concern about the way section 4 support decisions are 
made in practice and the impact these decisions are having on levels of destitution 
among failed asylum-seekers.  
These interviewees did not suggest that Limbuela had found any immediate 
application in the context of section 4, either in the courts or at a policy level. What 
emerged strongly in our interviews was that the application of section 4 and destitution 
among failed asylum-seekers was the “key, live issue” and that the UKBA “might have 
to consider whether section 4 was adequate”, as one local authority strategic manager 
for asylum put it.  
Several interviewees noted that the speeding up of asylum status decisions under the 
UKBA’s New Asylum Model152 could have the unintended consequence of increasing 
destitution. As one put it: 
You’ve got more people processed quicker and refused quicker, and fewer 
means of support available within the community ... and at that point people 
go off the radar.153 
 
 
149  This interpretation was underlined by our interviewee in the UKBA who noted that if a claimant 
does not qualify to remain in the UK, the fact that they are destitute is “neither here nor there. They 
can go back and be destitute at home”. 
150  National Audit Office (2005), Returning Failed Asylum Applicants,p.2; 
http://www.nao.org.uk/publications/nao_reports/05-06/050676.pdf. 
151 Asylum Statistics Fourth Quarter 2007. 
152  The aim of the New Asylum Model is to have individual case workers dealing with a case from start 
to finish and to conclude it within six months. See http://www.refugee-legal-
centre.org.uk/C2B/document_tree/ViewACategory.asp?CategoryID=170. 
153  See also West Midlands Strategic Migration (2008), Maternity, Mortality and Migration: the impact 
of new communities, p.22; 
http://www.wmlga.gov.uk/documents/MMM%20Document_FINAL%20Webversion.pdf. 
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The Asylum Support Appeals Project (ASAP) has highlighted the problem of 
destitution among those who are physically unable to leave the UK through no fault of 
their own, yet have failed to access section 4 support.154 ASAP concludes that:  
UKBA’s narrow criterion places an unrealistic demand on failed asylum-
seekers to prove they are taking all reasonable steps to return.155 
Several interviewees from local authorities and advocacy organisations noted that 
recent case law has thrown the issue of the UKBA’s potential responsibility for the 
human rights of failed asylum-seekers into sharp relief. In particular, the recent case 
involving Slough Borough Council is likely to have the effect of narrowing the eligibility 
of failed asylum-seekers to receive community care support from their local authority 
and putting the responsibility back onto the UKBA.156 Advocacy organisations 
expressed concern that as a result of the case longstanding recipients of community 
care could have their support terminated, and new applicants be refused. A strategic 
director for asylum said “the UKBA may have to consider the human rights issues for 
those people”.   
2.3 Impact on local authority decision-making 
Local authorities are prohibited under section 54 of the NIA Act 2002157 from assisting 
failed asylum-seekers, except when doing so would lead to a violation of Convention 
rights. The term given to these exceptions is “destitute plus” – that is, people who are 
assessed as having a need for care and attention that does not arise solely from 
destitution but from an additional reason such as age, illness or disability. We 
interviewed individuals in local authorities, from directors to case workers, to explore 
whether – contrary to the narrow interpretation by UKBA - they saw Limbuela as 
relevant to this area of their work.  
 
154  They include, among others, stateless people and those whose nationality is in dispute, those who 
do not possess any travel or identity documents and those whose safe route home is disputed. 
See: Asylum Support Appeals Project (2008), Unreasonably Destitute? A report by ASAP into the 
difficulties of obtaining Section 4 Support for refused asylum-seekers taking reasonable steps to 
leave the UK; http://asaproject.org/web/images/PDFs/news/unreasonably_destitute.pdf.  
155  Ibid, p.24. 
156  R (M) v Slough Borough Council (2008) UKHL 52. This case established that an able-bodied 
person’s need for a refrigerator in which to keep HIV medication did not amount to “need of care 
and attention” under section 21 of the National Assistance Act 1948 so as to entitle him to 
residential accommodation from his local authority. “Care and attention” had to mean something 
more - a need to be “looked after”, beyond merely the provision of a home and the means of 
survival. Only if a person already needed section 21 care and attention under this definition is the 
local authority responsible – “otherwise the responsibility falls on central government” (para 41). 
Full judgment at http://www.parliament.the-stationery-
office.co.uk/pa/ld200708/ldjudgmt/jd080730/rmfc-1.htm. 
157  Section 54 removes the rights of European Economic Area nationals and their dependants, failed 
asylum-seekers and overstayers to community care assistance.  See 
http://www.islington.gov.uk/Health/ServicesForAdults/nrpf/eligibility.asp. 
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2.3.1 Relevance of Limbuela to local authorities 
In our survey of legal directors in England and Wales, around half of the 25 
respondents who answered the relevant question had not heard of Limbuela and none 
had changed policy because of it.158 
Local authority interviewees generally noted that Limbuela was not “high on the radar” 
of local authorities compared to case law more directly concerned with their 
responsibilities.159  
However, some local authority interviewees said they saw the general principles of the 
case as being relevant to their work. One director of a large adult social care 
department said:  
Limbuela is very helpful for drawing a bottom line ... Limbuela sets that 
context where – as it should – the Human Rights Act sets a higher order of 
things and says ... ‘you cannot be treated lower than this standard’. 
He suggested that this principle could be of particular relevance to local authorities 
with few asylum-seekers who are faced with unfamiliar challenges such as a large 
influx of migrant workers living in destitute conditions. He said the case could regain 
prominence in relation to destitution among newer groups of European migrants who 
have not developed networks of support (and who might, in future, face restrictions on 
their entitlement to benefits). 
One strategic manager for asylum in a metropolitan authority agreed that Limbuela 
was “not a key case” for local authorities. However,  
There are interesting messages that come out of Limbuela which … all public 
bodies need to be aware of – that it’s not just actions, it can be inactions [that 
can have an effect].  
We interviewed one local authority manager whose team has developed its own 
human rights assessment form with key cases, including Limbuela, on the front 
sheet.160 The manager said case law is a “lingua franca” in her team and is routinely 
referenced in individual assessments to ensure accountability:   
 
 
158  Six of the 36 legal directors who responded to all or part of the survey said asylum was not a 
significant issue in their area. 
159  An NRPF team manager in a London borough said that for him, Limbuela was a “small piece of a 
bigger picture” and got “mashed up” in the interface between the HRA, community care legislation 
and immigration law.   
160  See Annex 5.  
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Our starting point is the difference between a power and duty ... Some local 
authorities may err on the side of only acting where they have a duty ... and 
not on a more generous application of utilising their powers. Whereas we as 
a team will always look at what we can do and ask ‘where’s the case law that 
backs us up on that?’ 
We found some evidence that advocacy organisations rely on Limbuela when 
claimants who are “destitute plus” meet resistance to their community care application. 
One solicitor for a housing charity said Limbuela had “given …a sense of the line to be 
drawn, below which people can’t be allowed to go”.   
2.3.2 Variation in practice between local authorities  
There is considerable variation in the way that local authorities discharge their duty to 
identify and support those who are “destitute plus” to avoid breaches of Convention 
rights. 
A survey of 26 authorities by the No Recourse to Public Funds (NRPF) network in 
2006 found that community care, mental health and human rights assessments vary 
by, and sometimes within, authorities.161 More than half of the respondent authorities 
had an “ad hoc” approach to assessment, with responsibility split between different 
service departments.162 
One interviewee, who co-ordinates a regional group of local authorities, noted that 
hard-pressed authorities will effectively set the bar higher than those with fewer claims 
for community care. The director of a large social care department noted that resource 
pressure has, in some areas, bred “competitive behaviour” between authorities. 
Interviewees also raised the problem of “advice deserts”, suggesting that case law 
principles only come into play if claimants have an advisor pressing their case.   
There are significant initiatives to bring about greater clarity and consistency among 
local authorities. Among these are the NRPF network163 and the Asylum Task 
Force164 of directors of adults’ and children’s social s
 
161  Islington Council (2006), Destitute People from Abroad with No Recourse to Public Funds: a survey 
of local authorities; 
http://www.islington.gov.uk/DownloadableDocuments/HealthandSocialCare/Pdf/nrpf_survey_local_
authorities.pdf. 
162  One local authority, where there appeared to be confusion about NRPF obligations, indicated that 
women who had been told they were ineligible for support had offered their children up for 
adoption.  
163  The NRPF network, which is partly funded by the UKBA, is chaired by LB Islington and has more than 
250 members, mostly other local authorities.  See: 
http://www.islington.gov.uk/Health/ServicesForAdults/nrpf_network/default.asp. 
164  http://www.adss.org.uk/committee/asylum.shtml. 
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The NRPF network has drawn up guidance on assessing and supporting people with 
no recourse to public funds, including guidance on making human rights 
assessments.165 Their assessment form is structured around Articles 3 and 8. 
Limbuela is not cited expressly and nor was it singled out in our interview with a 
leading member of the network as having influenced the assessment form. The 
network does not have a formal case law monitoring role; however, one team manager 
said that “if there have been cases with particular impact the implementers will pick it 
up and often distribute [it] to other authorities”. Case updates came primarily from the 
authority’s legal department and not from the Home Office. The interviewee said local 
authority practitioners who belonged to the network were increasingly aware of their 
duties in this area “but it hasn’t filtered up to their managers”.  
2.3.3 Broader climate of decision-making 
Our interviews explored with local authority directors and managers the influence on 
their decision-making of the broader climate around human rights and asylum. 
Some interviewees in English authorities noted that the adversarial climate in which 
they work produced defensive attitudes to human rights. As one strategic manager for 
asylum and persons from abroad in a metropolitan authority said:   
[Local authorities] are beaten around the head quite substantially by solicitors 
who seek to challenge virtually every decision we make. That …is a negative 
side to human rights – you get into a very defensive position in terms of trying 
to justify your own decisions rather than looking at how you can use human 
rights to improve [services]. 
Most of our local authority interviewees agreed that decision-making about the support 
due to failed asylum-seekers was made more difficult by the lack of central 
government reimbursement for NRPF work and the lack of Home Office guidance and 
regulation.166 Our interviewee on the Asylum Task Force said that local authorities had 
been reticent about raising the funding issue publicly because they were: 
… cognisant that if they make too much noise, there’s a danger of opening 
up another, more dangerous political agenda locally ... They are worried 
about a press debate which feeds the far right ... So there’s a silence on it 
and a reticence in coming forward and saying ‘there’s a baseline’. 
 
165 http://www.islington.gov.uk/Health/ServicesForAdults/nrpf_network/policy_guidance.asp. 
166  In 2006, the NRPF network asked the Home Office to issue interim guidance to and regulations for 
local authorities, and to establish a shared database on who is getting local authority support in order 
to minimise fraud and ensure individuals are adequately supported. A leading member of the NRPF 
network told us this had “come to nothing”.  See Destitute People from Abroad with No Recourse to 
Public Funds: a survey of local authorities, p.11. 
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These comments illustrate how the political climate around an issue can restrain 
debate, which may in turn influence the context in which case law is considered and 
acted upon. Our interviewee in the Welsh Refugee Council suggested that the climate 
there was different. Failed asylum seekers in Wales qualify for free health care, unlike 
in England, and ministers refer to the HRA in their speeches.    
3. Conclusion 
We have seen that Limbuela has had a direct and quantifiable impact on reducing 
“beginning of process” destitution by changing the way section 55 is applied in policy 
and practice.  
We have not been able to identify a direct impact of Limbuela in reducing “end of 
process” destitution. Contrary to the position of the UKBA, some of our local authority 
interviewees do see the case as having relevance for their work in setting a baseline 
of acceptable treatment and reinforcing the principle that omissions as well as actions 
can breach Convention rights. However, all our local authority interviewees said 
subsequent case law more directly applicable to local authorities was significantly 
more influential. 
Our interviewees in local authorities and advocacy organisations said that destitution 
among failed asylum-seekers, and issues surrounding the application of section 4, are 
now the key challenge. As far as we are aware, a case has not been made in the 
courts or at a policy level as to whether the matrix of factors causing destitution among 
failed asylum-seekers (and, through bureaucratic shortcomings, among some people 
still in the asylum system) might amount to “acts or omissions for which the state is 
directly responsible” as established in Limbuela. What does seem clear is that the 
emerging context of destitution in the UK presents challenges to the UKBA and to local 
authorities in which the general principles of the Limbuela case might potentially have 
resonance.  
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CHAPTER 6  
BALANCING RIGHTS: THE CASE OF EAST SUSSEX167 
 
The East Sussex case related to the issue of “no lifting” policies and the need to 
balance the dignity and integrity of service users with the safety of care staff (section 
1). In this chapter, we examine the impact of the case on manual handling policy and 
practice by public authorities, with a focus on the primacy of individual risk 
assessment (section 2). We also examine the factors limiting its impact (section 3) 
and the changing public policy context in which the principles must be implemented 
in the future (section 4).   
1. The case and its context 
Two adult sisters, A and B, have profound physical and learning disabilities and are 
cared for by their mother (X) and stepfather (Y). In order to carry out many daily 
activities the sisters need to be moved and handled by others. Central to this case 
was a dispute between the family and East Sussex County Council (ESCC), as to 
whether moving and handling should always be done using hoisting equipment, as 
ESCC stipulated on health and safety grounds, or sometimes manually - as X and Y 
preferred, because the sisters found the hoist painful and distressing. The council 
had refused to employ care workers in the family home and sought to place the 
sisters in residential care.168 
Some key principles reinforced by the case are: 
• Where there is a blanket ban on manual handling, Article 8 is engaged as it 
protects the disabled person’s dignity and their physical and psychological 
integrity, including their right to participate in the community and have access 
to cultural and recreational activities.169   
 
167 http://83.137.212.42/sitearchive/DRC/the_law/transcripts_of_key_judgments/a_and_b_v_east_ 
sussex_county.html. 
168  For more background on the case, see: 
http://83.137.212.42/sitearchive/DRC/library/policy/health_and_independent_living/high_court_ruli
ng_on_manual_li.html. 
169 R v East Sussex County Council Ex parte A, B, X and Y [2003] EWHC 167 at para 99. The 
judgment noted that Article 3 could also be engaged where the consequence of failing to lift A or 
B manually might result in them sitting in bodily waste or on the lavatory for hours. Leaving 
disabled people as a matter of policy or protocol to drown in the bath or perish in a fire could 
engage Article 2 (para 114). 
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• The state has a positive obligation to take appropriate measures designed to 
ensure as far as possible that a disabled person is not "so circumscribed and 
so isolated as to be deprived of the possibility of developing his 
personality".170 
• Individuals like A and B require an enhanced degree of protection under 
human rights legislation; in order to avoid discriminating it is sometimes 
necessary to treat people in different circumstances differently.171  
• Certain types of manual handling policy are likely to be unlawful. In the 
context of community care, these are: “no lifting”; no lifting unless life is at 
risk, and no lifting in every instance where equipment can effect the 
transfer.172  
• Care staff also have rights, which must be balanced proportionately with 
those they care for; moreover, hoisting is not inherently undignified. In each 
and every case, “individual assessment is all”.173  
 
Under the Manual Handling Operations Regulations of 1992,174 employers are 
required, so far as reasonably practicable, to avoid (but not eliminate) the need for 
employees to undertake manual handling operations which involve risk of injury.175 
Commentaries on this case say the adoption of “no lifting” policies arose from 
misunderstandings or over rigid interpretations of these regulations. The Disability 
Rights Commission (DRC), which intervened in East Sussex, singled out Royal 
College of Nursing (RCN) guidance as particularly unhelpful:   
Most of the problems with manually lifting policies have resulted from 
adherence to the RCN guidance which advises that ‘…the manual lifting of 
 
170  R v East Sussex County Council Ex parte A, B, X and Y [2003] EWHC 167 at para 99; for an 
analysis of how Strasbourg jurisprudence (notably Botta v Italy [1998] 26 EHRR 241), has 
interpreted the meaning of Article 8 see paras 67-122. 
171  R v East Sussex County Council Ex parte A, B, X and Y [2003] EWHC 167 at para 93. In its 
submission to this project, the Ministry of Justice said it agreed with this principle, which, it notes, 
forms the basis of the Disability Discrimination Act (DDA) 1995 duty of reasonable adjustment for 
providers of services, the first stage of which pre-dated the East Sussex judgment. The DDA 
2005 amended the 1995 Act and introduced a range of new duties for public authorities.    
172  R v East Sussex County Council Ex parte A, B, X and Y [2003] EWHC 167 at para 154. 
173  R v East Sussex County Council Ex parte A, B, X and Y [2003] EWHC 167 at paras 118, 122, 
128. 
174  http://www.opsi.gov.uk/SI/si1992/Uksi_19922793_en_1.htm. 
175  For analysis of how ‘reasonably practicable’ and ‘risk’ have been interpreted by the courts, see R 
v East Sussex County Council Ex parte A, B, X and Y [2003] EWHC 167 at paras 49-66 
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patients is eliminated in all but exceptional or life threatening situations’.176 
The East Sussex judgment articulated a framework of principles for the interpretation 
and application of the 1992 Regulations. It said the principles were concerned only 
with care workers supporting disabled people in their own homes.177 Accordingly, our 
interviews have focused primarily on those managing the provision of home care, 
those training or advising home care staff, and practitioners (such as occupational 
therapists) providing services in the home. However, there is evidence that some 
public authorities and advocacy organisations have interpreted the case as being 
applicable to other care settings such as hospitals and residential homes and where 
possible our interviews have explored this wider application of the East Sussex 
principles.      
2. The impact of the case  
In this section, we examine the variability in manual handling policy and practice that 
existed at the time of the East Sussex judgment (section 2.1). We explore different 
types of impact identified by our interviewees. These include a “bottom up” influence 
on professional practice and debate (section 2.2) and impacts on policy and 
guidance (section 2.3), training (section 2.4) and day-to-day service delivery (section 
2.5). These are qualitative findings which reflect the experiences of randomly 
sampled individuals and authorities and may not represent wider trends. 
2.1 Manual handling before East Sussex 
The DRC said that the East Sussex case was: 
... the tip of a ‘no lifting’ iceberg: stories abound of disabled teenagers going 
to school in nappies because no one is allowed to lift them on to the toilet 
and of older disabled adults unable to leave their houses because their 
carers are forced to rely on hoists…178 
 
176 http://83.137.212.42/sitearchive/DRC/newsroom/news_releases/2003/no_lifting_bans_on_home_ 
care.html. See Royal College of Nursing (1996), Code of Practice for Patient Handling. The East 
Sussex judgment, at para 47, noted that the RCN guidance was “not necessarily an entirely safe 
guide” to the handling of incapacitated people in their own homes, and that guidance issued in 
2002 by the Health and Safety Executive (HSE), in consultation with the DRC and the 
Department of Health, was the most relevant guide. See Health and Safety Executive (2002), 
Handling Home Care: Achieving safe, efficient and positive outcomes for care workers and 
clients.    
177  R v East Sussex County Council Ex parte A, B, X and Y [2003] EWHC 167 at para 124. 
178  Human Rights Culture – A Social or Legal Phenomenon? Speech by Bert Massie to the UCL and 
Bindmans annual debate, 15 May 2007; 
http://83.137.212.42/sitearchive/DRC/library/drc_speeches/bert_massie_speech_ucl_bindm.html. 
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By contrast, the Ministry of Justice told this project the case was “very much a ‘one 
off’ with extreme circumstances”.179 This apparent discrepancy highlights the difficulty 
of generalising about manual handling policy and practice, which is diffused across 
the social care field.    
The picture that emerges from our interviews is of a continuum of policy and practice 
rather than any clear watershed. Several manual handling advisors and service 
managers said their authorities had previously had policies which, though not blanket 
policies, were loose enough for prescriptive practices to flourish. An advisor to a 
range of public authorities said that only in the last five years had it become the norm 
for public authorities to have manual handling policies at all. Even now, many are 
“extremely basic” and not individualised to the organisation. 
Our interviewees said the principle of balanced decision-making enshrined in East 
Sussex was not new: there was some earlier (non HRA) case law180 and guidance, 
and debate in professional circles, which promoted the principle, together with the 
established public law principle of not fettering discretion.  
Interviewees who advise a range of public authorities suggested that East Sussex 
has been more influential than these earlier cases. This was partly because, thanks 
largely to the DRC’s intervention, the case gained a high profile in the specialist and 
mainstream press, among professional networks and in a speech by the prime 
minister about a balanced approach to risk.181  
In this sense, as one manual handling advisor put it, the case might have accelerated 
the evolution of manual handling policy without being a revolution. 
2.2 “Bottom-up” change  
Our interviewees suggested two broad ways in which they considered the case had 
exerted impact, over and above specific changes to policy and practice which we 
explore below (sections 2.3-2.5). We characterise this change as “bottom up” in the 
sense that it is primarily visible in debate and practice among peer practitioners 
rather than in top down guidance or instruction.   
 
179  Ministry of Justice submission to this project, August 2008 (unpublished). 
180  See King v Sussex Ambulance NHS Trust [2002] EWCA Civ 953 and Koonjul v Thameslink 
Healthcare NHS Trust [2000] PIQR P123. For a fuller analysis of case law in this area see 
Mandelstam, M. (2007), Case file: cross-arm lifts, swivel transfers, moving beds, lifting and 
disability discrimination in school; in The Column, journal of the National Back Exchange and 
Mandelstam, M (2002), Manual Handling in Health and Social Care: An A-Z of Law and Practice 
(London: Jessica Kingsley Publishers). 
181  For a useful summary of how the case was publicised see Disability Rights Commission (2005), 
Disability Rights Commission submission to the Equalities Review, pp.45-7; 
http://www.leeds.ac.uk/disability-
studies/archiveuk/DRC/DRC_final_submission_to_the_equalities_review.pdf. 
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Manual handling advisors and practitioners told us that one impact of East Sussex 
was to influence the terms in which manual handling issues were debated by 
professionals. An interviewee recalled one indicator of this shift – a national 
conference held shortly after the case called ‘Humanising the Load’: 
A title like that speaks volumes about [how] professionals had come to 
regard people as inanimate objects – so East Sussex tipped people to 
thinking there must be a better balance.  
The second was to validate the efforts of practitioners who were seeking to challenge 
the over-rigid interpretation of manual handling regulations. One local authority 
manual handling advisor noted that:  
[The judgment] … gave me license to do what we were doing anyway ... 
[Previously] we were working against our own policy. So the case was like 
a ray of sunshine that allowed us to do it properly and legitimately. 
Another advisor, herself a physiotherapist, noted that:  
It’s not so much that the case has changed practice – what it’s done is to 
allow physiotherapists to practice without feeling that they couldn’t tell 
anyone what they were doing.  
These experiences show how human rights cases can impact upon public authorities 
by reinforcing the efforts of committed professionals seeking to effect change from 
within. As the head of one disability organisation put it: 
Quite often the impact of legal interventions ... is that, although overtly they 
are challenging an organisation, what they may be doing is giving support to 
people within that organisation or that sector who want to progress in that 
direction. Understanding that dynamic and working with those ‘champions 
within’ is very important. 
2.3 Impact on policy and guidance 
One immediate impact of the case was that the DRC and the parties agreed the 
wording of a model manual handling policy which was adopted by ESCC and which 
the DRC promoted to public authorities and care providers.182  
 
182 As far as we are aware, there was no follow up to this promotion, and none of the public 
authorities we interviewed on this case said they had developed policy through this route. See 
http://83.137.212.42/sitearchive/DRC/the_law/drc_legal_cases/interventions/r_v_east_sussex_ 
county_council.html. 
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The imprint of the case is clearly visible in what is commonly described as the “gold 
standard” guidance, The Guide to the Handling of People, published in 2005.183 The 
editor told us that the East Sussex judgment was one influencing factor in her  
decision to commission a chapter on manual handling in social care, which previous 
editions had lacked. In addition, it had a “reinforcing effect” to be able to cite a legal 
judgment in support of arguments that had previously been made by often isolated 
practitioners. She emphasises that the guidance differs from pre-East Sussex 
editions in that it is “not prescriptive; it’s about equipping people to make balanced 
judgments”. 
Some interviewees told us the case had influenced the development of manual 
handling policy or procedure in their authority. For example, a disability services 
manager in an English city council said the case was one of the drivers behind a joint 
policy for moving and handling agreed by the social services department and NHS 
Trusts in the city.184  
A manual handling co-ordinator in another English city council said the case had 
changed the way risk assessments were explained to staff. She was developing the 
council’s first corporate policy on the moving and handling of people; existing policies 
deal primarily with inanimate loads.  
The manual handling co-ordinator for a Welsh county borough council said she had 
revised manual handling policy because of the case.185 This interviewee noted that 
among the 22 authorities grouped in the Welsh Local Government Association 
Manual Handling Forum “there’s plenty of evidence that they all provide a balanced 
assessment process”. She said the forum was planning to replicate guidelines 
developed (with explicit reference to East Sussex) by Scotland’s Commissioner for 
 
183  Smith, J (ed) (2005), The Guide to the Handling of People, 5th Edition (London: Back Care). This 
guidance was produced in collaboration with the Royal College of Nursing, the National Back 
Exchange, the Chartered Society of Physiotherapy and the College of Occupational Therapists. 
184  With reference to East Sussex, the policy states that the authorities “recognise and accept that it 
may be unlawful to fetter the discretion of those undertaking moving and handling risk 
assessments by adopting restrictive or blanket policies or protocols. To that end this policy 
requires that designated risk assessors adopt a balanced decision-making approach in full 
consultation as appropriate with the person being assessed, their family, involved professionals, 
carers and contracted parties”.   
185  The relevant section now reads: “...handling that involves manually lifting the whole or large part 
of a person’s weight is eliminated wherever possible. However, where this is considered 
necessary due to considerations affecting the client’s well being, the decision to lift clients must 
be made on a multi-disciplinary basis.  A balanced risk assessment must be completed which 
considers both staff and client needs, and reduces risks to the lowest practicable level.” 
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Children and Young People for the moving and handling of children and young 
people with disabilities.186 
The College of Occupational Therapists (COT) has incorporated elements of East 
Sussex into its manual handling guidance, with express reference to the case and 
the HRA.187 An interviewee from the COT said the case had brought welcome clarity 
to divergent professional practice: “it was a real landmark to have a case that set out 
some principles”. 
2.4 Impact on training  
All the manual handling trainers or advisors we interviewed said the principles of the 
East Sussex case were embedded in the training or advice they deliver, with or 
without express reference to the case. Given their specialist role, one would expect 
these individuals to have a greater awareness of the case than other practitioners. As 
one noted: 
Since the case I’ve changed the way I ... teach ... I don’t think there would 
be a single manual handling advisor that would not be aware of the case – 
but I do know there are many other professionals to whom it’s relevant 
[who] … may well not be aware. 
One city council we interviewed used the case as the basis for problem-solving 
exercises, alongside broader discussion about the ECHR. This authority also used 
the case as a framework within which to discuss issues such as for how long it was 
acceptable to leave a service user lying in urine or faeces.     
The disability service manager in another city council said care staff had had training 
on Articles 3 and 8, and that the case was raised during this discussion.   
2.5 Impact on day-to-day service delivery 
Identifying the case’s impact on routine practice is uncertain. Our interviews suggest 
that policy and practice don’t run on straight lines: a policy that reflects the case 
doesn’t necessarily lead to good practice if it is not operationalised, while 
experienced care staff may provide a good service even with a restrictive policy.   
 
186  Scotland’s Commissioner for Children and Young People (2008), Handle with Care: a report on 
the moving and handling of children and young people with disabilities; 
http://sccyp.org.uk/admin/04policy/files/spo_271200Handle%20With%20Care%20Young%20Pers
ons%20for%20Web%20200802.pdf. 
187  College of Occupational Therapists (2006), Manual Handling, pp.15-16; 
http://www.cot.org.uk/members/publications/list/manualhandling/pdf/COT-Manual_Handling-
text.pdf. 
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Some operational managers and practitioners said they couldn’t disentangle their 
knowledge of East Sussex from other professional values and legislation which 
influenced their behaviour. As one occupational therapist in a London borough noted: 
It’s inherent in what we’ve been doing for years, way before it was called 
human rights. It’s second nature. With a case like [East Sussex] ... you 
might use it as ammunition to back up your argument, but the thinking goes 
to our core.     
 
Nevertheless, some interviewees identified positive impacts on their practice which 
they attributed at least in part to their knowledge of the case.   
2.5.1 Improved transparency and accountability 
Most of our interviewees stressed that East Sussex was primarily about the need for 
individualised risk assessment, not about the need for more manual handling per se. 
For some service users in some circumstances, the use of equipment can be more 
dignified than cruder manual techniques. In other instances, a risk assessment may 
conclude, against the wishes of a service user or carer, that it is not safe for care 
staff to carry out a manual handling procedure. However, our interviewees recalled 
instances where, in either scenario, the process of risk assessment had afforded a 
degree of transparency and accountability and achieved a consensual outcome 
based on negotiation and compromise. As one manual handling advisor said, “even if 
the service user doesn’t get what they want, at least they’re not completely 
disempowered”.  
The occupational therapists in a London borough we interviewed acknowledged that 
the process of risk assessment was potentially challenging to practitioners: 
It complicates things. It takes you out of your comfort zone. If you’ve got a 
nice blanket policy, you don’t have to start questioning your own value 
judgments.  
Nevertheless, none of the practitioners we interviewed identified the process of risk 
assessment as anything other than beneficial.   
2.5.2 Improved health and safety for staff 
Interviewees said that the promotion of balanced decision-making was beneficial to 
staff, because where prescriptive policies had existed they would do lifting “on the 
quiet” and without protection or supervision. Several interviewees noted that a well-
managed higher risk procedure was generally less hazardous to staff than a poorly 
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managed lower risk one.188 One manual handling advisor in a local authority gave the 
example of administering rescue medication to a person having an epileptic fit, which 
involves getting the person out of a chair:  
If they were trained to deliver rescue medication, they couldn’t be expected 
to stand by and not deliver it, if someone was in distress or choking … But 
at least now we can do it in a co-ordinated and planned way. 
 
2.5.3 Enriching the concept of dignity  
Some manual handling advisors and practitioners noted that parts of the East Sussex 
judgment relating to dignity and integrity were ground breaking. Practitioners gave 
examples of where dignity considerations had been paramount in decisions about 
risk assessment. Among these was the case of a morbidly obese man who had to be 
admitted to hospital. Previously he had been dragged out onto the street on a canvas 
sheet. The advisor did a risk assessment and found a way of using a hoist and trolley 
to wheel him out of his house with more dignity.189  However, interviewees noted that 
central and local government initiatives to promote dignity in care meant the 
particular impact of East Sussex was hard to pinpoint. 
3. Limits to impact 
Our interviewees caution against overstating the overall impact “on the ground” of 
East Sussex, so far as it can be ascertained through anecdotal evidence. Our 
surveys of English and Welsh local authorities also suggest grounds for caution.   
Our interviewees who advise a range of authorities and care providers suggest the 
case may have had a greater impact among specialist professionals whose practice 
is centrally concerned with rehabilitation (such as physiotherapists and occupational 
therapists) than among council home care staff, agency staff and nurses.190 One 
interviewee with substantial experience across different care settings also noted “a 
much greater readiness to write older people off” compared to manual handling 
 
188  See also Mandelstam, M (2005), ‘Manual Handling in Social Care: Law, Practice and Balanced 
Decision Making’ in The Guide to the Handling of People, Ch.2, p.28. 
189  For more on this case, see Cookson, K (2007), Large but Unseen: bariatric patients and manual 
handling in Cardiometabolic Risk and Weight Management Vol 2, Issue 1. 
190  After the East Sussex judgment, articles in some specialist nursing publications argued that the 
hazards of working in the community environment had generally been better addressed as part of 
the assessment for and delivery of individual care packages than the hazards facing nursing staff 
in hospitals. One noted that: “As a result of the revised interpretation of reasonably practicable by 
the courts, NHS trusts will need to review their no-lift policies to ensure they are not unlawful. The 
manual handling of patients will be more common. Nurses will be obliged to put themselves at 
risk of back injury and the incidence of such injuries in health care is likely to rise”. See Griffiths, 
R and Stevens, M (2004), Manual handling and the lawfulness of no-lift policies, Nursing 
Standard, Vol 18, No 21, pp.39-43.   
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provision for children and young people. These generalisations remind us that the 
impact of case law may not be uniform between sectors and different types of service 
user.  
We identified four broad areas which, in the view of our interviewees, might limit the 
impact of East Sussex in those authorities or care providers where policy or practice 
is not necessarily compliant. 
3.1 Lack of systematic policy review and guidance 
None of our interviewees working as service managers or frontline practitioners in 
public authorities recalled getting specific guidance on the case through their 
authority. They had generally heard about the case in the media and/or sought 
guidance from professional associations and networks or specialist journals.191 Some 
had subsequently encountered the case in manual handling training provided by their 
employer, and several advisors responsible for delivering training said this was a 
good way to introduce frontline staff to the issue.    
Manual handling advisors noted that communication channels do exist to 
disseminate key messages about policy and practice (for example, email lists for 
medical device alerts).  However, as one advisor in an NHS Trust put it:  
Nobody comes and puts something on my desk and says ‘that’s about 
human     rights and it’s relevant to you’ ... From consultants to porters 
to everyone in between ... there’s very, very few that have heard of [East 
Sussex] ... there’s no method to cascade case law down to the relevant 
people. 
In our survey of directors of legal services in England and Wales, a third of the 23 
respondents who answered the relevant question said their authority had examined 
its policies in the light of East Sussex. Three respondents said their authority had 
changed its policies, while 18 per cent said their authority had issued guidance to 
ensure staff were aware of lessons for their everyday practice.192 
 
191  Practitioners and manual handling advisors we spoke to said the National Back Exchange was 
especially influential as an arena for debate and information; 
http://www.nationalbackexchange.org/. 
  
192  Note that nine out of the 35 respondents who filled in all or part of the survey said their authority 
did not have a social services function. By way of comparison, a survey by Scotland’s 
Commissioner for Children and Young People of Scottish local authorities’ manual handling policy 
and practice found that none had “no lifting” policies, but some implied that equipment must be 
used in every situation and many “struggled to distinguish between moving and handling 
inanimate objects and people”. The survey found that there is often wide variation in moving and 
handling practice and that practice does not always accurately reflect law or national policy. 
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These findings point to the difficulties of disseminating changes to policy or practice 
based on case law within large and complex organisations and to a range of different 
practitioners. Our interviews suggest consistency is not always achieved within a 
single authority, less still between authorities.   
3.2 Persistence of blanket policy or practice and restrictive working cultures 
It is beyond our scope to quantify the impact of East Sussex in terms of the continued 
prevalence of potentially unlawful restrictive policies. We have not found evidence of 
complaints about manual handling being taken to either the Parliamentary and Health 
Service Ombudsman or the Local Government Ombudsman. The three national 
disability organisations we interviewed reported few complaints about manual 
handling to their helplines.193 However, we found anecdotal evidence of restrictive or 
“no lifting” policies both within public authorities and private providers.  
One interviewee with wide experience of advising councils and care providers had 
encountered “shocking” practice, including authorities or care agencies who tell staff 
“we don’t do stairs” or “we don’t do legs” – even when the intervention would involve 
minimal risk (such as a verbal reminder to a stroke patient to move their hand up a 
stair rail).  
As this interviewee put it: 
Far too often, you still come across the two extremes – the extreme where 
people’s needs, independence and human rights are being forgotten in blind 
protection of staff or the other extreme where staff are inadequately 
protected [and] end up taking risks they ought not to.  
A director of adult social care in a metropolitan authority reported investigating a 
complaint in which care had been delivered according to the “snooker table test”: 
If you couldn’t care for the person by keeping one foot on the floor we were 
going to withdraw services. It was a blanket policy – and it was being done 
with good intent, for the safety of the workforce, but it was complete 
nonsense.    
The occupational therapists we spoke to said “no lifting” policies persist among 
private care agencies they work with: 
 
Scottish authorities also expressed a need for more guidelines and best practice models. See 
Handle with Care, pp.47-67. 
193  One director of a large disability organisation noted that the low volume of complaints did not 
necessarily indicate that there were no problems with manual handling, but rather that those 
affected tended to have other priorities or be so marginalised that they had no contact with 
advocates or disability organisations. 
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You hear it from care agencies all the time ... they call us in because moving 
and handling isn’t something they’re prepared to do ... It’s all driven by 
people being sued and care staff going off sick and claiming compensation. 
Interviewees recalled instances where risk managers or health and safety officers 
overruled experienced manual handling advisors, including in cases where a service 
user’s rehabilitation could be affected by the decision.194  
A manual handling advisor who works in a range of care settings said “blanket 
policies are rare on paper now” but resource constraints have the same effect of 
limiting practitioners’ ability to make balanced decisions. 
In a care setting, you will get people at the sharp end who are trying to 
make that judgment, but without the resources to support rehabilitation, 
dignity, or quality of life ... and big organisations turn their head to what’s 
going on because they’re quite happy to let staff take some risks and ... get 
away without having to put in place some of that more expensive provision. 
Our interviewee in the COT had encountered prescriptive policies in some local 
authorities, including authorities who fetter their discretion by not providing, for 
example, stair lifts for people with MS or epilepsy, or bathing equipment. 
They know people are entitled to risk assessment but they stop people 
coming in the front door by saying ‘we don’t provide that’ ... custom and 
practice becomes hardened into policy.    
She described these as “pockets of bad practice”, caused by a combination of 
resource constraints, poor management and supervision, limited understanding of 
the law and excessive risk-aversion. However, none of the practitioners or service 
managers we interviewed cited resource constraints as a significant obstacle to 
implementing the East Sussex principles. 
3.3 Divergent perceptions of human rights   
Some manual handling advisors noted that “sensationalised” media coverage had 
created received wisdom about the East Sussex case which sometimes prompted 
 
194  We found examples of such policies, including an ambulance service protocol which notes (with 
express reference to East Sussex) that some care home staff “have in effect a no lifting policy 
and have been advised by their managers not to lift patients from the floor” but instead dial 999. 
See East Midlands Ambulance Service NHS Trust (2007), Safer Manual Handling Policy; 
www.emas.nhs.uk/EasysiteWeb/getresource.axd?AssetID=625&type=Full&servicetype=Attachm
ent. We were also contacted by a training agency which promotes to public authorities “the need 
for a no-lifting approach to patient care” on the grounds that “people cannot safely lift people”. 
See http://www.handlingpeople.co.uk/. 
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negative reactions among staff (“before we couldn’t lift and now we have to”; “what 
about our rights?”) However, the interviewees suggested that these perceptions 
could be addressed through discussion.    
Several noted that labelling manual handling guidance as derived from human rights 
principles could be counter-productive. One advisor said that, while the East Sussex 
principles are embedded in his core training, he doesn’t “wave a big flag” to highlight 
their human rights origin.  
A group of occupational therapists employed by a London borough said East Sussex 
was not signposted as being derived from human rights principles in their training 
and it would “put people off” if it was. Their unanimously positive view of the case co-
existed with a generally negative view of human rights and the HRA. As one put it:   
I think there’s a lot of fear about it ... These rulings ... are fantastic in an 
ideal world but how do they transfer into reality where there isn’t a 
bottomless pit of resources? 
By contrast, one manual handling co-ordinator noted that in her local authority, East 
Sussex is signposted as a human rights case in training and she had not 
encountered negative reactions. She added that “if anything it becomes more 
empowering for care assistants because they ... get a better understanding of the 
context in which decisions are made” and of how they can use the case to protect 
their own safety. This suggests the way the case is presented – as being about 
balancing the rights of care staff and service users – can help allay potential 
resistance to its human rights dimension. 
3.4 Contracting out  
The contracting out of services can, interviewees noted, dilute the impact of local 
authority manual handling policies that enshrine the importance of individual risk 
assessment. One interviewee who has advised many public authorities said: 
Local authorities want to pay care agencies as little as possible, care 
agencies and care homes can’t retain staff – so where are you going to 
develop this body of expertise? ... People adopt the lowest common 
denominator approach and reach for the rigid policy because it’s easier and 
quicker ... That’s a huge, huge barrier.  
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In our survey of local authority legal directors, only 14 per cent of respondents said 
their authority had a mechanism to ensure that sub-contracted agencies are aware of 
policy in this area.195 
 
We found a variety of approaches in the authorities we interviewed. One city council 
required providers to have manual handling policies that are not in conflict with the 
council’s policy. In another authority, a manual handling advisor had been asked by 
contract compliance officers to assess the manual handling policies of private 
agencies; however, she doubted the effectiveness of enforcement measures since 
“the money factor always wins”. A director of social care in a metropolitan authority 
acknowledged that: 
In areas like home care, we require them to have [manual handling] policies 
but it’s incredibly hard for us to check how that feeds through ... The driver 
in community care has been ... almost exclusively cost. 
A representative of the National Care Homes Association said she would not expect 
care homes in the association to have “no lifting” policies; however, she did not 
indicate that practice in this area was monitored. She added that, in her view, neither 
East Sussex nor the HRA had had any impact on practice in care homes. 
The case was a nonsense ... We have huge chunks of legislation around 
abuse, and if people aren’t implementing the legislation properly, it’s not 
going to be made any better because of ... human rights legislation. 
Asked whether local authority manual handling policies were built into contracting 
arrangements, she said: 
There’s a breakdown in communication in relation to commissioning and 
contracting and therefore these really important points … aren’t necessarily 
being discussed.     
4. Issues for the future  
The context in which manual handling is taking place is complex and changing, with 
significant implications for implementation.   
4.1 Direct payments and personalised care  
 
195  Another interviewee who advises a range of care providers noted that domiciliary care agencies 
are sometimes restricted in their practice by insurance companies who stipulate, for example, that 
care agency employees cannot work alongside informal carers, regardless of the outcome of an 
individual risk assessment. 
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Several interviewees raised the issue of direct payments196 as presenting new 
challenges in relation to manual handling practice. Local authority staff are unsure 
how far their authority can or should promote good manual handling practice to care  
 
workers who are employed by direct payment recipients.197  All our local authority 
interviewees said this was an area of concern; at best, they had been able to supply 
ad hoc manual handling training or advice to care workers employed via a direct 
payment, but with little or no follow up. The Welsh Manual Handling Forum has 
tabled the issue of direct payments for discussion because “we’re all waiting for it to 
be tested in the courts and we hope it won’t get tested with us”.  
However, some interviewees also said the broader policy trend towards personalised 
care created a positive dynamic in relation to East Sussex. One who heads adult 
social care in a metropolitan authority said he saw the case as “feeding into the 
personalisation agenda”. A manual handling advisor in an English city council noted 
that: 
East Sussex has gone down incredibly well because it fits in with a lot of 
agendas such as person-centred care. So the implications of the case and 
the tone it set have had a ripple effect going outwards which has been in 
line with ripple effects coming out of other influences on our work. 
This interviewee noted the impact of case law generally can be cyclical: case law can 
encourage a direction of policy change, and policy change can make authorities 
more responsive to the lessons of case law.  
4.2 Promoting compliance  
Inspectorate bodies, advocacy organisations, and professional associations or 
networks all have a role to play in promoting compliance with human rights principles.  
 
196  Direct payments are cash payments made to individuals who have been assessed as needing 
services, in lieu of social service provisions. 
197  Department of Health guidance notes that: “As a general principle, local councils should avoid 
laying down health and safety policies for individual direct payment recipients”. See Department 
of Health (2003), Direct payment guidance: community care, services for carers and children’s 
services, p.26; 
http://www.dh.gov.uk/en/Publicationsandstatistics/Publications/PublicationsPolicyAndGuidance/D
H_4096246. 
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Some interviewees suggested that manual handling does not readily fall within the 
structure of inspections and that some inspectors may lack the knowledge and 
understanding to pick up prescriptive practices.198   
 
There is some evidence that, at a policy level, disability organisations have promoted 
the East Sussex principles.199 However, disability organisations we interviewed 
suggested that disabled people and advocacy groups do not frame issues in human 
rights terms. As one director of a disability organisation noted: 
That’s not the sort of language [disability groups] are talking in and nor 
necessarily are the specific implications of [human rights] judgments being 
picked up ... I think there’s a big question about how legal cases and 
interventions get disseminated, picked up and used. 
This suggests potential to develop the “demand side” of human rights compliance by 
equipping service users to follow through on case law and its implications for service 
delivery.    
5. Conclusion  
We have seen that East Sussex has had a discernable impact on some policy and 
guidance within public authorities and professional associations. Manual handling 
advisors and practitioners have described the beneficial impact of the case on their 
practice. However, anecdotal evidence suggests that the impact of the case across 
public authorities and care providers is variable and uncertain.     
Professional associations and networks have played a significant role – often 
informally - in disseminating information about the East Sussex case and debating its 
implications for practice.200 Our interviews highlight the strong potential that these 
informal channels have for translating and disseminating the lessons of case law for 
everyday practice.   
 
198  The Commission for Social Care Inspection’s guidance to inspectors on how to interpret 
regulations and national minimum standards for home care notes the need for risk assessment in 
relation to manual handling, and refers to the 1992 Manual Handling Operations Regulations, but 
not the Human Rights Act. See Commission for Social Care Inspection (2007), Domiciliary Care 
Agencies Guidance Log; 
http://www.csci.org.uk/professional/care_providers/all_services/guidance/guidance_log_domiciliar
y_care.aspx.   
199  See for example, Mencap (2007), Moving and Handling; 
www.mencap.org.uk/displaypagedoc.asp?id=314. 
200  Several manual handling advisors suggested that, were a similar case to occur in the future, they 
would expect to find out about it via the National Back Exchange, which has an active network of 
local groups and an online forum for debate. 
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CHAPTER 7 
THE POSITIVE OBLIGATION TO SECURE DIGNITY AND INTEGRITY: 
THE CASE OF BERNARD 
The Bernard case is widely cited in literature on the Human Rights Act (HRA) as 
illustrating the potential of human rights to improve public service delivery.201 Our 
findings suggest this potential has not been fulfilled. According to our interviewees, 
the case has made little or no impact on local authority policy and practice or at a 
national policy level. Our research has focused on exploring why the case has largely 
failed to “bite” – either in the local authority concerned (section 2.1) or in other public 
authorities (section 2.2). 
1. The case and its context 
Enfield Council social services department had assessed the needs of a severely 
disabled woman, Mrs Bernard, who used a wheelchair and suffered from 
incontinence and diabetes. Her care plan stated that she needed to move to a 
suitably adapted property with urgency, but the council’s housing department failed to 
take action even after the court had ordered it to re-house her, and offered no 
apology or explanation. For 20 months, Mrs Bernard was almost confined to her 
home and forced to spend much of her time in a shower chair which caused her pain. 
She had no privacy and soiled herself several times each day.  
The High Court decided that the council’s failure to act showed a “singular lack of 
respect” for the claimant’s private and family life, amounting to a breach of Article 8, 
 
201  See for example: Age Concern (2006), Rights for Real: Older People, Human Rights and the 
CEHR, p.52; 
http://ageconcern.org.uk/AgeConcern/Documents/0406_Rights_for_Real_Report.pdf. Audit 
Commission (2003), Human Rights: Improving public services delivery, p.6; http://www.audit-
commission.gov.uk/Products/NATIONAL-REPORT/FDE9C6A9-7DAF-4cd3-B21E-
21E9E13E1D43/HumanRights-briefing_1.pdf. Joint Committee on Human Rights (2007), The 
Human Rights of Older People in Healthcare, Eighteenth Report of Session 2006-07, Vol I, p.83; 
http://www.publications.parliament.uk/pa/jt200607/jtselect/jtrights/156/156i.pdf. Social Care 
Institute for Excellence (2008), Dignity in Care: Adults’ Services Practice Guide, p.175; 
http://www.scie.org.uk/publications/practiceguides/practiceguide09/files/pg09.pdf. 
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and awarded £10,000 damages. However, the humiliation experienced was not 
severe enough to amount to inhuman or degrading treatment under Article 3.202 
 
Key principles reinforced by the case are: 
• Users of public services needing particular assistance should not experience 
undue delay in having those needs met.  
• The local authority was under an obligation to take positive steps to enable 
the disabled person and her family to live as normal a family life as possible. 
These positive steps included the provision of suitably adapted 
accommodation, which would have secured her physical and psychological 
integrity and restored her dignity as a human being.203  
• Gross acts of maladministration, with grave consequences, may merit a 
substantial award.204 
 
In 2004, 1.5 million people were in need of accessible accommodation, with 329,000 
living in completely unsuitable housing.205  A survey of physically disabled people by 
the John Grooms charity found that:  
Many local authorities don’t know what accessible housing stock is available 
or the needs and characteristics of disabled people locally. As a result there 
are thousands of disabled people who wait years before finding a house 
suitable for their needs. 206  
At least two cases referred to the Local Government Ombudsman (LGO) since the 
Bernard judgment involved similar circumstances. In one, an elderly, disabled woman 
lived in unsuitable accommodation for at least five years longer than necessary 
because the London Borough of Havering failed to consider her housing needs and 
 
202  R (Bernard) v Enfield LBC [2003] HRLR 4 at paras 28-9; the judgment cited as an important 
consideration the fact that the claimants’ suffering was due to corporate neglect and not an 
intention to humiliate or debase. 
203  R (Bernard) v Enfield LBC [2003] HRLR 4 at para 33. 
204  R (Bernard) v Enfield LBC [2003] HRLR 4 at para 36. 
205  Disability Rights Commission in association with Habinteg (2006), Housing and the Disability 
Equality Duty: A guide to the Disability Equality Duty and Disability Discrimination Act 2005 for the 
social housing sector, p.5; http://www.dotheduty.org/files/Housing.pdf 
206  John Grooms (2005), Response to the PM Strategy Paper “Improving the Life Chances of 
Disabled People; p.9; 
http://www.cabinetoffice.gov.uk/strategy/work_areas/disability/~/media/assets/www.cabinetoffice.
gov.uk/strategy/john_grooms%20pdf.ashx. 
  
96
                                           
her human rights.207 In another, a seriously ill and profoundly disabled woman was 
confined to bed in one room of her house for two years longer than necessary 
because Leeds City Council failed to recognise its legal duties to the woman and 
mishandled her disabled facilities grant.208 
The Leeds case illustrates the constraints that some local authorities face in 
providing suitable accommodation for disabled people. The LGO found no fault by 
the council in handling the claimants’ re-housing applications and commented that:  
It is some measure of the extreme pressure on social housing, especially 
properties adapted to be wheelchair accessible, that all the higher priority 
cases were in even more difficult situations than the complainant and his 
wife... 
The LGO decisions, and the broader context of deficient housing provision for 
disabled people, indicate the wide range of policies and practice for which Bernard 
might hold lessons: liaison and dispute resolution between housing and social care 
departments; decision-making around housing allocation and adaptations, and 
processes to ensure that accessible housing stock is matched without undue delay to 
those that need it.  
2. The impact of the case 
2.1 Impact on the London Borough of Enfield  
The Bernard judgment said the claimants’ case had “fallen into an administrative 
void” between Enfield’s social services and housing departments.209  At the time of 
the judgment, there was “nothing to indicate that the defendant's procedures have 
been improved so that the same kind of mistake ... is less likely to occur in the 
future”.210 
In July 2003, Enfield’s Homelessness Review211 drew two learning points from the 
case: 
 
207  London Borough of Havering (06/A/10428); http://www.lgo.org.uk/socserv.htm. 
208  Leeds City Council (05/C/13157); http://www.lgo.org.uk/socserv.htm. 
209  R (Bernard) v Enfield LBC [2003] HRLR 4 at para 29. 
210  Indeed, the Housing Department had compounded the effects of its inaction by threatening to 
evict the claimants; the threat was withdrawn, but should never have been made had there been 
proper liaison between the two departments (para 41). 
211  Enfield Council (2003), Homelessness Review; 
http://www.enfield.gov.uk/112/Homelessness%20Review.pdf). 
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• Staff compiling occupational therapy and other assessment reports should be 
familiar with the relevant legislation. 
• Different council departments should work closely together and co-ordinate 
activity and share information. 
 
A senior housing manager in LB Enfield (not in post at the time of the case) outlined 
a number of changes to organisational structure and practice that had been made 
since the judgment. She emphasised that none was a direct result of the case. 
Instead, Bernard was a subsidiary element in a continuum of other developments, 
notably the government’s drive for greater personalisation of care. 
Services relating to housing need in LB Enfield are now part of the adult health and 
social care department, under unified leadership. Cases involving complex needs are 
now addressed in multi-disciplinary meetings to avoid “battles over what’s expected 
and what’s deliverable”. Issues of need are now looked at “in the round”, with service 
users playing some role in designing their own solutions, whether from the council’s 
own stock or from the private sector.  
Asked to explain where the Bernard case fits alongside other drivers of policy and 
practice, she said:  
Reputationally, no authority would wish to be in the position [of] Enfield ... 
with regards to this case. So ... the council has taken it very seriously. 
However, as time moves on, the issues that were raised within the case are 
overtaken by government agendas ... [and] become embedded in the 
organisation as a result of many different drivers ... What [the case] does do 
is sharpen the mind as to what’s acceptable and what’s not acceptable and 
that is sharpened even further by the priorities that the government has set 
for local authorities. 
Asked whether the case had changed the council’s approach to human rights, she 
added: 
I don’t see it as something we would be fearful of - I see it as part of the 
jigsaw in terms of the context when you’re making a decision ...   
There was no indication that the case had featured prominently in staff training: the 
interviewee said she thought understanding of human rights came more from 
“copious” general briefings on the HRA than from Bernard. The interviewee praised 
the department for Communities and Local Government (CLG) for its email alerts on 
case law. Operational managers are expected to keep abreast of case law and 
“translate” the lessons for frontline staff. The interviewee acknowledged that “the 
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closer you get to the frontline the more diluted it becomes”, partly due to staff 
turnover. 
The interviewee was confident that the concept of positive obligations was 
understood by those staff that needed to know. She gave the example of a case 
conference which “pulled out all the stops” to house a severely disabled child having 
identified a right to life issue after a consultant said the child was at risk of catching 
an infection in hospital.  
We try to work proactively where ... we recognise that there is a risk to 
someone and a risk to the authority’s reputation – to ensure that that 
person’s needs are met, most definitely. It’s part of the system.  
The interviewee did not know whether the £10,000 financial penalty had made a 
difference to the council’s response to the case, but doubted whether a sum of this 
size would have a “major impact” as a driver of policy. 
Asked whether a similar case could arise again, she acknowledged that in a large, 
complex organisation, individuals can always “slip through the net”. However, she 
considered that the authority has enough checks and balances to make it extremely 
unlikely, including a complaints procedure that acted as an early warning and 
mechanisms to involve service users in finding solutions.  
2.2 Impact on other public authorities 
In this section we examine how far local authorities reviewed or changed policy in the 
light of the Bernard case. According to our interviewees and survey respondents, this 
did not happen to any significant extent (section 2.2.1). We examine the issue of 
resource and capacity constraints as a barrier to impact (section 2.2.2); the multiple 
drivers for change identified by our interviewees, in which Bernard and human rights 
case law generally are seen as subsidiary to other factors (section 2.2.3) and the 
impact of financial penalties attached to legal judgments (section 2.2.4).  
2.2.1 Policy review and revision   
In our survey of 36 directors of legal services in England and Wales, around two 
thirds of respondents who answered the relevant question had heard of the case; 
less than one third said their authority had examined policies because of the case, 
and one individual said their authority had changed policy.212 About ten per cent said 
their authority had issued guidance to ensure that staff were aware of the 
implications for their practice. Comments suggest the case is not regarded as holding 
relevant lessons: 
 
212  Note that five out of 36 respondents said that their council did not have a housing and/or a social 
services function. 
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This was a pretty basic case … It did not add anything new. 
This case was so extreme it would have been in contradiction of our 
understanding of our statutory position and our policies and guidance as to 
how we treat our clients. 
Of 25 directors of housing in England and Wales we surveyed, fewer than half of 
respondents who answered the relevant question had heard of the case; just over a 
third said their authority had examined policies in the light of it, and one respondent 
said their authority had changed policy. However, more than 90 per cent said they 
knew where to go for relevant guidance.213  
One respondent said they had cited Bernard to put pressure on another local 
authority to change a housing allocation for a homeless family referred to it. This is 
one instance where a public authority has used human rights arguments to seek to 
secure a better outcome for service users.  
2.2.2 Constraints on resource and capacity 
Comments by housing directors in our survey indicate that they see financial 
restraints and the shortage of accessible housing as barriers to implementation of the 
Bernard principles: 
[The case] has increased the gap between the legal obligations on 
adaptations for disabled people and the funds available to deliver those 
adaptations. 
The case has highlighted an issue that should have been addressed in any 
reasonable LA - however with the lack of accessible housing available it 
may occur again … Whatever is available is better than the street…  
A divergence of experience emerged in our interviews. A director of housing in a 
local council suggested that central London boroughs and other authorities with 
scarce accommodation always operated “on the edge of the law”. In authorities 
where there was less pressure on housing stock, “we rarely encroach on any case 
law, human rights or otherwise”.  One housing advisor in East Cambridgeshire 
District Council (who had not heard of Bernard) noted that her council had more 
adapted housing stock than neighbouring authorities and so rarely made adverse 
decisions requiring consideration of case law. By contrast, a disability housing 
 
213  In another survey of 13 local authority and housing association personnel (via the Chartered 
Institute of Housing), some two-thirds said they considered the case relevant to the work they did; 
none said their organisation had reviewed policy in the light of the case.  
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advisor in Hull said he handled some 400 cases a year relating to adaptations and 
re-housing, many in circumstances comparable to Bernard: 
And that’s the tip of the iceberg ... I haven’t been able to use [Bernard] partly 
because there are so many people that I think I could apply it to every case. 
 
2.2.3 Multiple drivers for change 
Interviewees working at a national policy level said that Bernard is viewed as 
peripheral by those directing and managing housing-related services both in local 
authorities and housing associations.  
A policy officer in the Local Government Association said that, in her view, Bernard 
was “extreme”; she could not recall it ever being discussed with senior officers in 
local authorities on matters of housing policy or implementation. She did not consider 
the HRA and human rights case law to be significant drivers of policy or practice: 
Authorities are structured in a way that mean [housing] legislation and 
statutory duties are the primary concern. Any case law is going to be open 
to interpretation and sometimes ... contradictory.  
An interviewee in the Housing Corporation, which regulates housing associations, 
said the regulatory code setting out the expectations of housing associations214 was, 
in his view, a much more significant driver of policy and practice than the HRA or 
case law.215  
[Bernard was the] exception rather than the rule – it just shouldn’t have 
happened. There are enough guidelines and expectations without the HRA 
for that to be something that is unacceptable.   
Interviewees in the Chartered Institute of Housing (CIH) reiterated this view. One 
professional practice officer noted that the case had not gained prominence as a 
“landmark case” in the housing sector. This interviewee said that the human rights or 
equality related cases which had gained a higher profile were those which appeared 
to expose a “systemic failure” which placed authorities at risk of breaching the law, or 
 
214  http://www.housingcorp.gov.uk/upload/pdf/RegulatoryCode.pdf. 
215  He added, however, that human rights considerations might come into sharper focus for housing 
associations given the recent ruling in R (Weaver) v London and Quadrant Housing Trust [2008] 
EWHC 1377 (Admin); [2008] WLR (D) 207, which held that the management and allocation of 
housing stock by a registered social landlord was a function of a public nature, so that it was 
amenable to judicial review and regarded as a public authority for the purposes of the HRA.  
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those which “go to the very core of the mechanics of how tenancies work”.216  By 
contrast, Bernard tended to provoke the reaction from local authorities: “it couldn’t 
happen here”.  
She added that some local authorities were taking steps to improve the supply and 
profiling of accessible housing stock (for example through the development of 
Accessible Housing Registers). This “slow burn” process was driven by a variety of 
factors, including legislation and a council’s motivation to be designated as high-
performing; no single case like Bernard could be identified as a driver.   
A senior figure in the CIH did not think the HRA or human rights case law were 
pushed with similar levels of leadership as the “huge amount of work” around equality 
and diversity: “human rights considerations appear on a case-by-case basis, not as 
standard”. 
One operational housing manager in a London borough noted that Bernard, and HRA 
cases generally, were viewed as less significant and immediate than case law under 
the Housing Act 1996 or the Disability Discrimination Act (DDA) 2005 - especially the 
general Disability Equality Duty.217 
This manager said Bernard was not incorporated into training, partly because the 
principles it raises have stronger drivers from other routes. For example, the principle 
of “no undue delay” is embedded in performance indicators and the Homelessness 
Code of Guidance.218 Other “hard targets” – such as those contained in Local Area 
Agreements, CLG targets and Best Value Performance Indicators – were all stronger 
drivers of practice than, as he put it, “airy fairy” human rights standards. The 
manager said that court judgments could only be enacted if the necessary housing 
stock existed and suggested operational managers became case-hardened: 
There’s so much case law around and it’s sometimes contradictory – so 
 
216  Housing cases with a human rights or equality dimension which our interviewees regarded as 
more significant were: Lewisham London Borough Council v Malcolm [2008] UKHL 43; [2008] 
WLR (D) 205, which held that a landlord’s claim for a possession order against a disabled tenant 
who sublet the premises in breach of the tenancy agreement did not amount to unlawful 
discrimination for a reason which related to the tenant’s disability. Also, Ghaidan v Mendoza 
[2004] UKHL 30, in which the Law Lords ruled that a homosexual man whose partner had died 
should succeed to the tenancy of their shared flat because the relevant provision of the Rent Act 
relating to the surviving ‘spouse’ fell within the ambit of Mr. Ghaidan’s Article 8 right to respect for 
his home and therefore also engaged his Article 14 right against discrimination.  
217  The Disability Equality Duty requires public authorities to promote equality of opportunity for 
disabled people when developing their policies and delivery procedures, and new duties requiring 
both private and social landlords to make reasonable adjustments for disabled people. In its 
submission to this project, the Ministry of Justice referred to the duties on local authorities under 
the DDA 2005, suggesting that it considers the principles of the Bernard case to have been met 
or superseded by this legislation. 
218  http://www.communities.gov.uk/documents/housing/pdf/152056.pdf. 
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issues of natural justice won’t be the prime driver in the way we make our 
decisions. 
We also interviewed a service manager and a director of service in Leeds City 
Council, with reference to the LGO case cited in section 1. The service manager 
noted that the external challenge from the LGO case had “given an extra edge” to 
changes already under way to improve the interface between housing and social 
care.219 Both  
interviewees confirmed that the Bernard case did not figure in discussions either 
within the council or between the council and the Ombudsman (though the HRA was 
raised retrospectively as having been relevant). The service manager noted that the 
HRA is “a bit peripheral in people’s thinking” and tends to get squeezed out amidst 
the “raft of legislation” that informs decision-making. However, she did recall Bernard 
being raised in discussions with the council’s complaints officer regarding provision to 
meet housing need.  
An interviewee from Shelter reiterated that Bernard had made little impact, “maybe 
because it is easily marginalised as being on rather extreme facts”. He welcomed the 
fact that the Court of Appeal had, in this case, interpreted Articles 3 and 8 in a 
positive way rather than as merely a negative restraint. But in his experience, “there’s 
never any mention of human rights as being any element of the decision-making 
process [in the housing sector] ... nothing proactive”.   
2.2.4 The role of financial penalties 
Directors and managers of housing services said that financial penalties could not be 
ignored; they consumed public money that could be used to provide services. But 
none considered the £10,000 penalty in Bernard to be significant in the context of 
authorities with multi-million pound budgets. One director of housing in a Welsh 
county borough council said a fine of this order “was not much of a threat” compared 
to an industrial tribunal with unlimited damages. It is not known how much Enfield 
spent defending the Bernard case; one housing manager in another London borough 
said his authority was in the process of spending some £100,000 fighting a case 
relating to the housing needs of a divorced couple.   
From the service user perspective, the disability housing advisor we interviewed said 
financial penalties were important for claimants to compensate for the stress of 
pursuing a case.    
 
219  These changes included the introduction of a multi-disciplinary case management approach to 
address complex housing needs and an appeals process to resolve disputes about what 
adaptations are required to meet a disabled person’s needs.    
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3. Conclusion   
Our interviewees offer a variety of opinions as to why they think the Bernard case 
has achieved so little traction in the housing and social care sectors, including a 
proliferation of legislation and case law; restraints on resources and capacity, and a 
tendency to view the case as an aberration. It may be that the sheer breadth of areas 
the case holds lessons for means any potential impact is lost amid a raft of other, 
more tangible drivers. 
In areas where there is sufficient capacity to meet the basic level of decent treatment 
set by Bernard, our interviewees suggest that the case is seen as having few 
generalisable implications. For example, the principle of no undue delay was seen as 
being enshrined in performance targets and codes of practice more central to 
everyday decision-making.   
In circumstances of extreme pressure on housing stock, our interviewees did not see 
Bernard as pertinent to the hard decisions that must be made in conditions of 
scarcity. What emerged from the interviews was a lack of “fit” between a case which 
set a minimum threshold of acceptable treatment and a system in which much 
existing legislation and guidance is about the equitable and transparent rationing of 
resources. 
These observations do not necessarily rule out the potential significance of the case 
in highlighting unacceptable professional practice which cannot be excused by 
resource and capacity constraints (the “corporate negligence” of which LB Enfield 
was accused). However, again, the majority of our interviewees pointed to other 
drivers that they would expect to prevent such egregious practice from occurring. 
Our findings suggest that the potential of the HRA to drive improvements in public 
services has been particularly under-explored in relation to housing. The tendency to 
view the HRA as peripheral to other drivers, including equalities legislation, was a 
strong theme of our interviews. It might be argued that this perspective neglects the 
role played by the HRA as an overarching piece of legislation which renders visible 
groups that fall outside the incomplete patchwork of anti‐discrimination legislation and 
gives them a voice and a channel for legal redress. This suggests further potential to 
develop and model integrated human rights and equality approaches within public 
authorities. 
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CHAPTER 8 
CONCLUSION 
 
In this chapter, we analyse the themes that emerge from our qualitative research on 
the impact of selected cases. These insights point to some of the inherent limitations 
of any exercise to determine the impact of human rights case law (section 1). They 
reveal some of the barriers which might prevent principles established by particular 
cases from changing policy or practice in public authorities which are not compliant 
(section 2). More positively, they provide snapshots of how the lessons of human 
rights case law have been put into practice and ways of communicating human rights 
to gain consent (section 3). 
1. Limits to assessing impact 
1.1 Multiple drivers for change 
At an institutional level, the HRA and human rights cases are rarely the sole or 
principal driver for change within public authorities. Our interviewees identified a 
range of other drivers and influences on practitioners. As illustrated here, these 
include externally imposed standards and broader government policy directions; 
organisational targets and working cultures; cultural and social factors such as media 
coverage, and constraints on capacity and resources.  
 
 The limits to assessing impact are not uniform. Where a case has direct implications 
for policy and guidance set nationally (as in Limbuela), the impact is visible and even 
quantifiable. Impact is harder to ascertain where cases have implications for diverse 
practice across a range of public authorities, or where they involve complex 
circumstances from which it appears hard to generalise.    
As individual practitioners, interviewees frequently struggled to disentangle their 
knowledge of case law from other factors (such as their professional ethos and 
training) as an influence on specific decisions or habitual behaviour. The exception 
appears to be the Osman case. Police officers were able to identify ways in which the 
case has influenced policy and practice; however, their awareness of the details of 
the case was lower, which might have implications for applying the principles of the 
case to a range of situations.  
1.2 The passage of time 
The time lag between an incident, a legal judgment, and resulting policy changes 
reaching operational staff can make it difficult to determine what is attributable to 
case law and what relates to the evolution of good practice; for example, prevention 
of suicide within the Prison Service or the evolution of manual handling practice. 
Policy changes may be made in response to an incident review ahead of any legal 
case; they may also be made in response to inquiries that stem from the legal case 
(as in the case of Zahid Mubarek). In each instance, determining the impact of the 
case itself is uncertain. 
1.3 Media coverage and advocacy 
In some cases, there has been high profile media reporting of a judgment and/or 
subsequent inquiries, or vocal campaigns by relatives and advocacy organisations to 
challenge poor practice. Arguably, the HRA underpins any resulting changes to 
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policy and practice; however, a note of caution is needed when assessing the impact 
of the case on its own.  
2. Potential barriers to impact 
2.1 Divergent perceptions of human rights  
We found both positive and negative views about human rights and the HRA at 
different levels of seniority in public authorities. 
Some service directors and managers had experienced human rights as a “stick to 
beat us with”, a “line of attack” or as the basis for unrealistic or unfounded claims to 
services. This had led to what one London housing manager described as a case-
hardened attitude to the HRA. Some said human rights were debated in an  
oppositional manner, making it harder to win consent to change (“what about my 
rights?”). Others spoke of the HRA as being “almost taboo”, an object of derision or 
something threatening, in contrast to the Disability Discrimination Act which was 
viewed positively by all those who referred to it.  
However, other interviewees emphasised that such views are neither universal nor 
insurmountable. Practitioners spoke about learning from human rights cases to 
approach seemingly intractable problems (such as the moving and handling of 
morbidly obese patients) and as a framework within which to resolve competing 
interests. Service directors spoke positively about human rights as a set of 
underpinning principles for their work and a constructive challenge function. One 
director said:  
I think it’s quite appropriate that I’m given organisational headaches, to 
ensure that I and other senior managers think about the human rights 
implications of what we’re doing.   
In the area of prisons, several interviewees said the principles of human rights are 
readily embraced by staff, but recognition that these principles reflect human rights 
law is low. Stephen Shaw, Prisons and Probation Ombudsman, said: 
If you say to prison officers ‘do you believe in treating prisoners with 
decency?’ then I think you would get a very high … and genuine sign up … 
If you asked the question ‘is it important that the Human Rights Act is 
followed in the treatment of prisoners?’, there I think you would get a much 
more varied response. 
Our findings suggest that generalisations about perceptions of human rights are hard 
to sustain: opinions in a single public authority can differ markedly. As one snapshot, 
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a frontline police officer told this project the Osman case had contributed to a 
“bureaucratic nightmare with frontline officers bearing the brunt” while another from 
the same force said Osman was "another example of how the Police are becoming 
more professional/accountable”.220   
2.2 Resources and capacity: an issue of supply and demand  
Interviewees said a significant barrier to applying the lessons of case law 
systematically is the need for additional resources (for example, the cost of a social 
care budget) or additional capacity (for example, accessible prison space or housing 
stock).221 It is rarely as straightforward as a public authority saying it cannot afford to 
implement case law; rather, limitations on resources and capacity create different 
dynamics in relation to case law.    
In some cases, public authorities appear to develop ways of interpreting the 
obligations they might be expected to take on as a result of case law to fit within 
available resources. For example, a regional asylum policy officer told us that hard-
pressed local authorities with large numbers of destitute failed asylum seekers 
effectively apply a higher threshold for community care than neighbouring authorities 
with fewer claimants.   
In other instances, case law concerned with a minimum level of decency and respect 
for a claimant’s human rights can struggle to gain purchase in a system which is 
primarily about the equitable and transparent rationing of resources. A case like 
Bernard may be a salient reminder of the “bottom line” but does not, some 
interviewees said, assist an authority to make hard decisions about allocating scarce 
housing stock.222  
On the “demand” side, our interviewees suggest that variations in the availability of 
legal representation or advocacy can create something akin to a “post code lottery” 
(for example, in relation to access to community care). Interviewees spoke of “advice 
deserts” and of applicants struggling to make headway through the system without 
representation. Disability organisations suggested that demands by service users to 
 
220  These views were obtained via an anonymous questionnaire of detective constables and police 
inspectors in the same force.   
221  This is not to suggest that implementing the principles of case law necessarily costs more than 
not doing so. Indeed, it may be that following through the lessons of case law could encourage a 
more rational use of resources (such as, in the case of Bernard, the development of Accessible 
Housing Registers to match adapted housing stock to those that need it). 
222 In such cases, the primary lead on following through the implications of case law may need to 
come from central government.  
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operationalise case law were patchy and certainly had not achieved a sufficient 
critical mass to drive change.     
The Middleton case has implications for the nature of coroners’ investigations and 
has in many cases facilitated an improved role for families in inquests – but some 
interviewees noted that families seeking legal representation still face considerable 
hurdles.  
2.3 Variable mechanisms to monitor case law and review policy against it 
Our findings suggest that monitoring arrangements are variable and often highly 
specific to each public authority. In local authorities differing perceptions may exist 
between legal staff and service departments as to the adequacy of those 
arrangements.   
In our survey of legal directors, more than half of the 32 respondents who answered 
the relevant question said their authority had systematic arrangements in place to 
monitor human rights case law regularly, while 40 per cent said their authority did so 
on an ad hoc basis. When asked the same question, directors of service departments 
appeared less confident; 22 per cent of housing directors and a third of directors of 
social services who responded said their authority had systematic monitoring 
arrangements.   
A significant number of interviewees within local authorities said mechanisms to 
review policy and guidance in the light of case law are haphazard and overly 
dependent upon personal initiative. Service directors or managers said they generally 
rely on legal colleagues to flag relevant case law that might affect policy, or wait to be 
alerted to it through external channels.  
A director of social care in a London borough said:  
I wouldn’t feel assured that important case law was coming through from the 
legal department ... I’ve got nobody scanning the system for the impact on 
policy issues.  
However, other interviewees (both in local and national government and in police 
forces) were more confident. A senior legal officer in the UK Border Agency (UKBA) 
said operational policy teams in the UKBA’s regional structure pick up relevant 
principles from specific asylum cases and feed these up to ministers. In turn, policy 
changes are fed back to the operational policy teams to generate new guidance or 
instructions when required. The National Offender Management Service (NOMS) 
said this role is served by having a legal adviser sitting on its board to inform it of the 
implications of upcoming and recent changes. Police officers from four out of the five 
police forces we interviewed were able to outline internal mechanisms for monitoring 
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case law and disseminating relevant points, and noted that the National Policing 
Improvement Agency (NPIA) fulfils this role at a national level.  
In one snapshot of local authority procedure, a director of adult social care in a 
metropolitan authority said the authority’s legal department collates cases of interest 
roughly every two months and flags them to relevant departments, with additional 
interpretation and guidelines: “this works well as a system to keep intelligence 
flowing”. 
2.4 Variable mechanisms to disseminate the lessons of case law 
We encountered variable experience in the public authorities we interviewed and 
surveyed, both as to the perceived effectiveness of how the lessons of case law are 
disseminated and whether policy responses are signposted as being derived from 
human rights judgments (especially to those on the “frontline” of service delivery).  
The dissemination of the lessons of case law – whether or not they come with a 
human rights label - depends upon channels of communication reaching all those 
that need to know. This is particularly challenging in public authorities that are large 
and/or geographically dispersed. 
Anecdotally, the service managers and practitioners we interviewed could not recall 
getting guidance about East Sussex or Bernard (or any resulting policy changes) 
automatically through their authority. Some had pro-actively sought information from 
their legal department or other sources (including specialist legal websites or alert 
services, specialist journals and professional associations or networks).  
In our survey of directors of social services, a quarter of respondents who answered 
the relevant question said they felt they received sufficient guidance about human 
rights case law. About one third thought the guidance was timely and accessible (in 
the sense of being written so that they understand the lessons of the case and can 
put them into practice). When asked whether they thought operational managers and 
frontline staff in their department received sufficient, timely and accessible guidance, 
the figures were the same or lower. The responses of housing directors to the same 
questions were broadly in line with these figures. 
In our survey of legal directors, 80 per cent thought operational managers in their 
authority received sufficient guidance, more than 70 per cent considered it timely and 
more than 60 per cent considered it accessible. The figures relating to their 
perception of the guidance given to frontline workers were lower (between 30 and 46 
per cent). These findings indicate that the perception of legal directors as to what 
constitutes sufficient, timely and accessible guidance may differ in some instances 
from that of directors of service departments. Notably, fewer than half of all these 
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director-level respondents consider that frontline staff in their authorities receive 
sufficient, timely or accessible guidance about the lessons of case law.  
There is debate about how far down an organisation it is helpful to label a policy 
change or guidance as being based on human rights. Some said this can be off-
putting  
or unnecessarily legalistic.223 However, several practitioners told us that, in some 
instances, they do find it helpful to understand the human rights origin of a change to 
guidance or policy. In the case of East Sussex, it helped frontline staff to know that 
changes were not arbitrary and involved a balancing of rights, including their own. 
For example, some interviewees in NHS Trusts or other agencies responsible for 
healthcare in prisons articulated a need for more explicit advice on human rights 
case law. One said he would like to see this framed as “positive guidance … based 
on sound, reasoned judgment … so it’s not just about risk aversion”. A medical 
director working across a cluster of prisons said he needed to know about case law 
developments for his patients’ benefit and his own protection:  
[T]here needs to be a way of distilling that case law, the wisdom of it and the 
instruction of it in a way that is recognisable by doctors and the [primary 
care trusts] that employ those doctors.   
An interviewee in the NOMS security policy unit said explicit references to human 
rights cases in policy documents can prevent staff from becoming too “cellular” and 
remind them that experiences in other prisons are relevant to them.  
We have also found evidence of local authorities articulating a need for central 
government guidance on the provision of support to people with no recourse to public 
funds, which would include the application of human rights assessments to determine 
potential breaches of Articles 3 and 8.    
Amid such variable experience, it is unsafe to draw conclusions about the most 
commonly used – or most effective – way of disseminating the implications of case 
law. What is clear is that we cannot always be sure whether, even in instances where 
case law has had a demonstrable impact, frontline staff necessarily know that human 
rights principles underpinned changes to their practice.   
 
223 In its unpublished submission to this project in August 2008, the Ministry of Justice said: “It would 
... be rare ... for a public authority to disseminate guidance about changes in case law, except 
between those who would actually need to understand such points of legal detail ... Instead, if as 
a result of case law a public authority decides that it should change its practices or policies, it 
would disseminate guidance about that specific change; this guidance may not necessarily need 
to refer to the underlying reasoning or case law.”   
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3. Human rights as a driver for change 
This section looks at some of the broader issues of human rights as a driver for 
change, as they have arisen in the course of our research into the impact of selected 
cases. As noted earlier, case law is only one way in which human rights influences 
change. 
3.1 A principles based approach  
Legal judgments are generally specific interpretations of the law applied to a 
particular set of circumstances: this is what a legal case requires and judges may be 
understandably reluctant to articulate broader frameworks of principles (though the 
East Sussex judgment is an interesting exception and the Osman judgment also 
articulates a principle intended to be broadly applicable). 
This in turn can discourage any culture within public authorities of identifying 
generalisable principles arising from case law – and create a tendency for authorities 
to await further legal challenges in order to determine the application of established 
principles to new situations. Similarly, individual professionals may distinguish 
specific situations that face them on the facts, if they do not have the knowledge or 
understanding to apply a broader human rights framework. Moreover, our interviews 
suggest a generic tendency to view some human rights case law as arising from 
extreme or aberrant circumstances. 
Some service directors acknowledged that, even where staff are aware of human 
rights principles, they are not always confident in applying them to individual cases or 
particular populations. One director of housing and social care in a London borough, 
who is active in the disability network of the Association of Directors of Adult Social 
Services (ADASS), said:  
What we’d like to know is: what is generalisable, what does this [case law] 
suggest should be ... the broad policy positions that we promote? ... That’s 
the area that needs to be developed from ADASS’s perspective. 
As one example of this broader application, a chief officer for housing and social care 
in a Welsh county borough council said human rights principles had been one driver 
behind a decision to stop applying a blanket policy around intentional homelessness 
because it was disadvantaging vulnerable children. In other examples, local authority 
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interviewees referred to cases concerning the need to investigate the effects of care 
home closures on residents as having produced tangible changes to policy and  
procedure, even where their own authority had faced no legal challenge.224 The 
director of social care in one metropolitan authority said case law in this area had 
helped drive a “pro-active approach” characterised by open consultation, transparent 
decision-making and service user involvement.  
However, we found relatively few examples of this kind, and interviewees across the 
public service areas we explored suggest the need to equip service directors and 
managers to apply human rights principles across a range of circumstances.  
Professor Francesca Klug has called this process “smart compliance”: that is, 
providing guidance to public authorities on the implications of human rights case law 
which extend beyond the public authority and specific facts raised by a particular 
case in ways that may not be immediately apparent.225 The absence until 2007 of a 
commission charged with this role of promoting human rights and “translating” the 
lessons of law into effective practice may well, our interviews suggest, have led to the 
HRA being under-sold and under-exploited.226  
3.2 Promoting “smart compliance” through formal and informal networks 
Our findings suggest that there are different dynamics by which case law can exert 
impact. Sometimes the lever is top down: for example, instructing case workers to 
process asylum support applications differently. Impact can also be achieved from 
the bottom up: in the case of East Sussex, our findings suggest that change occurred 
through non mechanistic routes, by validating the efforts of committed professionals. 
One director of a national disability organisation said legal interventions should be 
viewed as part of a longer-term process involving promotion and implementation, 
harnessing multiple formal and informal channels. Our interviews suggest several 
 
224  See Cowl et al v Plymouth City Council [2001] EWCA Civ 1935; R (Madden) v Bury MBC [2002] 
EWHC 1882 and R v North & East Devon Health Authority, ex p Coughlan [1999] Lloyds L Rep 
(Med) 306. 
225  Klug, F (2004), Establishment of the Commission for Equality and Human Rights: implications for 
the public sector: Westminster Explained 36: An assessment of the impact of the HRA, pp.3-4; 
http://www.lse.ac.uk/collections/humanRights/articlesAndTranscripts/Westminster_explained.pdf. 
226  The role played by the Ministry of Justice to ensure correct application of the HRA and improve 
public confidence in it is set out in Equality and Human Rights Commission (2008), Human rights 
in Britain since the Human Rights Act 1998: a critical review, forthcoming, pp.18-20. In its 
unpublished submission to this project, the Ministry of Justice sets out its view of the 
Government’s role in relation to promoting human rights. It notes that: “The Human Rights Act is 
not a form of regulation that is enforced by the Government. Instead, each person subject to the 
Act is responsible in their own right as a public authority for their compliance with the Act, and is 
susceptible to challenge before the courts. It is therefore for each public authority to ensure the 
compliance of their own actions and policies with the Act, rather than for Government to issue 
directions and intervene if they are not observed.”  
levers for promoting the implications of human rights case law to public authorities, 
which we show here as a cycle.  
 
 
 
Our interviews suggest the potential for national leadership to promote the 
principles of human rights case law – in particular from central government policy 
departments and national associations such as ADASS, together with the Equality 
and Human Rights Commission. One professional practice officer in the Chartered 
Institute of Housing noted that: 
Where cases have an impact it’s because they have this joint momentum 
behind them … Housing managers may still hear of a case ... but it’s 
unlikely to have the same impact unless there is a joint partnership to get 
the message out. 
Our interviewee in the College of Occupational Therapists (COT) offered the 
“spectacular” roll out of the Mental Capacity Act as a model for how to get a co-
ordinated message across to those delivering public services. It is worth noting, 
however, that while legislative changes are planned, public authorities’ responses to 
legal cases are invariably reactive. This can create a tendency to “bolt on” the 
response, rather than assess whether human rights principles might demand a more 
fundamental shift in thinking.  
Promotion via the media, including trade publications, is an effective way to reach 
practitioners, particularly given the patchy institutional application of case law. In 
some instances, interviewees had first encountered a human rights case in the 
media. One service manager said legal officers were more likely to examine policies 
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where a case was seen as a “live issue” posing greater reputational risk for an 
authority. Our findings also suggest the potential to promote human rights principles 
through professional associations and networks, and using new technology such as 
online forums. The engagement of those who can act as “multipliers” is critical (such 
as manual handling co-ordinators in the case of East Sussex).  
Advocacy - both legal representation and campaigning advocacy – can boost the 
“demand side” in relation to human rights cases. In the case of Bernard, our 
interviews suggest that the £10,000 penalty was not a sufficient incentive for change. 
A greater awareness among service users and advocacy organisations might 
increase the potential leverage of future cases.227  
Effective institutional application involves monitoring, review and “lessons learned” 
mechanisms, dissemination, training and the translation of principles into messages 
that make sense to practitioners’ everyday roles. The evidence we have found 
suggests that these systems vary considerably between authorities and in particular 
that the lessons of case law may not always filter down to those on the frontline. 
Dissemination is likely to be much more effective if the principles are set out in a 
context that is amenable to discussion in team meetings or training sessions and by 
managers who are not specialists.  
Application across sectors: The principles arising from legal cases, and the 
implications for practice, are not always immediately transparent to practitioners and 
are sometimes disputed. This brings us back to the role of national leadership to 
identify and champion key principles and lessons to a wider range of sectors and 
circumstances than might be suggested by the facts of the individual case.   
3.3 Communicating human rights  
Our interviews suggest that, in order to become more embedded in public services, 
human rights principles need to be communicated to professionals within those 
services (the “supply” side) and to those using services and to the wider public (the 
“demand” side). 
Our interviews with those delivering public services suggest several strategies for 
communicating rights in a way which taps into existing organisational cultures. 
In some cases, practitioners are already delivering services in a way which meets 
human rights standards, sometimes whilst under pressure to cut costs. Guidance that 
suggests they can have confidence in their judgments is seen by our interviewees as 
 
227  We heard anecdotally from the College of Occupational Therapists of practitioners feeding 
information to local service user organisations because they considered this the most effective 
route to challenge restrictive practices in their authority. 
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a useful validation. Indicating that changes based on case law can increase 
transparency and increase confidence in a service, particularly if things go wrong, is 
also constructive.     
Our interviews on East Sussex suggest that, where there are rights to be balanced, 
setting out guidance in a way which makes the resolution of competing interests clear 
can help gain consent. Where an absolute right is engaged, and where legal 
obligations are strong because someone is in the state’s care, interviewees 
(especially those new to detention settings) articulated a need to have these 
obligations explained explicitly and in a way that makes sense to their job.    
Where we encountered negative perceptions of human rights, this was in part based 
on a sense of them being burdensome. However, some interviewees working in 
housing and social care emphasised that the time invested in considering every 
aspect of a person’s needs – and involving service users and carers in devising 
solutions – can effect a qualitative change in the relationship between those who use 
and deliver public services.   
Human rights and the HRA are viewed as one among many drivers of policy and 
practice in public authorities. In local government, as one senior interviewee in the 
Improvement and Development Agency put it: 
... equalities is seen as a ‘home’ issue – I don’t think human rights is an 
‘owned’ issue in the same way … It’s not in the DNA. 
This suggests potential to develop integrated equality and human rights approaches 
which build consensus around the HRA as a means to extend existing approaches to 
inequality and set a threshold of treatment to secure dignity and respect for those in 
vulnerable situations. 
Our findings suggest that the effective promotion of “smart compliance” requires a 
pragmatic understanding of the complex legal and policy environment in which new 
principles need to be applied and a readiness to work with the grain of organisational 
cultures that may not readily embrace the language and principles of human rights. 
Equally, we have detected an appetite among some of our interviewees to 
operationalise the lessons of case law based upon a more confident understanding 
of how human rights principles can be applied across public services, thus promoting 
both the transformative and remedial roles the HRA was anticipated as playing a 
decade ago. 
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ANNEX 4 
NATIONALITY, IMMIGRATION AND ASYLUM ACT 2002 SECTION 55 LATE CLAIM 
FOR ASYLUM: REFUSAL OF SUPPORT  
 
(1) The Secretary of State may not provide or arrange for the provision of support to 
a person under a provision mentioned in subsection (2) if -   
(a) the person makes a claim for asylum which is recorded by the Secretary of State, 
and  
(b) the Secretary of State is not satisfied that the claim was made as soon as 
reasonably practicable after the person’s arrival in the United Kingdom.  
(2) The provisions are -  
(a) sections 4, 95 and 98 of the Immigration and Asylum Act 1999 (c. 33) (support for 
asylum-seeker, &c.), and  
(b) sections 17 and 24 of this Act (accommodation centre).  
(3) An authority may not provide or arrange for the provision of support to a person 
under a provision mentioned in subsection (4) if -   
(a) the person has made a claim for asylum, and  
(b) the Secretary of State is not satisfied that the claim was made as soon as 
reasonably practicable after the person’s arrival in the United Kingdom.  
(4) The provisions are -  
(a) section 29(1)(b) of the Housing (Scotland) Act 1987 (c. 26) (accommodation 
pending review),  
(b) section 188(3) or 204(4) of the Housing Act 1996 (c. 52) (accommodation pending 
review or appeal), and  
(c) section 2 of the Local Government Act 2000 (c. 22) (promotion of well-being).  
(5) This section shall not prevent –  
(a) the exercise of a power by the Secretary of State to the extent necessary for the 
purpose of avoiding a breach of a person’s Convention rights (within the meaning of 
the Human Rights Act 1998 (c. 42)),  
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(b) the provision of support under section 95 of the Immigration and Asylum Act 1999 
(c. 33) or section 17 of this Act in accordance with section 122 of that Act (children), 
or  
(c) the provision of support under section 98 of the Immigration and Asylum Act 1999 
or section 24 of this Act (provisional support) to a person under the age of 18 and the 
household of which he forms part.  
(6) An authority which proposes to provide or arrange for the provision of support to a 
person under a provision mentioned in subsection (4) - 
(a) must inform the Secretary of State if the authority believes that the person has 
made a claim for asylum,  
(b) must act in accordance with any guidance issued by the Secretary of State to 
determine whether subsection (3) applies, and  
(c) shall not be prohibited from providing or arranging for the provision of support if 
the authority has complied with paragraph (a) and (b) and concluded that subsection 
(3) does not apply.  
(7) The Secretary of State may by order - 
(a) add, remove or amend an entry in the list in subsection (4);  
(b) provide for subsection (3) not to have effect in specified cases or circumstances.  
(8) An order under subsection (7) - 
(a) may include transitional, consequential or incidental provision,  
(b) must be made by statutory instrument, and  
(c) may not be made unless a draft has been laid before and approved by resolution 
of each House of Parliament.  
(9) For the purposes of this section “claim for asylum” has the same meaning as in 
section 18.  
(10) A decision of the Secretary of State that this section prevents him from providing 
or arranging for the provision of support to a person is not a decision that the person 
does not qualify for support for the purpose of section 103 of the Immigration and 
Asylum Act 1999 (appeals).  
(11) This section does not prevent a person’s compliance with a residence restriction 
imposed in reliance on section 70 (induction).  
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ANNEX 5 
A SAMPLE HUMAN RIGHTS ASSESSMENT FORM FROM XXXX COUNCIL'S 
UNACCOMPANIED ASYLUM SEEKING CHILDREN AND PERSONS FROM 
ABROAD TEAM 
 
Human Rights Assessment 
Kimani v Lambeth LBC [2004] 1 WLR 272, “…that whether or not a refusal to 
support will cause a breach of Convention rights must be assessed with regard to all 
the circumstances, including the position in which the claimant will find themselves if 
they return to the country from which they came.” 
Pretty v UK (2003) 35 EHRR 1, in which the EctHR defined human and 
degrading treatment in the following terms:  “’ill-treatment’ that attains a minimum 
level of severity and involves actual bodily injury or intense physical or mental 
suffering.  Where treatment humiliates or debases an individual showing a lack of 
respect for, or diminishing, his or her human dignity or arouses feelings of fear, 
anguish or inferiority capable of breaking and individual’s moral and physical 
resistance, it may be characterised as degrading and also fall within the prohibition of 
article 3…” 
In R (Q) v SSHD [2003] 3 WLR 365, Subsequently applied to Limbuela – 
Limbuela, Tesema and Adam.  “Putting someone out on the streets will not in itself 
suffice, in the absence of special considerations, such as age, infirmity or other 
special vulnerability.  However, an Article 3 claim could arise subsequently if , for 
example , there is some illness or accident. Which materially affected the individual’s 
ability to fend for himself , or there were a demonstrated inability, over time, to find 
food and other basic amenities…” 
Ullah v Special Adjudicator [2004] UKHL 26.  That is, that a claimant who 
contends that they will suffer a breach of Convention rights if they are removed to 
another jurisdiction must show:  “…a very strong case”, amounting to “strong grounds 
for believing” that the person, if returned, faces a real risk of suffering a “flagrant 
violation” of their Convention rights, that is, that the right in question “would be 
completely denied or nullified in the destination country.” 
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Mrs S 
Person Basic Details 
CF Number; 123456 
DOB: 25-5-1972 
Current Address: XXXX 
Country of Origin: India 
Religion: Hinduism 
Date of Entry to UK: 21-08-2004 
Legal Status: Lawfully present, subject to immigration control 
Current Application: ILR application made under domestic violence concession. 
Date made: 20-07-2006 
Marriage Status: Separated 
Current Basis of Support: Section 21 (1A) of the National Assistance Act 1948 
 
Summary of Background to case 
Mrs S is an Indian woman who came to the UK on a marriage visa on 21-08-2004, 
having been married to her British born husband in India earlier that year.   Her 
religion is Hinduism.  Her first language is Gujarati, although Mrs S speaks and 
understands some English. She is currently in her second trimester of pregnancy. 
Mrs S states that she has been subjected to physical, emotional and financial abuse 
from her husband and his family with whom they lived.  She left her husband and his 
home on 09-07-2006 after he punched her in the face.  Mrs S says she called the 
Police who took her to the police station where she made a statement.  The Police 
subsequently took her to XXXX Royal Infirmary where she was admitted. Mrs S 
subsequently made the decision not to return to her husband.  She was without 
income to support herself and without anywhere to live, and is reported as 
depressed. Her case was referred by hospital ward staff to the Children and 
Maternity Social Work team at XXXX Royal Infirmary. This team arranged for Mrs S 
to be accommodated in a hotel pending further assessment. Her case was 
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subsequently transferred to the Persons from Abroad team for further assessments 
to take place. 
Mrs S’s marriage visa expired on 22-07-06. Assistance was given to her to apply for 
indefinite leave to remain (ILR) under the domestic violence concession. This was 
sent by recorded delivery on 20-07-06. Solicitor DM at Immigration Law Centre is 
now involved, and confirmed it would appear that the application was received in time 
at the Home Office.   
Mrs S was until recently, employed by an agency and was working in a biscuit 
factory.  However, her employers stated that Mrs S had a lot of time off sick, and they 
terminated her employment when her marriage visa expired.  
Mrs S has no income or savings. 
 
Support Networks 
Mrs S’s views of support available 
Mrs S states it is not an option for her to return to India, as she would not receive any 
support there.  She states her family have rejected her, as culturally it is not 
acceptable to them that she has left her husband, in spite of the circumstances 
surrounding this.  Mrs S states that her family in India consists of her mother, three 
brothers and her eldest brother’s wife.  She states that the family live in a very small 
two roomed house, and that whilst she was living there and being supported 
financially by her eldest brother while she was living in India, there was a clear 
expectation in the family that when she married she was leaving the family to be part 
of her husband’s family, and subsequently she cannot return to her family home.  Mrs 
S states her mother told her “you live with your husband, you die with your husband”.  
Mrs S states her mother refused to speak with her when she rang her family home 
recently, and says this was particularly hurtful to her. 
Mrs S states that her father died about five years ago.  The head of the family is now 
her eldest brother Mr B.  Mrs S states she did not work when she was in India, 
except for work experience placements as she studied and obtained academic 
qualifications in accounts and business studies, and vocational qualifications in 
garment making and beauty therapy.  She states that whilst her brother Mr B 
supported her when she was living in India, he earns a low wage as a maintenance 
person, and he could not afford to provide any financial support to her either in this 
country or in India, as he is financially providing support to his wife, and the rest of 
the family also.  
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Mrs S states that she has no one who is able to provide financial support or 
accommodation to her in the UK.  She says the people she knows in the UK are able 
to provide moral and emotional support to her only.  
Mrs S states that she wants to make a home for her and her baby in the UK and to 
be able to support herself when this is viable.  
The following people were contacted with regards to exploration of support to Mrs S : 
Mrs S’s brother Mr B   
Mr B was contacted by telephone.  It was explained that Mrs S was without a home 
and I was contacting him as part of my assessment. He confirmed that culturally it 
was not acceptable to him and the family that Mrs S returns to live in their home after 
a failed marriage.  He advised that he only earns a small wage, which has to support 
his wife and extended family, and therefore cannot offer any financial support to Mrs 
S either in India or in the UK.  I asked whether he knew of anyone else who could 
offer support either in the form of accommodation or financially to Mrs S either in 
India or in the UK.  He said he did not know of anyone else who could offer such 
support. 
Ms J, friend 
Ms J states she does not really know Mrs S all that well, but feels she is able to offer 
her moral and emotional support.  Ms J has been accompanying Mrs S to 
appointments and allowed Mrs S to stay at her house on one occasion after she had 
presented ill at hospital, and it had been recommended that she did not spend the 
night alone.  Ms J says she offered a bed to Mrs S on this occasion on a one off 
emergency basis, but it meant her daughter had to give up her bed to Mrs S for the 
night, and Ms J was clear she couldn’t offer ongoing support with accommodation or 
financial support. I asked Ms J if she knew of anyone else who could offer 
accommodation or financial support to Mrs S.  She stated she did not. 
Contact with Indian Embassy 
A Persons from Abroad team colleague has recently contacted the Indian Embassy 
and spoke with a Mr C, Consular, to check what support would be available to 
someone who was in very similar circumstances to Mrs S.  Mr C was clear that there 
are no provisions available in the UK or in India from the Indian Government in the 
way of shelter or food.  Mr C’s advice for securing support in such circumstances is 
to file a case in court for compensation and maintenance from the husband.  The 
Embassy would not accept getting involved in this. 
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Domestic Abuse 
Mrs S’s views 
Mrs S says she has been left very depressed by the domestic abuse she was 
subjected to by her husband and his family. She states she was subjected to 
physical, emotional, sexual and financial abuse by her husband, and emotional 
abuse by his  
family.  She states her husband threatened the life of her and their baby, and on one 
occasion kicked her in the stomach.  Mrs S states she made the decision to leave her 
husband when he punched her in the face.  She subsequently telephoned the police 
who took her to the police station to make a statement, and then onto hospital.  
Police Feedback 
Mrs S advised me that a PC MW was the investigating officer when she contacted 
the Police after her husband punched her. She was able to give me an incident 
reference number, but did not know if her husband was to be arrested or charged  
with an offence or not. Mrs S’s solicitor DM at the Immigration Law Centre has 
requested police feedback in order to provide supporting evidence for Mrs S’s ILR 
application to the Home Office.  
GP feedback 
Mrs S’s GP Dr P has provided information on Mrs S’s presentation to him, which 
supports her report of domestic abuse. See ‘health needs’ section. 
Hospital feedback 
The referral made by hospital ward staff to this department confirmed police 
involvement with Mrs S and gave details of the crime reference number.  The referral 
also confirmed that Mrs S presented to hospital with facial bruising.  
 
Health Needs 
Mrs S’s views on her health 
Mrs S says she feels very depressed and at times suicidal. However, she says she 
will not give in to such feelings, as she will not put her baby at risk. She says she 
feels at her worst at nighttime when she starts to think about what has happened to 
her. She says this makes her feel very tired the following day and affects her 
functioning ability.  She has been having aches and pains recently which feel to her 
liked pulled muscles.  She has presented to hospital with these pains but was not 
  
133
admitted.  Mrs S says she experiences hay fever sometimes, but apart from this her 
physical health is usually good.  
Dr P, GP Feedback  
Dr P, GP, states that Mrs S has presented to him several times before she left her 
husband feeling very depressed and anxious, which seemed to be precipitated by the 
domestic abuse she was subjected to.  He advised she also presented with bruising 
to her thigh after she claimed her husband threw a hairbrush at her.  He confirmed 
that she remains very distressed and presents with anxiety and depression.  Dr P 
advised that he is unable to prescribe medication to relieve Mrs S’s symptoms 
because of her pregnancy, and has referred her to a counsellor.  Although Mrs S has 
not found this service helpful to her so far, she plans to continue to attend the 
counselling sessions for the time being. 
Dr P states that he has no concerns about Mrs S’s pregnancy or physical health. 
Midwives’ Feedback 
TR, Consultant Midwife at XXXX Royal Infirmary, states she is involved with 
providing follow up care to Mrs S because of concerns raised following Mrs S’s 
emotional presentation at hospital ante natal appointments, as she was mentally very 
agitated and spoke of suicide.  TR states physically there are no concerns with the 
pregnancy, but said Mrs S presents as visibly upset and anxious. 
DL is Mrs S’s community midwife and confirmed that she does not have concerns 
about Mrs S’s physical health or pregnancy, but states that Mrs S continues to be 
very upset by the abuse subjected on her. 
SR Women’s Aid Worker Feedback 
SR states that Mrs S was referred to Women’s Aid as hospital staff felt she needed 
support because of her emotional state.  SR confirms that in her opinion Mrs S is 
socially very isolated and depressed, and states that although she can give her 
emotional and practical support in terms of accompanying her to appointments and 
making telephone calls on her behalf, she feels that Mrs S needs counselling to help 
her come to terms with her situation. 
Presentation 
Mrs S presents as very tearful at times particularly when talking about her past 
experiences, and her family’s rejection of her.  She also presents as very anxious 
about most aspects of her life, and has evidenced this in telephone calls to myself 
where she shared her concerns about her visa and employment termination.  During 
a recent visit she had been followed by her husband from the bus station to XXXX 
(witnessed by SR, Women’s Aid Worker).  Mrs S was clearly very distressed by the 
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incident, and took a long time to recover before she felt able to leave the building.  
This incident appears to clearly have knocked her confidence also. Mrs S also 
appears very fatigued whenever I have seen her, and low in mood.  She has shared 
her past thoughts of suicide with me, but also is clear that she will not act positively 
on these feelings because of her baby.   
Evaluation 
Mrs S originally came to the UK on a marriage visa. She has been subjected to 
physical, emotional, financial, and sexual abuse throughout her marriage.  She left 
her husband after he assaulted her on 09-07-2006.  She had contacted the police 
who subsequently took her to hospital.   
Mrs S’s visa expired on 22-07-06, and she submitted an in time application to the 
Home Office for ILR under the domestic violence concession.   
Mrs S is in her second trimester of pregnancy.  She has been experiencing some 
aches and pains.  However, she has presented at hospital with these and hospital 
staff have not felt a need to admit her.  There are no concerns about Mrs S’s physical 
health, but the professionals involved in her care confirm that she is experiencing 
anxiety and depression at present. She has also expressed suicidal thoughts in the 
recent past, and is currently receiving counselling for her mental health.  Her mental 
state appears to be reactive to her situation and the abuse she has experienced.   
Mrs S has no income or savings, and has no recourse to public funds under the 
terms of her visa. All possible options of support have been pursued on Mrs S’s 
behalf, and it would seem her family have turned their backs on her, as it is not 
acceptable to them culturally for Mrs S to have left her husband.  Her brother who is 
head of the family states that it is not possible for him to financially support her or 
offer her accommodation, and says he does not know of anyone else who could 
provide such support.  There does not appear to be anything in India in the way of 
governmental or charitable support that could provide for Mrs S and her baby, when 
it is born. Mrs S has a friend in the UK who is able to offer moral support, but cannot 
offer financial support or accommodation.  
Whilst Mrs S has a right to work, and indeed has worked in the past, she is not well 
enough to work at the moment, her mental state and stage of pregnancy leaving her 
very fatigued.  Her stage of pregnancy will also affect her employability.  When Mrs S 
has her baby, her chances of finding work, which will also offer child care or pay 
enough to employ child care services, are likely to be slim.   
Mrs S appears mentally quite fragile and requires a lot of emotional support, as her 
coping mechanisms are limited.  Based on the information gathered in the course of 
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the community care and human rights assessments, the reality is that Mrs S, (and 
her baby when it is born), would experience inhumane and degrading treatment if 
they were to return to India, as they would not have access to any support, and 
would be without automatic access to food or shelter.  Indeed, the situation would be 
the same in the UK as Mrs S has no means of informal support or recourse to public 
funds in this country either, and if it were not for the current level of support given to 
her, she would be without food and shelter and at risk of nutritional neglect.  This 
would put Mrs S’s health at risk of further deterioration, and her pregnancy would be 
put at risk.  I therefore feel Mrs S’s basic human rights under Article 3 of the Human 
Rights Act 1998 would be violated if support with shelter and food and other basic 
essentials were withdrawn from her. 
 
Conclusion and Recommendation 
I recommend that the Department continues to support Mrs S under Section 21 (1A) 
of the National Assistance Act 1948 on the basis that at this time, Mrs S is physically 
and emotionally vulnerable due to her pregnancy, the effects of the domestic abuse 
she experienced, and that she is destitute without means to support herself in the UK 
or secure travel back to India.   
This assessment will need to be reviewed on a three monthly basis, and re-evaluated 
by reference to a number of factors, including the progress of her domestic violence 
concession application and any adjudicator’s decision in respect of this, by Mrs S’s 
ability and willingness to continue to pursue other avenues of support for herself 
including a legal right to seek support from her husband, and a re-assessment of her 
fitness to travel to India after the birth of her baby, and any risks she may be exposed 
if she were to return to India following this. 
 
 
21-08-2006  
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ANNEX 6 
ANONYMISED LIST OF PARTICIPANTS 
Limbuela 
National level officer UK Border Agency 
Manager for asylum and persons from 
abroad; Strategic director, social care and 
health (2) 
English metropolitan authority 
 
Manager, Unaccompanied Asylum 
Seeking Children and Persons from 
Abroad team 
English city council 
Manager, adult social care Outer London borough 
No Recourse to Public Funds team: head 
of refugee and migrant service; team 
manager and 2 x caseworkers (4) 
Inner London borough 
Policy officer Regional multi-agency Strategic 
Migration Partnership  
Project worker British Red Cross 
National officer Welsh Refugee Council 
Policy officer Refugee Council  
Legal advisor Asylum Support Appeals Project 
Solicitor Shelter 
 
East Sussex 
Manual handling advisor NHS Foundation Trust 
Manual handling co-ordinator English city council 
Director of housing and social care, 
manager of adult social care, manual 
handling co-ordinator and 7 x occupational 
therapists (10) 
Outer London borough 
Strategic director, social care and health English metropolitan authority 
Manual handling co-ordinator Welsh county borough council 
Disability services manager, deputy 
director of social services (2) 
English city council 
Director of housing and social care Welsh county borough council 
National officer Radar 
National officer National Centre for Independent Living 
National officer PMLD Network/Mencap 
National officer National Care Homes Association 
National officer College of Occupational Therapists 
Independent advisor to public authorities 
and care providers on manual handling 
and social care law   
 
Independent advisor on manual handling  
Lecturer, nursing (and Royal College of 
Nursing safety rep) 
University of Northumbria 
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Bernard 
Senior housing officer (and background 
conversation with former housing 
manager) (2) 
LB Enfield 
Disability services manager; deputy 
director of social services (2) 
English city council 
Director of housing and social care; 
housing manager; social services 
manager (3) 
Outer London borough 
Strategic director, social care and health English metropolitan authority 
Housing advisor  English district council 
Director of housing and social care Welsh county borough council 
Disability housing advisor Habinteg housing association 
National officers (2) Chartered Institute of Housing  
Policy officer  Housing Corporation 
Policy officer Local Government Association  
Solicitor Shelter  
 
Osman, Detainees, Price 
Coroners (2) 2 English cities 
Police officers – various ranks (9) 5 forces 
Prison health managers (3) 3 PCTs 
Prison health practitioners (5) 5 prison clusters 
Prison health adviser London PCT  
Regional prison health adviser Health and Social Care in Criminal 
Justice 
Government prison policy advisers (2) Central government 
Prison health policy advisers (2) Central government  
Prisons and Probation Ombudsman - 
Independent prison monitor  Independent Monitoring Board 
Senior director NOMS 
Prison training director Newbold Revel Prison Service College 
Professor of Prison Studies London university 
Director Prison NGO 
Analyst/researcher Prison NGO 
 
ANNEX 7 
EXAMPLE OF AN ‘OSMAN WARNING’ 
 
         Northamptonshire Police 
      Notice of Threat to Personal Safety 
 
Mr/Mrs/Miss 
I am in receipt of the following information, which suggests that your personal safety 
is now in danger. 
I stress that I will not under any circumstances disclose to you the identity of the 
source of this information and whilst I cannot comment on the reliability or otherwise 
of the source or the content of this information, I have no reason to disbelieve the 
account as provided. 
Insert here details of the threat 
Although Northamptonshire Police will take what steps it can to minimise the risk, the 
Police cannot protect you from this threat on a day-by-day, hour-by-hour basis. 
I also stress that the passing of this information by me in no way authorises you to 
take any action which would place you in contravention of the law (e.g. carrying 
weapons for defence, assault on others, breaches of public order) and should you be 
found to be so committing you will be dealt with accordingly. 
I therefore suggest that you take such remedial action as you see fit to increase your 
own safety measures e.g. house burglar alarms, change of daily routines, always 
walk with an associate, carry a mobile phone, install a domestic CCTV door guard 
system, increase house security measures e.g. locks and bolts. It may even be that 
you decide that it is more appropriate for you to leave the area for the foreseeable 
future. That is a matter for you to decide. 
If you wish to provide me with full details of the address at which you will be resident I 
will ensure that the necessary surveys can be undertaken by police staff to advise 
you regarding the above safety measures. 
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I would also ask that you contact the Police regarding any suspicions incidents 
associated with this threat. 
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I ……………….acknowledge that at ...........hours on .......................2008, the above 
notice was read out to me 
by ................................... of the Northamptonshire Police. 
 
Signed ...............................................  
Date of Birth ..................................... 
Address ............................................................................................................. 
........................................................................................................................... 
........................................................................................................................... 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 
 
Signed by Officer reading notice to 
........................................................Time/Date............... 
 
Signed by Officer witnessing reading 
........................................................Time/Date................ 
 
 
ANNEX 8 
GLOSSARY 
ACCT    Assessment, Care in Custody & Teamwork 
ACPO    Association of Chief Police Officers 
ADASS   Association of Directors of Adult Social Services 
ASAP    Asylum Support Appeals Project 
CIH    Chartered Institute of Housing 
CLG    Communities and Local Government 
COT    College of Occupational Therapists 
DDA    Discrimination and Disability Act (2005) 
DRC    Disability Rights Commission 
ECHR    European Convention on Human Rights 
ECtHR   European Court of Human Rights 
ESCC    East Sussex County Council 
HMIC    Her Majesty’s Inspectorate of Constabulary 
HMIP    Her Majesty’s Inspectorate of Prisons 
HMP    Her Majesty’s Prison 
HRA    Human Rights Act (1998) 
HSE    Health and Safety Executive 
IAP    Inter-Agency Partnership 
IPCC    Independent Police Complaints Commission 
JCHR    Joint Committee on Human Rights 
LB    London Borough 
LGA    Local Government Association 
LGO    Local Government Ombudsman 
MOJ    Ministry of Justice 
NASS    National Asylum Support Service 
NHS    National Health Service 
NIA Act   Nationality, Immigration & Asylum Act (2002) 
NOMS   National Offender Management Service 
NPIA    National Policing Improvement Agency 
NRPF    No Recourse to Public Funds 
PACE    Police and Criminal Evidence Codes of Practice 
PCT    Primary Care Trust 
PER    Prisoner Escort Records 
PPO    Prison and Probation Ombudsman 
PSI    Prison Service Instruction 
PSO    Prison Service Order 
RCN    Royal College of Nursing 
UKBA    United Kingdom Border Agency 
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ANNEX 9 
BRIEFING FOR INTERVIEWEES 
 
Research project for the Equality and Human Rights Commission (EHRC): 
Evaluating the impact of selected cases under the Human Rights Act on  
public service provision 
 
Thank you for participating in this project which is being conducted by Professor 
Philip Leach of the Human Rights and Social Justice Research Institute at London 
Metropolitan University and Alice Donald, Elizabeth Mottershaw and Jenny Watson 
of Global Partners and Associates. 
1. Aims of the project  
This project is part of the EHRC’s ongoing independent inquiry into human rights in 
Britain (launched in April 2008).  The project will:  
explore the impact of a number of strategic legal cases brought under the Human 
Rights Act (or the European Convention on Human Rights) on a range of public 
authorities; 
− explore with service providers from different sectors whether and how the 
principles established in these cases have been incorporated into policy 
and practice; 
− explore the positive impact within these sectors of implementing human 
rights principles; 
− identify the barriers that prevent or obstruct the use of human rights 
principles in these sectors. 
2. Interviews   
We are conducting semi-structured interviews with key stakeholders who have 
particular experience and expertise in the implementation of human rights standards 
in Britain and whose organisations have a role to play in the creation of a human 
rights culture.  The general questions we will explore are: 
a. What are the mechanisms for monitoring case law and disseminating 
guidance on the principles and implications of case law that you are 
aware of – and, in your view, how effective are they?   
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b. If you are working in a public authority, are you able to access guidance 
about the lessons of case law that makes sense for the work you do?   
c. In your experience, do mechanisms exist for the key principles of case 
law to be incorporated effectively into policy and practice? If so, how does 
this happen (e.g. through training, written guidance, policy reviews, top-
down briefings)?  
d. In your organisation or sector, can you point to any aspect of everyday 
practice which you think has changed because lessons have been learnt 
from human rights cases? 
e. What are the barriers to implementing the lessons of human rights cases 
and how do you think they could be tackled?    
f. In your experience, are there positive benefits within your sector or 
organisation that can be identified as having flowed directly from the 
implementation of HRA case law? 
g. What factors, from your experience, make the difference between “risk 
proofing” in response to legal judgments and cases being seen as a 
positive way of achieving better outcomes for staff and service users?     
h. In general, do you see human rights law as imposing lines that cannot be 
crossed or as a (potential) driver of good practice? Put another way, does 
it make you think “what can’t I do?” or “what should I do?”   
3. Selected cases 
We have chosen a number of cases which have significant implications for policy and 
practice in a range of public authorities. As a means of focusing the general 
questions above, we would like to explore with you, as appropriate to your sector and 
your own experience, the impact of one or more of the following. We stress that we 
are focusing on the general principles raised by these cases and their lessons for 
policy and practice, rather than a detailed consideration of the legal judgments.  
Cases involving Article 2: right to life 
Cases illustrating key principles concerning the circumstances in which preventative 
measures should be taken in order to avert a risk to life; the nature of such 
measures, and the holding of effective investigations where there has been loss of 
life. 
Osman v UK, No. 23452/94, Judgment of 28 October 1998 / Osman v UK (2000) 29 
EHRR 245 
Keenan v UK (2001) 33 EHRR 38 
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R (on the application of Wright) v S/S for the Home Department [2001] 1 Lloyd’s Rep 
Med 478 
Edwards v UK (2002) 35 EHRR 19 
R (on the application of Amin) v S/S for the Home Department [2004] 1 AC 653; 
[2001] EWHC Admin 520; 2001 WL 606447 
R (on the application of Middleton) v Coroner for the Western District of Somerset 
[2004] 2 AC 182  
 
The Limbuela case 
This case concerned a group of asylum seekers and established that where inhuman 
or degrading treatment or punishment results from acts or omissions for which the 
state is directly responsible, there is an absolute obligation on states to refrain from 
such conduct.  In addition, it established that treatment was inhuman or degrading if, 
to a seriously detrimental extent, it denied the most basic needs of any human being. 
The test for whether the margin was crossed was whether the treatment to which the 
asylum seeker was being subjected by the entire package of restrictions and 
deprivations that surrounded him was so severe that it could properly be described 
as inhuman or degrading treatment within the meaning of Article 3. 
R [Limbuela and Ors] v Secretary of State for the Home Department [2005] UKHL 66, 
3 November 2005 
Cases involving principles relating to balancing rights and the application of 
blanket policies 
The “East Sussex manual handling case” concerned the family of two adult sisters 
with profound physical and learning disabilities who challenged the council’s blanket 
application of a policy prohibiting manual handling by care workers. In the “prison 
baby case” the court held that a policy of only allowing babies to remain with their 
mothers in prison until they were 18 months old had to be applied flexibly, bearing in 
mind the individual circumstances. These cases enshrine principles involving the 
application of a blanket policy or the rigid application of a policy without consideration 
of individual circumstances, as well as the way in which the HRA provides a 
framework for balancing competing rights. 
R v East Sussex County Council Ex parte A, B, X and Y [2003] EWHC 167 
R [on the application of P and Q] v S/S for the Home Department [2001] EWCA Civ 
1151 
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Cases involving positive obligations relating to disability and Articles 3 & 8:  
In Bernard v Enfield a disabled woman was knowingly placed in unsuitable council 
accommodation, in breach of her Article 8 right to a private and family life. In Price v 
UK a disabled woman was detained in a cell not adapted to her needs, amounting to 
inhuman or degrading treatment under Article 3. These cases both relate to the 
principle of positive obligations in relation to disability – that is, the proactive steps 
that public authorities must take to protect and promote the rights of disabled people. 
Bernard v Enfield also established the need to provide a service free from 
unnecessary delay for service users who need particular assistance.  
Bernard v Enfield LBC [2003] HRLR 4 
Price v UK [2001] 34 EHRR 128 
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ANNEX 10 
HUMAN RIGHTS SURVEY - THE OSMAN CASE 
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ANNEX 11 
HUMAN RIGHTS SURVEY – LEGAL DIRECTORS  
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www.equalityhumanrights.com
